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Earlier, we had presented [3] heuristic arguments to show that a natural unification of the ideas of
the quantum theory and those underlying the general principle of relativity is achievable by way of
the measure theory and the theory of dynamical systems. Here, in Part I, we provide the complete
physical foundations for this, to be called, the Universal Theory of Relativity. Newton’s theory and
the special theory of relativity arise, situationally, in this Universal Relativity. Explanations of
quantum indeterminacy are also shown to arise in it. Part II provides its mathematical foundations.
One experimental test is also discussed before concluding remarks.
To be submitted to:
The organization of this paper is such that phys-
ical foundations of the proposed Universal Theory
of Relativity are to be found in § I, its mathemat-
ical foundations in § II, one experimental test in
§ III and concluding remarks in § IV.
In § I A, we discuss the general background for
the present considerations. It should help distin-
guish the proposed Universal Theory of Relativity
from various other theories, including, Quantum
Geometry [1] and String Theory [2].
In § I B, we discuss the physical basis of some of
the newtonian concepts, in particular, inertia and
force. In this discussion, we mainly stress that the
Galilean concept of the inertia of a material body
is, undoubtedly, more fundamental, more general,
than the newtonian concept of force. Therefore,
we may expect the concept of inertia to necessarily
find a place in any future physical theory, but not
the concept of force.
Newton’s theory does not explain the origin of
either the inertia or the electric charge of material
bodies. For any theory that attempts to explain
the origin of inertia and the electric charge, it then
becomes necessary to replace the newtonian con-
cept of force with some suitable other. The con-
cept of the material body as a source of force is,
consequently, to be completely abandoned in any
such theoretical framework. Decisively, this must,
simultaneously, hold for all the forces that need to
be postulated to describe the motions of material
bodies in Newton’s and other theories.
In other words, it is decisive to recognize that
the mathematical framework of any theory which
“explains” origins of newtonian source properties
of the physical matter must, necessarily, be also
applicable, simultaneously, to all the “fundamen-
tal” forces that are needed in Newton’s and other
theories to describe the motions of material bodies.
This is [3] the key to the “new” theory.
Clearly, a formulation that replaces the concept
of only a single source property of material bodies
cannot then be physically satisfactory as well as
conceptually consistent.
In this section, we then stress the importance of
the physical construction of the reference frames
or the coordinate systems. We also stress that the
motions of material bodies must, in general, affect
the constructions of coordinate frames.
In § I C, we then discuss the status of the gen-
eral principle of relativity. This important princi-
ple states that the laws of physics must be appli-
cable to all the frames of reference. Consequently,
the universal theory of relativity, a theory consis-
tent with the general principle of relativity, will
necessarily have to incorporate the physical con-
struction of the coordinate systems.
In the context of this above discussion, we also
consider Einstein’s equivalence principle and stress
that the equivalence principle essentially estab-
lishes only the consistency of the phenomenon of
gravitation with the general principle of relativ-
ity. It then needs to be emphasized here that the
equivalence principle is not logically equivalent to
the general principle of relativity.
In section § I D, we discuss various general ex-
pectations from a theory consistent with the gen-
eral principle of relativity. This section essentially
sets the conceptual background for the sections to
follow. But, a reader is requested to go through
even the earlier sections.
Then, in § I E, we consider quantum aspects [4]
vis-a´-vis the general principle of relativity and the
requirements of the mathematical formalism im-
plied by such considerations.
In § II, we provide the mathematical founda-
tions for the proposed unified theory. Specifically,
methods of measure theory and dynamical systems
are reviewed in this section.
2Then, in § III, we analyze a torsion balance ex-
periment. Any theory using the concept of force al-
ways predicts a non-null effect for this experiment.
However, a “null effect” is also obtainable in the
Universal Theory of Relativity apart from possible
non-null effects (of the theories using the concept
of force). We therefore suggest that the existence
of such anomalous null-results be searched for in
torsion balance experiments, preferably involving
dynamic measurements.
[Such anomalous null results will be some of the
main features of the proposed Universal Theory of
Relativity. This is because a transformation of the
underlying space providing null result for any given
experimental situation is, thinkably, permissible.
But, physical space of Universal Relativity changes
with changes in matter. Care is therefore needed
in establishing null-results.]
Finally, § IV, contains some concluding remarks
about the proposed theory.
I. PHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. General Background
For the sake of completeness, we recall here the
discussion from [3]. Its purpose here is to contrast
the present approach with some other approaches
[1, 2] to the unification of the ideas of the quantum
theory and Einstein’s general relativity.
In an essence, Newton’s deliberations define [5]
specific mathematical structures or fields (scalar,
vector, tensor functions) over the metrically flat
3-continuum and consider the laws of their trans-
formations. The 3-continuum admits the same Eu-
clidean metric structure before and after the coor-
dinate transformations. The ever-flat 3-continuum
is, in this sense, an absolute space and, in New-
ton’s theory, accelerations of material bodies can
refer only to this absolute space.
Furthermore, in Newton’s theory, physical laws
for these quantities are the mathematical state-
ments form-invariant under the galilean coordinate
transformations which are basic to the newtonian
formulation of mechanics.
Mathematical methods [6] for these newtonian
fields are, evidently, required to be consistent with
the underlying flat 3-continuum admitting the
same metric structure before and after the trans-
formations of these fields. This is, truly, the sense
of any theory being newtonian.
Then, the galilean transformations under which
the newtonian laws are form-invariant are, as op-
posed to general, specific transformations of the
coordinates of the continuum R3.
Newton’s theory also attaches physical meaning
to the space coordinates and to the time coordi-
nate. In this theory, the space coordinate describes
the “physical distance” separating physical bodies
and the time coordinate describes the reading of a
“physical” clock. Euclidean space is then also the
physical space of Newton’s theory.
In addition, the (newtonian) temporal coordi-
nate has universally the same value for all the spa-
tial locations, ie, all synchronized clocks at differ-
ent spatial locations show and maintain the same
time. In other words, the newtonian time coordi-
nate is the absolute physical time.
Basically, Newton’s theory imagines a material
body as a point-mass endowed with the inertia of
that material body. It is a primary physical con-
ception of this theory. Necessarily, a point-mass
moves along a one-dimensional curve of the un-
changing Euclidean 3-continuum.
In physical associations of Newton’s theory, it
is then tacitly assumed that the interaction of a
measuring instrument (observer) and the object (a
particle whose physical parameters are being mea-
sured) is negligibly small or that the effects of this
interaction can be eliminated from the results of
observations to obtain, as accurately as desired,
the values of these parameters [7].
An issue closely related to the above one is that
of the causality. Given initial data, Newton’s the-
ory predicts the values of its variables of the point-
mass exactly and, hence, assumes strictly causal
development of its physical world.
Conceptually, in Newton’s theory, force is the
cause behind motions of material bodies. Next to
inertia, force is the second most important of the
conceptions of Newton’s theory.
Furthermore, as Lorentz had first realized very
clearly, the sources of the newtonian forces are
the singularities of the corresponding fields defined
on the flat 3-continuum. Although unsatisfactory,
this nature of the newtonian framework causes no
problems of mathematical nature since this distinc-
tion is maintainable within the formalism, ie, well-
defined mathematical procedures for handling this
distinction are possible.
Here, one could imagine bodies of vanishing in-
ertia moving with the same speed relative to all
the inertial observers. But, acceleration (relative
to absolute space) in Newton’s second law of mo-
tion has no meaning for vanishing inertia. This
inability is a certain indication of the limitations
of Newton’s theoretical framework.
Then, if a zero rest-mass object were to exist in
reality, and nothing in Newton’s theory prevents
this, it is clear that we need to “extend” various
newtonian conceptions. Only experiments can tell
us about the existence of such bodies.
3Now, light displays phenomena such as diffrac-
tion, interference, polarization etc. But, as is well
known, Newton’s corpuscular theory needs unnat-
ural, non-universal, inter-particle forces to explain
these phenomena. That light displays phenomena
needing unnatural explanations in Newton’s the-
ory could, with hindsight, then be interpreted [8]
to mean that light needs to be treated as a zero
rest-mass particle. Then, the speed of Light is the
same for all the inertial observers.
Revisions of newtonian concepts were necessary
by the beginning of the 20th century. Firstly, ef-
forts to reconcile some experimental results with
newtonian concepts failed and associated as well
as independent conceptions led Einstein to Spe-
cial Theory of Relativity [9]. Secondly, other ex-
periments related to the wave-particle duality, of
radiation and matter, both, ultimately led to non-
relativistic quantum theory [4].
The methods of Non-Relativistic Quantum Field
Theory [10] are also similar of nature to the above
newtonian methods in that these consider quantum
fields definable on the metrically flat 3-continuum.
For these fields of quantum character, we are of
course required to modify the newtonian mathe-
matical methods. The Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg for-
malism achieves precisely this.
Quantum considerations only change the nature
of the mathematical (field) structure definable on
the underlying metrically flat 3-continuum. That
is, differences in the newtonian and the quantum
fields are mathematically entirely describable as
such. But, the metrically flat 3-continuum is also,
in the above sense, an absolute space in these non-
relativistic quantum considerations.
Now, importantly, the “newtonian source prop-
erties” of physical matter are differently treated in
the non-relativistic quantum field theory than in
Newton’s theory. The mass and the electric charge
of a physical body appear as pure numbers, to be
prescribed by hand for a point of the metrically flat
3-continuum, in Schro¨dinger’s equation or, equiv-
alently, in Heisenberg’s operators.
Quantum theory then provides the probability of
the location of the mass and the charge values in
certain specific region of the underlying metrically
flat 3-continuum. The mathematical formalism of
the quantum theory provides only probability and
it is basically a set of mathematical rules to calcu-
late the probability of a physical event.
However, certain physical variables of the new-
tonian mass-point acquire discrete values in the
mathematical formalism of the quantum theory.
This discreteness of certain variables is the gen-
uine characteristic of the quantum theory and is a
significant departure from their continuous values
in Newton’s theory.
This quantum theory is fundamentally a theory
that divides the physical world into two parts, a
part that is a system being observed and a part
that does the observation. Therefore, quantum
theory always refers to an observer who is external
to the system under observation. The results of
the observation, of course, depend in detail on just
how this division is made.
But, it must be recognized that classical con-
cepts are not completely expelled from the physi-
cal considerations in the quantum theory. On the
contrary, in Bohr’s words [11]:
♠ ... it is decisive to recognize that, however
far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical
physical explanation, the account of all evidence
must be expressed in classical terms. ♠
This applies in spite of the fact that classical (new-
tonian) mechanics does not account for the obser-
vations of the microphysical world. (Bohr offered
“complementarity of (classical) concepts” as an ex-
planation for this.)
We also note that it is not possible to treat zero
rest mass particles in the non-relativistic quantum
theory. As is well known [10], Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion or Heisenberg’s operators of this theory are
meaningful only when mass of the considered parti-
cle is non-vanishing. Essentially, it is the same lim-
itation as that of Newton’s theory. Non-relativistic
quantum field theory cannot then describe the phe-
nomena displayed by light.
But, in these non-relativistic quantum consid-
erations, a physical body is described as a non-
singular point-particle, not as an extended object.
That is, mass and electric charge appearing herein
are non-singularly defined only for a point of the
metrically always-flat 3-continuum.
Now, special relativity [12] implies that the par-
ticle of electromagnetic radiation has zero rest-
mass - follows from the mass-variation with veloc-
ity. Special relativity enlarges the galilean group of
transformations of the metrically flat 3-continuum
and time to the Lorentz group of transforma-
tions of the metrically flat 3-continuum and time,
also treatable as a metrically flat 4-dimensional
Minkowski-continuum [56].
Lorentz transformations keep Minkowski metric
the same. Then, special relativistic laws for elec-
tromagnetic fields (mathematical structures on the
metrically flat 4-continuum), Maxwell’s equations,
are mathematical statements form-invariant under
Lorentz transformations.
Then, “special relativistic laws of motion” exist
for the sources and Maxwell’s equations exist for
the fields. So long as we treat the sources and the
fields separately, mathematical problems do not
arise since well-defined mathematical procedures
exist to handle these concepts.
4Standard mathematical methods then permit
us again considerations of classical fields on the
Minkowski-continuum [6]. The “newtonian” math-
ematical methods hold also for them, now in 4-
dimensions, and are consistent with the fact that
the flat 4-continuum admits the same metric struc-
ture before and after the Lorentz transformations
of these fields. This is, now, the sense of any theory
being classical. The Minkowski-spacetime is then
an absolute 4-space.
To describe motions of zero rest mass particles,
we ascribe vanishing rest mass to a point of the
space. A point of the space then has m = 0 when
E = ± p and such a point necessarily moves with
the speed of light.
Notably, Lorentz transformations under which
special relativistic laws are form-invariant are spe-
cific coordinate transformations.
Further, since the involved transformations are
very different than those of Newton’s theory, con-
cepts of a measuring rod and a clock are subject
to critical examination and it then becomes clear
that the ordinary newtonian these concepts involve
the tacit assumption that there exist, in principle,
signals that are propagated with an infinite speed.
Then, as was shown by Einstein [13], the absolute
character of time is lost completely: initially syn-
chronized clocks at different spatial locations do
not keep the same time-value.
However, like with Newton’s theory, coordinates
have a direct physical meaning in special theory
of relativity. Although it is the same association
of physical character, the Lorentz transformations
constitute significant departure from the newto-
nian concepts since time is no longer the absolute
time in special relativity.
But, classical considerations of special relativity,
like with Newton’s theory, assume exact measura-
bility as well as strict causality.
Now, quantum fields require suitable equations
that are form-invariant under Lorentz transforma-
tions to describe quanta moving close to the speed
of light in vacuum. These quantum fields are,
once again, suitable mathematical structures de-
finable on the metrically ever-flat 4-dimensional
(Minkowski) spacetime.
Methods of the special relativistic quantum field
theory [14] then handle such quantum fields de-
fined on the metrically ever-flat 4-continuum ad-
mitting a Minkowskian metric. Next, the quantum
mathematical methods are appropriate generaliza-
tions of the mathematical methods of Schro¨dinger-
Heisenberg formalism. This, the Dirac-Schwinger-
Tomonaga formalism [14], achieves for the metri-
cally flat minkowskian 4-continuum that which the
Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg formalism achieves for the
newtonian 3-space and time.
Then, the differences in the (special-relativistic)
classical and quantum fields are mathematically
entirely describable as such. Non-relativistic re-
sults are recoverable when the velocities are small
compared to the speed of light.
However, the underlying Minkowski spacetime
does not change under the (Lorentz) transfor-
mations keeping the quantum equations form-
invariant and is also, in the earlier sense, an ab-
solute 4-space here.
Likewise with non-relativistic theory, a body is
represented in these special relativistic quantum
considerations by ascribing in non-singular sense
the mass and the charge as pure numbers to points
of the ever-flat Minkowski 4-continuum in the cor-
responding operators.
This special relativistic quantum field theory
then provides us the probability of the spatial lo-
cation and the temporal instant of the mass and
the charge values in a region of the Minkowski 4-
continuum, for all velocities limited by the speed
of light in vacuum.
Other massless particles, eg, neutrinos, are also
allowed in the special relativistic quantum field
theory due to the group enlargement from that of
the galilean group to the Lorentz group of trans-
formations. This group enlargement permits form-
invariant Dirac equation [14] and also the theory
of massive spin 12 fermions.
But, there is no possibility of explaining the ori-
gin of “mass” as well as of “charge” in, quantum or
not, special relativistic theories. It is only after we
have specified the values of mass and charge for a
source particle that we can obtain, from the math-
ematical formalisms of these theories, its further
dynamics based on the given (appropriate) initial
data. Hence, the values of mass and charge are not
obtainable in these theories.
Clearly, the newtonian and the special relativis-
tic frameworks, both, are not sufficiently general
to form the basis for the entire physics. Therefore,
some new developments are needed to account for
the “origins” of inertia and electric charge. We
recall here that these are the physical properties
by which we “identify” or “characterize individual
material or physical bodies.
Next, Lorentz had recognized [15] (p. 155) the
notion of the inertia of the electromagnetic field.
He then had a clear conception that inertia (oppo-
sition of a physical body to a change in its state of
motion) could possess origin in the field concep-
tion. Just as a person in a moving crowd experi-
ences opposition to a change in motion, a parti-
cle (region of concentrated field) moving in a sur-
rounding field experiences opposition to a change
in its state of motion. This is Lorentz’s conception
of the field-origin of inertia.
5Now, firstly, the distinction between the source
and the field must necessarily be obliterated in any
formulation of this conception. In other words, a
field is the only basic concept and a particle is a
derived concept here. Secondly, the mathematical
formulation of this conception is also required to
be intrinsically nonlinear.
Solutions of linear equations obey superposition
principle, and required number of solutions can be
superposed to obtain the solution for any assumed
field configuration. But, sources generating the as-
sumed field configuration continue to be the singu-
larities of the field. Hence, the distinction between
source and field cannot be obliterated.
Solutions of some (non-linear) field equations
would not obey the superposition principle. Then,
one could hope that non-singular solutions of non-
linear equations for the field would permit appro-
priate treatment of sources as singularity-free re-
gions of concentrated field energy.
An important question is now that of the ap-
propriate (non-linear) field equations, of obtain-
ing these equations without venturing into mean-
ingless arbitrariness. In fact, this question is of
some appropriate non-linear mathematical formal-
ism that need not even possess the character of
non-linear (partial) differential equations for the
field as a mathematical structure on the underly-
ing continuum. (It is also the issue of whether the
most fundamental formalism of physics could have
a mathematical structure other than that of the
(partial) differential equations.)
Historically, the very difficult and lengthy path
to appropriate non-linear equations was developed
by Einstein alone.
The pivotal point of Einstein’s formulation of
the relevant ideas is the equivalence of inertial and
gravitational mass of a physical body, a fact known
since Newton’s times but which remained only an
assumption of Newton’s theory.
The above equivalence principle implies that the
Lorentz transformations are not sufficient to incor-
porate the explanation of this equivalence of iner-
tial and gravitational mass of a material body. It
then follows that general transformations of coor-
dinates are required and the physical basis is that
of the general principle of relativity.
On the basis of the equivalence principle, Ein-
stein then provided us the “curved 4-geometry” as
a “physically realizable” entity.
To arrive at his formulation of general relativity,
Einstein raised [16] (p. 69) the following questions:
♠ Of which mathematical type are the variables
(functions of the coordinates) which permit the
expression of the physical properties of the space
(“structure”)? Only after that: Which equations
are satisfied by those variables? ♠
He then proceeded to develop this theory in two
stages, namely, those dealing with
(a) pure gravitational field, and
(b) general field (in which quantities correspond-
ing somehow to the electromagnetic field oc-
cur, too).
The situation (a), the pure gravitational field, is
characterized by a symmetric (Riemannian) metric
(tensor of rank two) for which the Riemann curva-
ture tensor does not vanish.
For the case (b), Einstein [16] (p. 73) then set up
the “preliminary equations” to investigate [57] the
usefulness of the basic ideas of General Relativity.
His (makeshift) field equations of this formulation
of General Relativity are form-invariant under gen-
eral (spacetime) coordinate transformations. The
form-invariance of field equations under general co-
ordinate transformations is known as the principle
of general covariance [17] [58].
Through these equations, geometric properties
of the spacetime are supposed to be determined
by the physical matter. In turn, the spacetime ge-
ometry is supposed to tell the physical matter how
to move. That is, the geodesics of the spacetime
geometry are supposed to provide the law of mo-
tion of the physical matter.
The ideas of general relativity essentially free
Physics from the association of physical meaning to
coordinates and coordinate differences, an assump-
tion implicit in Newton’s theory and in special rel-
ativity. The formulation of Einstein’s (makeshift)
field equations however attaches physical meaning
to the invariant distance of the curved spacetime
geometry and considers it to be a physically ex-
actly measurable quantity.
Now, we may imagine [17] a small perturbation
of the background spacetime geometry and obtain
equations governing these perturbations. We may
also consider [17] quantum fields on the unchanging
background spacetime geometry.
Then, such methods (of perturbative analysis
and also of the Quantum Field Theory in Curved
Spacetime) are quite similar of nature to methods
adopted for either the flat 3-continuum or the flat
4-continuum in that these consider “mathematical
fields” definable on the fixed and metrically curved,
absolute, 4-continuum.
But, as far as Lorentz’s or Einstein’s ideas are
concerned, these above considerations of quantum
field theory in curved spacetime or perturbations
of a curved spacetime geometry are, evidently, not
self-consistent since matter fields must affect the
background spacetime geometry. However, these
are not the real issues here.
6Importantly, Einstein’s approach to his field
equations is beset with internal contradictions of
serious physical nature [19]. These contradictions
originate in the fact that gravity is given preferen-
tial treatment in it. (See later.)
Firstly, Einstein’s vacuum field equations [59]
are entirely unsatisfactory [18, 19] since these are
field equations for the pure gravitational field with-
out even a possibility of the equations of motion
for the sources of that field.
Certainly, matter cannot be any part of the the-
ory of the vacuum or the pure gravitational field.
Then, there cannot be physical objects in consid-
erations of the pure gravitational field, except as
sources of such fields.
Now, a material particle is necessarily a space-
time singularity of the pure gravitational field and,
hence, mathematically, no equations of motion for
it are possible. Then, we have only equations for
the pure field but no equations of motion for the
sources creating those fields.
But, the vacuum field equations alone are not
enough to draw any conclusions of physical nature.
Without the laws for the motions of sources gener-
ating the (vacuum) fields, we have no means of as-
certaining or establishing the “causes” of motions
of sources. No conclusions of physical nature are
therefore permissible in this situation and, thus,
the vacuum field equations cannot lead us to phys-
ically verifiable predictions.
[Note that this above situation is markedly dif-
ferent from that with special relativity. In special
relativity, the background geometry does not pos-
sess any geometric singularity at any location, but
only the (mathematical) fields defined on this ge-
ometry can be singular. Then, similar to Newton’s
theory, situations in special relativity lead us to
physically testable predictions.]
Secondly, recall that the energy-momentum ten-
sor deals with the density and fluxes of particles.
Then, unless a definition of what constitutes a par-
ticle is, a-priori, available to us, we cannot con-
struct the energy-momentum tensor.
Now, various relevant solutions of Einstein’s field
equations represent a point particle as a spacetime
singularity for which no laws of motion are possi-
ble. Consequently, no acceptable description of a
particle is available in Einstein’s approach to the
General Theory of Relativity.
Therefore, the concept of a particle is not clearly
defined to begin with and, hence, is not a-priori
available in Einstein’s approach to his (makeshift)
field equations. Thus, Einstein’s preliminary field
equations are ill-posed [18, 19].
Notably, this above does not, however, invalidate
or question the General Principle of Relativity in
any manner whatsoever. (See later.)
Next, recall that the quantum theory based on
Schro¨dinger’s Ψ-function provides us, essentially,
the means of calculating the probability of a phys-
ical event. It presupposes that we have specified,
say, the lagrangian or, equivalently, certain phys-
ical characteristics of the problem under consid-
eration. Evidently, this is necessary to determine
the Ψ-function using which we then make (prob-
abilistic) predictions regarding that physical phe-
nomenon under consideration.
At this stage, we then note the following funda-
mental limitation of any theory that uses proba-
bilistic considerations. (This limitation is clearly
recognizable for statistical mechanics in relation to
the newtonian theory.)
Importantly, the method of obtaining the prob-
ability of the outcome of its toss is irrelevant to
intrinsic properties of the coin [60].
Therefore, methods of quantum theory, these
leading us to the probability of the outcome of a
physical experiment about a chosen physical ob-
ject, cannot provide us the means of “specifying”
certain intrinsic properties of that physical body.
This fact, precisely, appears to be the reason as
to why we had to specify by hand the values of
the mass and the charge in various operators of
the non-relativistic as well as relativistic versions
of the quantum theory.
Therefore, quantum theory presupposes that we
have specified intrinsic properties of physical ob-
ject(s) under consideration. Hence, origins of such
properties are to be sought “elsewhere” and not
within the quantum theory.
Hence, we have that the formulation of general
relativity as only a theory of gravitation, Einstein’s
1916 (makeshift) field equations [13], is entirely un-
satisfactory. We also have that the probabilistic
quantum theory cannot hope to explain the ori-
gins of inertia and electric charge.
But, even when Einstein’s field equations are
physically ill-posed, the underlying conceptions
of the geometry being indistinguishable from the
physical matter need not be so. The General Prin-
ciple of Relativity makes sense even without Ein-
stein’s equations. (See later.) Proper recognition
of this issue is then important.
A question therefore arises of some satisfactory
mathematical formulation of not only the funda-
mental conceptions underlying the general princi-
ple of relativity but also of unifying them with the
fundamental conceptions of the quantum theory in
an appropriate manner.
But, for the “new” theory, we need the concep-
tual framework of only the General Principle of
Relativity or only that of the Probabilistic Quan-
tum Theory, and not the both. Let us then turn
to the issues related to this choice.
7Other approaches to unification
Now, the two “most successful” theories of the
20th century, namely, the Quantum Theory and
Einstein’s Theory of Gravity, possess profoundly
different conceptual frameworks and have led us to
adopt “separate” approaches to various problems
of the micro and the macro world [61].
As far as the theories of the micro-world are con-
cerned, these are based on the principles of the
Quantum Theory. QED, QCD etc. have been ex-
perimentally justified by way of the verification of
their predictions, some to remarkable accuracies.
These successes [20] lead us to accept the concep-
tual basis of the Quantum Theory.
But, these theories of the micro physical world
are certainly incomplete without the incorporation
of gravitation of the micro-objects.
Now, the General Principle of Relativity has the
appropriate conceptual framework for gravitation.
Einstein’s equivalence principle provides us the ap-
propriate basis to formulate a theory of gravita-
tion. Einstein, in 1916, had followed exactly this
path to propose his preliminary equations for the
field theory of gravitation.
Einstein’s formulation of General Relativity as
only a theory of gravitation leads us to classic tests
of this theory of gravity such as the precession of
the perihelion of Mercury, the bending of light, the
gravitational red-shift etc.
These classic tests of General Relativity, though
not as accurate as those of the theories of the micro
world, provide us adequate reasons to also accept,
simultaneously, the conceptual framework of the
General Principle of Relativity.
As an early recognition of the diverse conceptual
frameworks of these two aforementioned physical
theories and also as an early warning about the in-
volved issues, Einstein wrote in 1916 (Preussische
Akademie Sitzungsberichte) that:
♠ Nevertheless, due to the interatomic move-
ment of electrons, atoms would have to radiate not
only electromagnetic but also gravitational energy,
if only in tiny amounts. As this is hardly true in
Nature, it appears that quantum theory would have
to modify not only Maxwellian electrodynamics but
also the new theory of gravitation. ♠
Surely, Einstein’s formulation deals only with
the phenomenon of gravitation and, consequently,
does not incorporate electromagnetism as well as
other aspects of various known micro-particles on
the same footing as gravity. It is therefore quite
natural to expect that aspects related to quantum
nature of (gravitating) matter would necessitate
fundamental changes to, the then new, Einstein’s
theory of gravitation [62].
Equally surely, an appropriate synthesis of the
quantum theory and the general principle of rela-
tivity is also necessary as their diverse conceptual
frameworks force on us a “schizophrenic” view [1]
of the physical world in which we treat macro world
as per Einstein’s theory of gravity and the micro
world as per the quantum theory.
A question then arises of the “final correctness”
of the conceptual basis. Einstein, as is well known
[15], chose the General Principle of Relativity while
most like Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli chose the
probabilistic Quantum Theory.
Einstein’s attempts at the Unified Field Theory
led him and others, like Schro¨dinger, de Broglie
[21], to nowhere. But, Einstein sang his “solitary
song” in favor of the conceptual basis of General
Relativity till the end [15].
Learning, perhaps, from the failures of Einstein’s
numerous attempts at the formulation of a satis-
factory Unified Field Theory and keeping thereby
“faith” in probabilistic methods of the quantum
theory, some like Bronstein, Rosenfeld, Pauli, then
attempted to quantize [63] Einstein’s gravity in the
same manner as was followed for other fields such
as the electromagnetic field.
But, such an approach to the “quantum theory
of gravity” was slated to face serious mathemati-
cal difficulties. The foremost of these difficulties is
that the metric of the spacetime geometry is not
just an inert arena but also the primary dynamical
quantity in Einstein’s theory of gravity which has
no background metric.
The known procedures of quantum theory were
geared to the existence of a background metric
such as the Minkowski metric. Therefore, by giving
up Einstein’s most cherished dream, inseparability
of geometry and matter, the 4-metric was treated
as a perturbative tensor field over the (usually) flat
background. This gave us the covariant formalism
of quantum gravity.
For this formalism, Feynman then extended per-
turbative methods of QED to Einstein’s gravity.
Then, De Witt formulated [22] the Feynman rules
for covariantly quantized Einstein’s gravity. This
all then led us to the notion of a massless spin-2
graviton. But, this perturbative quantum gravity
turned out to be non-renormalizable.
The non-renormalizable nature of perturbative
quantization of Einstein’s gravity was interpreted
to mean that important high energy processes (at
the Planck energy scale) were being ignored by
these perturbative methods.
A cure for this problem was sought by coupling
Einstein’s gravity to other fields, as it must be. In
particular, “super-gravity” imagined cancellation
of bosonic infinities of the gravity by those of the
suitable fermionic fields [2].
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non-renormalizable at the fifth and at higher order
loops. In the mean while, an innovative idea of re-
placing point particles by a 1-dimensional (Nambu-
Goto) string, an extended object, was invoked for
the theory of strong interactions.
Originally, the “Duality Hypothesis” that the
s- and t-channel diagrams provide “dual” descrip-
tions of the same physics, where s and t are the
Mandelstam variables, was tried [2] for the strong
interactions. However, models based on the above
duality hypothesis predicted a variety of massless
particles which do not exist in the hadron world.
Then, this failure of the duality theories eventually
yielded the way for QCD.
But, duality theories could accommodate high
spin particles without ultraviolet anomalies and,
in “quantized” general relativity, the gravitational
field is to be a massless spin-2 graviton. Hence, the
idea that some “duality theory” could be a “theory
of all interactions” soon caught attention. Then,
the Veneziano duality model was also shown to be
a relativistic string.
In the String Theory approach, different modes
of oscillations of the string correspond to particle-
like states. Then, it turns out that, in addition to
the spin-1 mode, there also exists in String Theory
a spin-2 mode. A boon in disguise, the spin-2 mode
could then represent gravity.
Within the theoretical framework of the String
Theory, only one fundamental quantity, the string
tension, needs to be specified a-priori. Then, it is
tempting indeed to think that a built-in unification
of all interactions by way of the modes of vibrations
of the string is possible. This expectation led to a
flurry of theoretical activity.
As many implications of String Theory were be-
ing developed, usefulness of its ideas was also ex-
plored in the context of cosmological conceptions.
Such studies explored mainly the “cosmological ”
implications of higher dimensions necessarily re-
quired for the String Theory.
The string theory [2] necessarily uses dimensions
higher than the usual four (10 for the super-string
and 26 for the bosonic string for which quantum
anomalies do not occur in the theory). It also uses
the ideas of super-symmetry and works with back-
ground fields as essential ingredients. The overall
thrust of the String Theory is then certainly on
the unification of all the four interactions, includ-
ing Einstein’s gravity by way of the spin-2 mode
of the string oscillations.
Still, it needs to be adequately realized that the
String Theory cannot hope to explain the origins
of either the inertia or the electrostatic charge on
the basis of only the string tension which is an
arbitrary constant of this theory.
But, a “theory of everything” must provide these
aforementioned explanations [64]. If not anything
else, this aforementioned inability of the String
Theory alone forces us to look “elsewhere” for the
explanations of properties of matter.
Next, another approach to quantum theory of
gravity also evolved simultaneously to the String
Theory. It was shown by Dirac [23] that the hamil-
tonian of Einstein’s theory of gravity is a mathe-
matically well-defined quantity. Motions generated
by this hamiltonian are then evolutions in time of
the initial spatial section, the Cauchy surface of
the Einstein field equations.
These theoretical developments led to the canon-
ical approach to Einstein’s gravity which is then
to be viewed as the dynamical theory of the 3-
geometries - the geometrodynamics [65].
The ADM-formalism then led to further devel-
opments in canonical approach. The 3-metric and
the extrinsic curvature of the 3-geometry are the
canonically conjugate variables of the geometro-
dynamics. Notably, Einstein’s field equations for
gravity then reduce to two types of equations: con-
straints and evolution equations. One could then
think of using (generalizations of) Dirac’s methods
for quantization of “constrained systems” for these
sets of equations of gravity.
These developments led to a definite (Wheeler’s)
program of ambitious nature to quantize Einstein’s
gravity. However, this proposal remained mostly
formal and quite separate from quantum theories
of the micro world.
In this last context, deserving special mention
are the recent developments related to Quantum
Geometry [1]. Notably, the Ashtekar phase space
of Einstein’s gravity is the same as that of the
gauge theories of the micro world.
The basis of these developments is a canonical
transformation of the ADM variables of gravity
that yields, at the most, polynomial constraints.
“Spin connection” and “triad” achieve together
this simplification. The 3-metric, obtainable from
Ashtekar’s spinorial variables, is nowhere needed
in the “metric-free” formalism.
Canonical gravity being non-perturbative, these
achievements were quite important for quantum
gravity. The quantization of the Einstein-Ashtekar
gravity leads to “loop-states,” 1-dimensional exci-
tations, from which the continuum arises only as
a coarse-grained approximation over the “weave”
states of quantum geometry.
This “quantized” Einstein-Ashtekar gravity, the
Theory of the Quantum Geometry, then appears
to be the “ultimate” logical end of the program
of canonical gravity. But, it has not provided yet
any principle or procedure for incorporating other
three interactions.
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is basically a rigorous mathematical theory, like the
Euclidean geometry, in which one needs to “insert
by hand” physical qualifications of matter to con-
nect it to the physical world.
In the context of this above issue, one is then
bound to recall Einstein’s theorem [16] (p.63) that:
♠ ... nature is so constituted that it is possi-
ble logically to lay down such strongly determined
laws that within these laws only rationally com-
pletely determined constants occur (not constants,
therefore, whose numerical values could be changed
without destroying the theory). - - - ♠
Then, an additional “physical difficulty” of the
Quantum Theory of Geometry is that physical con-
stants (such as Planck’s constant, Newton’s con-
stant of gravitation etc.) also do not arise in it
from various permissible mutual relationships of
physical bodies, just exactly as we obtain them
experimentally out of mutual relationships of the
involved physical objects.
But, physical constants have to be specified by
hand not only in Quantum Geometry but also in
String Theory. Consequently, these theories are,
physically speaking, quite limited. [66]. The same
limitations apply to other highly original and moti-
vating approaches such as the Euclidean quantum
gravity [24], twistor theory [25], non-commutative
geometry [26], the theory of H-spaces [27] etc., al-
though these approaches are not discussed here for
want of space and purpose.
Now, as seen earlier, Einstein’s formulation of
his field equations is itself beset with problems of
serious physical concerns. Moreover, as also seen
earlier, methods of quantum theory, leading us to
the calculation of only the probability of a physical
event, cannot provide us the “origins” of intrinsic
properties of physical objects.
Consequently, it is necessary to “look” beyond
the mathematical formalism of either of these theo-
ries to reach to some appropriate, theoretically sat-
isfactory, explanations of the origins of the prop-
erties of physical matter.
Now, as will be discussed in the next sections,
the General Principle of Relativity still holds. It
therefore seems advisable to follow the conserva-
tive path of developing appropriate mathematical
formulation based on the general principle of rel-
ativity and basic conceptions of the quantum the-
ory, and to let it suggest to us the explanations of
physical phenomena.
Hence, even at the cost of being elementary and
pedantic, it appears to be certainly worthwhile to
recall here as to what the “phenomenon of gravi-
tation” is all about and how exactly Newton’s and
Einstein’s theories attempt to explain it.
B. Conceptual Preliminaries
To begin with, let us note that the foremost of
the concepts behind Newton’s theory is, undoubt-
edly, (Galileo’s) concept of the inertia of a material
body. We postulate that every material body has
this inertia for motion.
The association of the inertia of a material body
with the points of the Euclidean space is the first
primary physical conception that is necessary for
Newton’s theory to describe motions of physical
bodies. Then, with this association, the Euclidean
distance becomes the physical distance separating
material bodies and the Euclidean space becomes
the physical space for any further considerations of
Newton’s theoretical scheme.
Next, a physical clock is a material body under-
going periodic motion or a periodic phenomenon.
Essentially, in Newton’s theory, a physical clock is
a set of points of the Euclidean space exhibiting
periodic motion under a periodic transformation.
Mathematically, in Newton’s theory, let A be the
set of all points x
A
of the Euclidean space making
up the clock. Let T be the periodic transformation
such that ∀ x
A
∈ A, T n x
A
= x
A
, where n is the
period of the transformation T .
In Newton’s theory, an observer can observe the
entire periodic motion of the material body of the
clock (under the use of the transformation T ) with-
out disturbing the clock in any manner whatsoever.
Then, the known state or the reading of the clock
represents the physical time. Any “measurement”
of the physical time gives the period or the part of
the period n of the transformation T . It is tacitly
assumed in these considerations that the involved
quantities are exactly measurable.
Now, consider a material point with an initial
location ~xo. In Newton’s theory, the trajectory of
this material point is a (continuous) sequence of
points of the Euclidean space. It is then a “curve”
traced by the point ~xo under some transformation
T˜t of the Euclidean space where parameter t labels
points of the sequence. Of course, the transforma-
tion T˜t need not be periodic.
The label parameter t can then be made to cor-
respond to the physical time in a one-one corre-
spondence. This is theoretically permissible as the
measurement of the physical time does not disturb
the clock in any manner whatsoever in Newton’s
theory. This correspondence is the physical mean-
ing of the labelling parameter t.
An observer can thus check the position of an-
other material point against the state of a physical
clock. Without this “correspondence,” the geomet-
ric curve of the Euclidean space has no physical
sense for the path of a material point.
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When such physical associations are carried out,
we say that the material point is at “this” location
given by the three space coordinates and the phys-
ical clock is simultaneously showing “this” time.
This simultaneity is inherent in the physical asso-
ciations of Newton’s theory.
Also, as a consequence of the fact that Newton’s
theory treats material bodies as existing indepen-
dently of the space, the state of a physical clock or
its reading is assumed to be independent of the mo-
tion of another material point or points separately
under considerations. Then, physical time is inde-
pendent also of the coordination of the metrically-
flat Euclidean space.
But, then, the motion of a material point in the
“physical” space does not produce any change in
that space. Clearly, this fact applies also to the pe-
riodic motion or the periodic phenomenon making
up the physical clock.
The “physical” construction of the coordinate
axes and clocks must also be using the material
bodies, for example, coordinate axes could be con-
structed using “sufficiently long” material rods,
say, of wood. Then, any material object, a road-
roller, say, crossing the coordinate axis must “af-
fect” the corresponding wooden rod.
But, in Newton’s theory, the coordinate axes of
the Euclidean space do not get affected by the mo-
tions of other material bodies. Clearly, use of non-
cartesian coordinates does not change this state of
affairs with Newton’s theory.
Now, any difference of coordinates in the Eu-
clidean space is a “measuring stick or rod” that
can be used to “measure” the physical separation
of material bodies.
Furthermore, in Newton’s theory, each observer
has a coordinate system of such measuring rods
and clocks. Then, when one observer is in motion
(relative to another one), the entire system of co-
ordinate axes and clocks is also carried with that
observer in motion.
Conceptually, the aforementioned physical situ-
ation is “acceptable” except in one case. Surely, we
cannot have a material rod with one observer and
simultaneously, another material rod, at the same
place, with other observer in (uniform or not) mo-
tion relative to the first one.
But, in Newton’s theory, measuring stick of one
observer does not collide with that of another ob-
server in motion even when both these sticks ar-
rive at the same place. Unacceptably, any two such
measuring sticks just pass through each other with-
out even colliding on their first contact.
The same situation does not arise for other ma-
terial bodies which are supposed to collide on their
first contact. Then, in Newton’s theory, the mea-
suring rods of the physical space - Euclidean space
- are treated separately than other material ob-
jects. But, measuring rods must also be made up
of material objects. Then, their separate treat-
ment is, theoretically, not appropriate one. Surely,
this problem with Newton’s theory is, undeniably,
of serious theoretical concern.
(This above issue would not have been relevant
if the Euclidean distance were also not, simulta-
neously, the physical distance separating material
bodies. Mathematically, the continuum R×R×R
can be assumed.)
Hence, Newton’s theory attempts to explain all
phenomena as relations [67] between objects exist-
ing in Euclidean space and time. It achieves this
by attributing absolute properties to the space and
the time, thereby totally separating them from the
properties and motions of matter.
Thus, limitations of Newton’s theoretical scheme
(providing his famous three laws of motion) origi-
nate in its use of the Cartesian concepts related to
the Euclidean space and the associations of prop-
erties of material bodies with the points of this
metrically-flat space.
Now, the entire physical structure of Newton’s
theory is woven around only two basic concepts,
namely, those of the inertia and the force.
Clearly, the force, as a cause of motion, is an-
other pivotal concept of Newton’s theory. Hence,
consider the status of the concept of force, the
cause behind motions of material bodies, within
Newton’s theory of mechanics.
Firstly, we could ask: What is the cause of this
force? Within Newton’s overall theoretical scheme,
only a material point can be the source of force. A
material point “here” acts on a material point lo-
cated “there” with the specified force. Newton’s
theoretical scheme is therefore an action at a dis-
tance framework.
Then, in Newton’s theory, we can consider a
physical body as one material point and also other
physical bodies as other material points. We vec-
torially add the forces exerted by each one on the
first physical body to obtain the total force acting
on it. It is this total force that is used by Newton’s
second law of motion to provide the means of es-
tablishing the path followed by that physical body
under the action of that total force.
In Newton’s second law of motion, we must first
specify the force acting on a material body. Only
then can we solve the corresponding differential
equation(s) and obtain, subject to the given initial
data, the path of the material point representing
that material body.
Then, without the Law of Force, it is clear that
the Law of Motion is empty of contents in New-
ton’s theoretical framework. This is an extremely
important issue for a physical theory.
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From our ordinary, day-to-day, observations, we
notice that various objects fall to the earth when
left “free” in the air. We then say that objects
gravitate towards the Earth. This is, in a nutshell,
the phenomenon of gravitation.
We then need to explain as to why the objects
“ordinarily” gravitate to Earth, ie, why they have
a tendency to come together or why the distance
between them decreases with time.
In Newton’s theory, only forces “cause” motions
of material bodies. Then, the gravitating behavior
of objects is “explainable” only by postulating a
suitable force of gravity that makes material bodies
fall to the Earth.
But, in Newton’s theory, a force acts between
any two separate material points possessing the re-
quired source property by virtue of which the force
in question is generated. Furthermore, for the in-
ternal consistency of Newton’s scheme, the force
so generated by one material point on the second
material point must also be equal in amplitude but
opposite in direction to that generated by the sec-
ond material point on the first material point. This
is Newton’s third law of motion. This law also has
the status of a postulate within the overall scheme
of the newtonian mechanics.
Newton had assumed that the force of gravity
is proportional to the inertias of the two mate-
rial points under consideration because, following
Galileo, he had postulated that inertia “character-
izes” a physical body.
Such a force of gravity must then be generated
by a chosen body (Earth) on all the other material
bodies because, by postulate, every material body
possessed inertia. The force of gravity must then
be universal in character.
To explain many of the day-to-day observations
involving the terrestrial bodies as well as plane-
tary motions that were already known in details,
Newton was therefore compelled to state a Law of
Force - Newton’s Law of Gravity - to explain the
phenomenon of gravitation.
In fact, in Newton’s theory, a material body has
two independent attributes: the first, its inertial
mass, is a measure of the opposition it offers to a
change in its state of motion, and the second, its
gravitational mass, is a measure of the property by
virtue of which it produces the force of gravity on
another material point.
Various observations, since Galileo’s times, then
indicate [28] that the inertial and the gravitational
masses of a material body are equal to a high de-
gree of accuracy. However, this equality becomes
an assumption of Newton’s theory.
Inverse-square dependence of the gravitational
force on the distance separating two bodies is also
an assumption of Newton’s theory.
In relation to the inverse-square dependence of
Newton’s force of gravity on distance separating
two bodies, we could then always raise questions:
Why not any other power of distance? Why should
this force not contain time-derivatives of the space
coordinates? Clearly, Newton’s theory offers no ex-
planation for even the inverse-square dependence
of the force of gravitation.
Hence, in Newton’s scheme, his law of gravita-
tion has the status of a postulate about the force
acting between two material particles separated by
some spatial distance.
Also, Coulomb’s law from the electrostatics pro-
vides another, postulated, fundamental force. It
is also assumed to exist universally between any
two charged material bodies. It is an “additional”
force, over and above that of gravity, which New-
ton’s theory postulates to explain the motions of
charged material points.
Now, every object does not fall to the Earth. So,
“something” opposes the attractive force of grav-
ity. That “something” must also be another force.
Thus, in a nutshell, a force can oppose another.
But, every force is an assumption here.
Then, if we find that some physical body, for
example, a star, is stable, we could, in Newton’s
theory, explain its stability by postulating another
suitable force which counterchecks the force of self-
gravity of the star. On the other hand, if the star
were unstable, existence of “unbalanced” forces in
the star is implied.
In Newton’s theory, there are no fundamentally
important issues involved here than those related
to finding the nature of the force opposing the self-
gravity of the star. It is essential to recognize this
important aspect of Newton’s theory.
Nonetheless, in spite of it being an assumption
of Newton’s theory, Newton’s inverse-square law of
gravitation does possess certain experimental jus-
tification - it is this inverse-square dependence that
is known to be consistent with various observations
and experiments.
Still, it cannot be denied that Newton’s law of
gravitation is an important assumption of the new-
tonian mechanics.
To reemphasize the status of the laws of the force
in Newton’s theory, we note that every force is
an assumption of this theory. Some forces are as-
sumed to exist universally between any two mate-
rial bodies. In particular, “the force of gravitation”
is postulated by this theory.
In Newton’s theory, every “fundamental” notion
of the force necessarily requires a source property
to be attributed to material bodies. Then, the
action-at-a-distance force has this important char-
acteristic always.
12
Obviously, Newton’s theory cannot hope to “ex-
plain” the origin of any of such source attributes,
each of these source attributes being an assump-
tion of that theory. Evidently, the same applies
to other action-at-a-distance theories. It is impor-
tant to recognize this fact at this early stage of our
present considerations.
Perhaps, we would have been satisfied even with
these assumptions of Newton’s theory if it were not
for the fact that Newton’s theory does not explain
the phenomena displayed by Light. Moreover, var-
ious observations related to the wave-particle dual-
ity of light as well as matter are also unexplainable
within the newtonian scheme.
Apart from various fundamental reasons of the-
oretical nature as discussed earlier, it is also for
such experiments or observations which cannot be
explained by Newton’s theory, that some suitable
“new” theory becomes a necessity.
Of course, different results of Newton’s theory
which successfully describe motions of material
bodies must be obtainable within the new theory
in some suitable way.
Then, to formulate “new” theory, we need to,
not just modify but, abandon some newtonian con-
cepts at a fundamental level.
Now, let us also note the newtonian principle of
relativity which states that: If a coordinate system
K is chosen so that Newton’s laws of motion hold
good without the introduction of any pseudo-forces
with respect to this frame then, the same laws also
hold good in relation to other coordinate system
K ′ moving in uniform translation relatively to K.
This principle is a direct consequence of the exper-
iments conducted by Galileo.
These issues then bring us to the question of the
status of the principle of relativity in a theoretical
framework that abandons the newtonian concept
of the force. It is to this and other related issues
that we now turn to.
C. The General Principle of Relativity
To incorporate the physical description of the
phenomena displayed by Light, zero rest-mass ob-
ject, Einstein modified the newtonian principle of
relativity as: If a coordinate system K is chosen
so that physical laws hold good in their simplest
form with respect to this frame then, the same laws
also hold good in relation to other coordinate sys-
tem K ′ moving in uniform translation relatively to
K. This is the special principle of relativity. As
is well known, together with the principle of the
constancy of the speed of light in vacuo, it leads to
the special theory of relativity.
Einstein’s this special principle of relativity is
essentially the same as the principle of relativity
of Newton’s theory. The word “special” indicates
here that the principle is restricted to the case of
uniform translational motion of K ′ relative to K
and does not extend to non-uniform motion of K ′
in relation to the system K.
But, even the special theory of relativity is not
sufficiently general to offer explanations for various
physical phenomena as observed. Not only gravity,
but, as should be amply clear, the origin of inertia
as well as the origin of electrostatic charge are also
not explainable in special relativity.
Primarily, the special theory of relativity is an
extension of only the newtonian laws to accommo-
date properties of motions of material bodies with
vanishing inertia [8]. It achieves this extension by
acknowledging the fact that, in our day-to-day ex-
periences, we use Light to observe.
But, the special theory of relativity also rests
on the metrically flat continuum and is, thereby,
beset with the problems of treating the measuring
rods and clocks separately from all other objects.
There is therefore the need to extend the special
principle of relativity.
Then, Einstein extended [13] this principle on
the basis of Mach’s reasoning as follows.
Mach’s reasoning concerns the following situa-
tion. Consider two identical fluid bodies so far
from each other and from other material bodies
that only the self-gravity of each one needs to be
considered. Let the distance between them be in-
variable, and in neither of them let there be “in-
ternal motions” with respect to each other. Also,
let either body, as judged by an observer at rest
relative to the other body, rotate with constant
angular velocity about the line joining them. This
is, importantly, a verifiable relative motion of the
two identical fluid bodies.
Now, using surveyor’s instruments, let an ob-
server at rest relative to each body make measure-
ments of the surface of that body. Let the revealed
surface of one body be spherical and of the other
body be an ellipsoid of revolution.
The question then arises of the reason behind
this difference in these two bodies. Of course, no
answer is to be considered satisfactory unless the
given reason is observable. This is so because the
Law of Causality has the “genuine scientific” sig-
nificance only when observable effects ultimately
appear as causes and effects.
As is well known, Newton’s theory as well as the
special theory of relativity require the introduction
of fictitious or the pseudo forces to provide an an-
swer to this issue. The reason given by these two
theories is, obviously, entirely unsatisfactory since
the pseudo-forces are unobservable.
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Any cause within the system of these two bod-
ies alone will not be sufficient as it would have to
refer to the absolute space only. But, the abso-
lute space is necessarily unobservable and, conse-
quently, any such “internal” cause will not be in
conformity with the law of causality.
The only satisfactory answer is that the cause
must be outside of this physical system, and that
must be referred to the real difference in motions of
distant material bodies relative to each fluid body
under consideration.
Then, the frame of reference of one fluid body is
equivalent to that of the other body for a descrip-
tion of the “motions” of other bodies. As Mach
had “concluded” [29], no observable significance
can be attached to the cause of the difference in
their shapes without this equivalence.
The laws of physics must then be such that they
apply to systems of reference in any kind of motion
(without the introduction of any fictitious causes or
forces). This is then the extended or the general
principle of relativity.
Clearly, the reference frames must be constructed
out of material bodies and any motions of “other”
material bodies must affect the constructions of the
reference frames. Therefore, the general principle
of relativity also means that the laws of physics
must be so general as to incorporate even these sit-
uations in their entirety.
Now, equally important is the fact that the no-
tion of the physical time must undergo appropri-
ate changes when the above is implemented. In
particular, the correspondence of the labelling pa-
rameter of the “path” of a physical body with the
time displayed by a physical clock must be dif-
ferent than that in Newton’s theory or in special
relativity. Notably, the underlying continuum and
the physical space are then different.
Einstein connected the general principle of rela-
tivity with the observation that a possible uniform
gravitation imparts the same acceleration to all
bodies. This insight leads us to Einstein’s equiva-
lence principle. It arises as follows.
Let K be a Galilean frame of reference relative
to which a material body is moving with uniform
rectilinear motion when far removed from other
material bodies. Let K ′ be another frame of refer-
ence which is moving relatively to K in uniformly
accelerated translation. Then, relatively to K ′,
that same material body would have an acceler-
ation which is independent of its material content
as well as of its physical state.
The observer at rest in frame K ′ can then raise
the question of determining whether frame K ′ is
“really” in an accelerated motion. That is, whether
this is the only cause for the acceleration of bodies
being independent of material content.
Now, let various bodies, of differing material
contents and of differing inertias, fall freely under
the action of Earth’s gravity after being released
from the same distance above the ground and at
the same instant of time. Galileo had, supposedly
at the leaning tower of Pisa, observed that these
bodies reach the ground at the same instant of time
and had thereby concluded that these bodies fall
with the same accelerations.
Hence, the decrement in distance between ma-
terial bodies displaying only the phenomenon of
gravitation is then uniquely characterized by the
fact that the acceleration experienced by material
bodies, occupying sufficiently small region of space
near another material body of large spatial dimen-
sion, is independent of their material content and
their physical state. Here, the gravitational action
of the larger material body can then be treated as
being that of uniform gravitation.
Therefore, the answer to the question raised by
the observer at rest in the frame K ′ is in the neg-
ative since there does exist an analogous situation
involving the phenomenon of uniform gravitation
in which material bodies can possess acceleration
that is independent of their material content and
the physical state.
Thus, the observer at rest in the frame K ′ can
alternatively explain the observation of the “accel-
eration being independent of the physical state or
the material content of bodies” on the basis of the
phenomenon of uniform gravitation.
The mechanical behavior of involved material
bodies relative to the frame K ′ is then the same
as that in the frame K, being considered “special”
as per the special principle of relativity. We can
therefore say that the two frames K and K ′ are
equivalent for the description of the facts under
consideration. Clearly, we can then extend the
special principle of relativity to incorporate even
the “accelerated” frames.
Borrowing Einstein’s words on this issue [13],
this above situation is then suggestive that:
♠ the systems K and K ′ may both with equal
right be looked upon as “stationary,” that is to say,
they have an equal title as systems of reference for
the physical description of phenomena. ♠
[Note the word “suggestive” in this statement.]
Now, the equality of inertial and gravitational
masses of a material body refers to the “equal-
ity” of corresponding qualities of a material body.
But, this is permissible only in a theory that as-
sumes the concept of a force as an external cause
of motions of material bodies. The concept of the
gravitational mass is, however, irrelevant when the
concept of force is abandoned. Only the concept
of the inertia of a material body is then relevant
to the motions of physical bodies.
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What then is the status of the general principle
of relativity in a theory that completely abandons
the concept of force? Does it hold in the absence
of the concept of force?
From the above, it should now be evident that
the general principle of relativity stands even when
the concept of force is abandoned because it only
deals with the observable concept of an accelera-
tion of a material body. Specifically, in the context
of Einstein’s equivalence principle, it rests only on
the observation that uniform gravity imparts the
same acceleration to all the bodies.
Now, it is crucial to recognize that the equiv-
alence principle establishes only the consistency
of the phenomenon of gravitation with the gen-
eral principle of relativity. Clearly, the equivalence
principle is not logically equivalent to the general
principle of relativity.
As noted earlier, Einstein had, certainly, been
quite careful to use the word “suggestive” in stat-
ing the relation of these two different principles.
He further wrote in [13]:
♠ ... in pursuing the general theory of relativity
we shall be led to a theory of gravitation, since we
are able to “produce” a gravitational field merely
by changing the system of coordinates. ♠
But, in spite of the phenomenon of gravitation
being consistent with the general principle of rel-
ativity, there could, in principle, exist other phys-
ical phenomena which could be inconsistent with
the general principle of relativity. This would have
been the situation if Newton’s theory had shown
us the existence of some “fundamental real force”
distinguishing accelerated frames from the inertial
frames but that force “explaining” the observed
motions of material bodies.
This last is, of course, not the situation and we
therefore have the faith that the general principle
of relativity should be the basis of any “satisfac-
tory” physical theory. Moreover, the “verifiability”
of the motion in Mach’s arguments considered ear-
lier is also indicative of the “universality” of the
general principle of relativity.
From the above, it should then be clear that the
general principle of relativity can be reached from
more than one vantage issues. Each such issue can
then indicate only that some physical phenomenon
related to that issue is consistent with this prin-
ciple of relativity. The mutual consistency of the
general principle of relativity and various physi-
cal conceptions then becomes the requirement of a
satisfactory physical theory.
Therefore, physical construction of the frames of
reference, the physical coordination of the physical
space using measuring rods, is also one of the pri-
mary requirements of the satisfactory theory based
on the general principle of relativity.
Then, it should now be also clear that the uni-
versal theory of relativity, a physical theory explic-
itly based on the general principle of relativity, will
not be just a theory of gravitation but, of neces-
sity, also the theory of everything. It is certainly
decisive to recognize this.
Therefore, a theory which abandons the concept
of force completely can “explain” the phenomenon
of gravitation by demonstrating that the decrement
of distance between material bodies is, in certain
situations, independent of their material contents
and physical state. By showing this, a theory of
the aforementioned type can incorporate the phe-
nomenon of gravitation.
Why is this above mentioned demonstration ex-
pected to hold only in certain situations?
To grasp the essentials here, let us recall that,
in Newton’s theory, only the total force acting on
a physical body is used by Newton’s second law
of motion. We usually also decompose this force
into different parts in the well known manner as
the one arising due to gravity, the one arising due
to electrostatic force etc.
But, what matters in Newton’s theory for the
motion of any physical body is the total force act-
ing on it and not the decomposition of this total
force in parts, the decomposition, strictly speak-
ing, being quite irrelevant.
Thus, the phenomenon of gravitation is, then,
“displayed” by material bodies, essentially, only in
certain situations, those for which the total force
is that due to gravity.
This above is, in overall, the significance of the
general principle of relativity.
D. General Expectations from the Universal
Theory of Relativity
Now, what are our general expectations from
any “new” theory then?
Clearly, the concept of the inertia of a material
body is more fundamental than that of the force
because the conception of gravitational force re-
quires the introduction of gravitational mass which
is conceptually very different but “equals” the in-
ertia in value to a high degree of accuracy [28].
Hence, only the newtonian concept of force comes
under scrutiny for modifications.
Therefore, it must be adequately recognized that
the newtonian concept of “force” will have to be
abandoned in the process of developing the new
theoretical framework. In other words, the “cause”
behind the motions of material bodies will have to
be conceptually entirely different than has been
considered by Newton’s theory.
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Consequently, “agreements” of the results of the
new theory with the corresponding ones of New-
ton’s theory can only be mathematical of nature.
The physical conceptions behind the mathematical
statements of the new theory will not be those of
Newton’s theory.
Therefore, any explanation of the phenomenon
of gravitation in the new theory will only involve
the demonstration of the “decrement of distance”
under certain situations involving material bodies.
It must, of course, be shown that this decrement in
distance is, for these situations, such that the “ac-
celeration” of the bodies is independent of their
material content and the physical state. It must
also be shown that the “known” inverse-square de-
pendence of this phenomenon arises in the new the-
ory in some mathematical manner.
Any such “new theory” must then explain the
“origin” of the inertia of material bodies. It must
also incorporate the “physical” construction of the
coordinate system that must, necessarily, change
with the motions of material bodies in the “physi-
cal” space. Without the appropriate incorporation
of these two issues, no theory can be considered to
be physically satisfactory.
Any such “new” theory needs also “explain” the
equality of the inertial and the gravitational mass
of a material body. The equality of these two en-
tirely different physical conceptions, even with ex-
perimental uncertainties, is a sure indication that
the same quality of a material body manifests it-
self, according to circumstances, as its inertia or as
its weight (heaviness).
But, it must be remembered that the concept of
the gravitational mass and that of the electrostatic
charge owe their origins to the newtonian concept
of the force.
But, the “source properties” cannot be basic to
the new theory that abandons the concept of the
force. Consequently, the gravitational mass of the
material body will not be fundamental to the new
theory, but the inertial mass will be. Some “entity”
that replaces the electrostatic charge will also be
basic to the new theory.
Then, it must also follow from the mathematical
framework of the new theory that the inertial mass
can also be “naturally” considered as the “source”
in the mathematical quantity that can be the new-
tonian gravitational force.
Similarly, the quantity that, in the new theory,
replaces the electrostatic charge must also natu-
rally appear as the “source” in the mathematical
quantity that can be considered to be Coulomb’s
electrostatic force.
Furthermore, we need to demand that the “new”
theory must also not contain the law of motion
which is “independent” of the law of the force.
That is to say, the force as an external quantity,
to be “specified” separately of the law of motion,
must not occur in this new theory. In it, we can
only have the law of motion.
Crucially, abandonment of the concept of force
that is independent of the law of motion applies,
at the same time, to “every kind of (fundamental)
force” postulated to be acting between the material
particles by Newton’s theory.
Therefore, the conceptual framework as well as
the mathematical formalism or procedure by which
we “replace” the concept of force (as an “external
cause of motion” independent of the law of motion)
will have to be applicable to every kind of (funda-
mental) force that Newton’s or any other theory
has to postulate or assume to explain the observed
motions of material bodies.
The Principle of the Simplicity (of Theoretical
Construction) dictates that this above must be the
case for a satisfactory theory.
Replacing only the concept of the gravitational
force is then unacceptable not only from this point
of view of the simplicity but also because the resul-
tant theory then cannot account for the entirety of
charged material bodies within its hybrid frame-
work. Charged material bodies will have to be the
singularities of the electrostatic force but not of the
gravitational force in the mathematical framework
of such a hybrid theory. Any such hybrid frame-
work is then bound to be physically inconsistent
and, hence, unacceptable.
Then, the mathematical procedure by which we
replace the notion of, say, Newton’s gravitational
force cannot be expected to be entirely different
than the one adopted, say, for replacing the notion
of Coulomb’s electrostatic force.
Now, Einstein attempted to replace the notion
of force with that of the curvature of the space-
time manifold. Then, this replacement must also
be applicable to every notion of force in Newton’s
theory. In particular, it must apply to Coulomb’s
electrostatic force.
Then, Coulomb’s electrostatic force can be at-
tractive as well as repulsive depending on the “rel-
ative” signs of the involved electric charges. An
immediate implication of this above for Einstein’s
aforementioned attempt is that the relative sign of
charges determines the curvature for the geometry
“experienced” by them.
But, how this is to be achieved is unclear. Ein-
stein’s field equations with matter do not imple-
ment this in any non-singular manner. Moreover,
what about origins of electric charges that are to
determine the curvature?
We may then conclude that the concept of the
curvature of geometry is not sufficiently general to
replace the notion of force.
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Now, the concept of force is, in a definite math-
ematical sense [30], equivalent to that of certain
transformation of the points of the (Euclidean)
space in Newton’s theory. This then “suggests”
that mathematical transformations of points of the
(suitable underlying) space can, quite generally as
well as naturally, “replace” the newtonian concept
of force as a cause of motion.
A transformation which “brings” two bodies “to-
gether” corresponds to an attractive force between
them while the one which “pushes” these bodies
“away” from each other corresponds to a repul-
sive force between them. Moreover, the action of
a transformation can “naturally” depend on some
parameters (eg, electric charges). We may then be
able to incorporate Coulomb’s law (and other laws
of force) in a framework based on transformation
of some suitable (mathematical) space as a possi-
ble generalization of the newtonian conception of
force as a cause of motion.
Evidently therefore, the concept of transforma-
tion appears to be sufficiently general to replace
the (newtonian) notion of force.
It should then be also evident that the mathe-
matical laws obtainable using this replacement of
force by the transformation of suitable underlying
space will be applicable to every physically con-
structed frame of reference, and, hence, this math-
ematical formalism will be in conformity with the
general principle of relativity.
It should then be equally clear that the phe-
nomenon of gravitation is incorporated in this
framework as the concept of transformation is “ap-
plicable” in all the relevant situations.
This then brings us to issues of the quantum
considerations within the theme of the universal
theory of relativity whose certain characteristics
we have considered above.
E. Quantum aspects and the related
requirements of the Mathematical Foundations
for the Universal Theory of Relativity
Now, Bohr had captured [7] the “essence” of the
quantum theory in the following succinct words:
♠ ... The quantum theory is characterized by the
acknowledgement of a fundamental limitation in
the classical physical ideas when applied to atomic
phenomena. ... the so-called quantum postulate,
which attributes to any atomic process an essential
discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely
foreign to the classical theories. ...
... Strictly speaking, the idea of observation be-
longs to the causal spacetime way of description. ...
According to the quantum theory, just the impossi-
bility of neglecting the interaction with the agency
of measurement means that every observation in-
troduces a new uncontrollable element. ...
This postulate implies a renunciation as regards
the causal spacetime coordination of atomic pro-
cesses. Indeed, our usual description of physical
phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the
phenomena concerned may be observed without dis-
turbing them appreciably. This appears, for exam-
ple, clearly in the theory of relativity, which has
been so fruitful for the elucidation of the classi-
cal theories. As emphasized by Einstein, every ob-
servation or measurement ultimately rests on the
coincidence of two independent events at the same
spacetime point. Just these coincidences will not be
affected by any differences which the spacetime co-
ordination of different observers may exhibit. Now,
the quantum postulate implies that any observation
of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction
with the agency of observation not to be neglected.
Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary
physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phe-
nomena nor to the agencies of observation. ... ♠
Indeed, the quantum theory is then supposed to
acknowledge an essential limitation of the classical
newtonian ideas by recognizing that any observa-
tion of a physical system involves, necessarily, an
uncontrollable disturbance of that physical system.
This is, in spirit, similar to the special theory of rel-
ativity acknowledging a fundamental fact that we,
ordinarily, use electromagnetic radiation, Light, to
observe material bodies [8].
The quantum hypothesis, through Heisenberg’s
indeterminacy relations [4], then renders the exact
measurability of the coordination of the space and
the time questionable indeed. This is the decisive
role of indeterminacy relations.
Then, let us consider that an observer chooses a
certain spatial location as the origin of the coor-
dinate system and intends to attach spatial labels
to various events in the vicinity with respect to it.
The observer needs to use a measuring rod, made
using physical matter, to achieve this.
The observer intends to also attach suitable tem-
poral labels to each event in the vicinity. For this
purpose, the observer then needs to place, at each
suitable location in the vicinity, near the “physical
events” to be observed, physical bodies executing
periodic motions as clocks.
But, by the quantum postulate, these concepts
must involve indeterminacies. Neither the origin
of the coordinate system nor the coordinate labels
can be determined in a physical measurement any
more accurately than permitted by Heisenberg’s
relevant indeterminacy relation. The physical co-
ordination used by an observer cannot then be
identical with the (mathematical) coordination of
the underlying continuum, if any.
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But, this last is also the implication of the issues
involved with even the physical construction of the
coordinate frames.
Recall from § I B that the “coordinate axes” of
the reference frame must be using physical matter,
and, in general, motions of other material bodies
must affect the coordinate axes.
Now, to attach coordinate labels to various spa-
tial locations, the observer needs to “move” the
“measuring rod” suitably and measure distances
to these locations. But, changes must, in general,
result to the coordinate axes due to the motion of
the measuring rod. Therefore, the observer will not
be able to measure exactly the distances necessary
to label the spatial locations.
The same also applies to the measurement of the
physical time since any physical clock must be con-
structed from physical matter and any such mea-
surement involves the measurement of the location
of the hands of the clock.
Once again, we see even here that the physical
coordination used by an observer cannot be iden-
tical with the (mathematical) coordination of the
underlying continuum, if any.
It is then natural to expect that these issues of
the physical construction of the coordinate axes
and those of the quantum postulate are related to
each other in some manner.
But, of course, the observer will be able to “ne-
glect” these changes to the coordinate axes in some
situations. Then, in approximation, the observer
could peruse the classical equations.
Now, in Newton’s theory, ordinary material bod-
ies are considered as some “rigid” or “non-rigid”
collection of material points, bound together by
inter-particle forces.
“Spatial extensions and associated properties”
of material bodies then arise in Newton’s theory
only from such conceptions.
In Newton’s theory, a physical rod is then to be
treated as such a spatially extended physical ob-
ject. Of course, we then cannot determine the dis-
tances of locations from a chosen origin any more
accurately than the chosen unit - the spatial exten-
sion of the chosen physical rod. To be able to do
any better, we need to “divide” the physical rod
into smaller parts. Within Newton’s overall the-
oretical scheme, this is, evidently, the conceptual
origin of the involved experimental limitations of
the distance measurement. However, in principle,
the distance measurements can be as accurate as
desired in Newton’s theory.
But, when the concept of force is abandoned, as
has to be the situation with the “universal theory
of relativity,” the aforementioned newtonian con-
ception of an “extended physical object” too will
have to be suitably replaced.
Now, Bohr’s approach [11] permits us to postu-
late, notably, an exactly localizable material point,
a classical newtonian particle, to represent a phys-
ical body but shifts the onus of the indeterminate-
ness of its location entirely on the process of mea-
surement, a physical process constituted “exter-
nally” to the system being observed.
The use of classical concepts to describe an ex-
perimental arrangement is the basis of Bohr’s ap-
proach. Recall from [11]:
♠ ... by the word “experiment” we refer to a
situation where we can tell others what we have
done and what we have learned and that, therefore,
the account of the experimental arrangement and
of the results of the observations must be expressed
in unambiguous language with suitable application
of the terminology of classical physics.
This crucial point, ..., implies the impossibility
of any sharp separation between the behavior of
atomic objects and the interaction with the mea-
suring instruments which serve to define the condi-
tions under which the phenomena appear. ... Con-
sequently, evidence obtained under different exper-
imental conditions cannot be comprehended within
a single picture, but must be regarded as com-
plementary in the sense that only the totality of
the phenomena exhausts the possible information
about the objects.
Under these circumstances an essential element
of ambiguity is involved in ascribing conventional
physical attributes to atomic objects, as is at once
evident in the dilemma regarding the corpuscu-
lar and wave properties of electrons and photons,
where we have to do with contrasting pictures,
each referring to an essential aspect of empirical
evidence. ... ♠
Bohr then insists on the use of “classical ideas”
(including the concept of force) for the “descrip-
tion” of the quantum properties of matter. Only
the “classical concepts” permit him an experimen-
tal arrangement to be constituted externally to the
system being observed because these concepts in-
volve agencies, forces, fundamentally external to
any conceivable system.
But, the newtonian point-particle then cannot
describe the “evidence” related to the wave phe-
nomena displayed by electrons, say. As shown by
Heisenberg [4], the corpuscular picture is limited
by the indeterminacy relations, which are then in-
terpreted to mean a definite lack of sharp distinc-
tion between the interaction of electron with the
instrument and the observed physical phenomenon
involving electrons.
Bohr’s is then a “hybrid” approach that uses
classical concepts without “fundamentally chang-
ing” those concepts. But, it associates probability
aspects with the classical concepts.
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Recall from [11]:
♠ ... any arrangement suited to study the ex-
change of energy and momentum between the elec-
tron and the photon must involve a latitude in the
space-time description of the interaction sufficient
for the definition of wave-number and frequency ...
Conversely, any attempt of locating the collision
between the photon and the electron more accu-
rately would, on account of the unavoidable inter-
action with the fixed scales and clocks defining the
the space-time reference frame, exclude all closer
account as regards the balance of energy and mo-
mentum.
... an adequate tool for a complementary way
of description is offered precisely by the quantum
mechanical formalism which represents a purely
symbolic scheme permitting only predictions, on
lines of the correspondence principle, as to results
obtainable under conditions specified by means of
classical concepts. ... Thus, a sentence like “we
cannot know both the momentum and the position
of an atomic object” raises at once questions as to
the physical reality of two such attributes of the
object, which can be answered only by referring
to the conditions for the unambiguous use of the
space-time concepts, on the one hand, and dynam-
ical conservation laws, on the other hand. While
the combination of these concepts into a single pic-
ture of a causal chain of events is the essence of
classical mechanics, room for regularities beyond
the grasp of such a description is just afforded by
the circumstance that the study of the complemen-
tary phenomena demands mutually exclusive ex-
perimental arrangements. ♠
When the classical concepts are retained without
fundamental modifications, the “quantum postu-
late” imposes the viewpoint that certain classical
concepts are “complementary” in accounting for
the physical experiences.
Bohr [7, 11] then explains the indeterminacy re-
lations as mathematical realizations of the comple-
mentarity of the involved classical conceptions and
supports their probabilistic basis.
Recall, once again from [11], that Bohr had been
“critical” of even the conceptual foundations of the
relativity theory:
♠ ...causal description is upheld in relativity the-
ory within any given frame of reference, but in
quantum theory the uncontrollable interaction be-
tween the objects and the measuring instruments
forces us to a renunciation even in such respect. ♠
and went on to express optimism that:
♠ ... the viewpoint of complementarity may be
regarded as a rational generalization of the very
ideal of causality. ♠
Whether this optimism can be upheld in a “hy-
brid” approach, as is Bohr’s, is doubtful.
Now, as seen before, certain newtonian concepts,
in particular, the concept of force, will have to
be fundamentally abandoned to accommodate the
General Principle of Relativity.
Consequently, in the context of various implica-
tions of the General Principle of Relativity, Bohr’s
complementarity hypothesis will be “limited” as an
explanation of the indeterminacy relations whose
basis must now be sought within only the context
of those implications.
Thence, in relation to the above discussion, we
now recall from § ID that, in the Universal Theory
of Relativity, transformations of the points of the
underlying space are to replace, naturally, the no-
tion of force in Newton’s theory. A transformation
of the points of the underlying space is the only
“cause” of the motion of a chosen material body
in the universal theory of relativity.
Then, a transformation of the underlying space
can be performed which does not affect the ma-
terial body whose location is being measured, but
“moves” only the measuring rod in use in the man-
ner desired by the observer for the involved mea-
surement. Notably, such a transformation is to
represent then “all” the actions, including that of
the (electromagnetic) radiation, if any, in the same
measurement process.
Now, if a material body were to be representable
as an “exactly localizable material point” within
this theoretical framework then, it would be pos-
sible to measure the “exact” location of that ma-
terial body by employing a transformation of the
aforementioned type.
[In this context, we note that force in Newton’s
theory can be looked upon as a transformation of
the points of the Euclidean space. Newton’s the-
ory represents a physical body as an exactly lo-
calizable material point. Then, it is possible in
Newton’s theory to measure the exact location of
the material point because a transformation that
does not affect the material point but moves only
the measuring rod is permissible.]
In other words, we could locate, exactly, a ma-
terial point by moving a measuring rod by its
side without affecting the location of that mate-
rial point since a transformation of the underlying
space that achieves this, including Light to “see”
the process, is, now, thinkable.
This would, however, violate the indeterminacy
relations which arise, naturally, from the quantum
postulate that has the impeccable support of the
empirical evidence of great value.
Then, in the context of the General Principle
of Relativity, the quantum postulate implies that
it must be impossible in the theory to hypothesize
an exactly localizable material point to represent a
physical object. Hence, an intrinsic indeterminacy
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in the location of a material point representing a
physical body is implied here.
In the Universal Theory of Relativity, the origin
of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations will then
be a combination of this intrinsic indeterminacy
in the location of a material point representing a
material body and the transformation of the un-
derlying space that is the “cause” of the motion of
that material point.
An “act of observation” involves transformation
of points of the underlying space representing the
observed physical system and also of points of the
space representing the used measuring apparatus.
Then, transformations of the underlying space and
intrinsic indeterminacies are the keys to quantum
aspects of matter.
Now, a transformation of the points of the un-
derlying space is to represent unique evolution of a
physical system fixed deterministically by the ini-
tial conditions. (See, for details, § II.) Then, an
observation of a physical system may involve the
“disturbance” of that particular system, but not an
uncontrollable or unpredictable disturbance. The
viewpoint that “any act of observation of a physi-
cal system involves, necessarily, an uncontrollable
disturbance of that physical system” will have to
be rested therefore.
The quantum hypothesis thus acknowledges the
existence of an intrinsic indeterminacy in the very
conceptualization of a material point to represent a
physical body. The mathematical formalism of the
universal theory of relativity must then respect this
acknowledgement. This is, now, the “true essence”
of the quantum postulate.
Then, having renounced newtonian conceptions
at a fundamental level, we needed to “reanalyze”
various such aspects as discussed above.
Recapitulating, moving a material body from its
given “location” should cause changes to the con-
struction of the coordinate system and, hence, to
the “physical geometry” because the construction
of the coordinate system is the basis of the “metric
function” of the geometry.
In turn, “given the metric or the distance func-
tion of the geometry” we would know how the to-
tality of all the material bodies are “located” rel-
ative to each other.
Hence, the physical geometry is determined by
material bodies which, in turn, are also determined
by the physical geometry.
However, the issue remains of physical charac-
teristics of material bodies such as, for example,
their inertia, electrostatic charge etc.
Recalling implications of the quantum postulate
here, these physical “qualities” of material bodies
must, basically, be “definable” for various subsets,
but not for any singleton subset, of the underly-
ing space. (A singleton subset would otherwise be
an “exactly localizable” material point.) But, such
aspects belong to the framework of the mathemat-
ical theory of measures [34, 35].
The physical “qualities” of matter are then to be
treated as measures defined on certain subsets of
the underlying continuum. Such subsets are then
the basic physical objects for the universal the-
ory of relativity and each physical object can be
viewed, necessarily, as a measurable set [34, 35] of
the corresponding measure space.
But, a measure can be averaged over a measur-
able set, the average being a property of each point
of that set. The averaged measure then provides
[3, 33] the non-singular notion of a point-object
with the physical characteristics.
But, the “location” of the point-object so de-
fined is indeterminate within the measurable set.
This mathematical situation is precisely in accord
with the requirement as imposed by the quantum
postulate on the mathematical formalism of the
universal theory of relativity.
Then, the physical distance separating two ma-
terial objects is the appropriate mathematical dis-
tance between the corresponding measurable sets.
“Kinematical” quantities such as “velocity” and
“acceleration” (for one measurable set relatively to
another measurable set) involve change in the so-
defined physical distance under the action of the
transformation T
t
of the underlying space. The
parameter t of T
t
“defines” time in an appropriate
sense as will be discussed later in § II.
Various physical phenomena can then arise from
the effects of transformations of the underlying
space on the measurable sets and the measures de-
fined on them. This is then the framework of the
theory of dynamical systems.
Then, these ideas as well as their mathematical
renderings are, evidently, fundamentally different
from those of Newton’s theory, of special relativity
and, of orthodox quantum theory.
Notably, there “do not occur” any “physical con-
stants” to be “specified by hand” in this above
framework. But, all the physical constants can
arise in this framework only from “mutual relation-
ships” of involved physical objects, just exactly as
we determine them experimentally.
For example, consider the phenomenon of grav-
itation within the present conceptual framework.
It involves the action of T
t
for which the “acceler-
ation” experienced by one measurable set, in rela-
tion to another reference measurable set, is inde-
pendent of the “measure” defined on that set, but
is proportional to the measure defined on the ref-
erence measurable set, both measure classes being
invariant under T
t
. (In general, measures change
under the action of T
t
.)
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Newton’s gravitational constant then “arises”
when “acceleration” is expressed as the “inverse-
square” of the physical distance. (This demonstra-
tion is, of course, somewhat involved, and will be
the subject of an independent study.) Clearly, the
possibility of theoretically obtaining the “value”
of Newton’s constant of gravitation can be seen to
arise in this manner within the overall framework
of the Universal Relativity.
Furthermore, it should also be equally clear that,
within universal relativity, other physical constants
can similarly “arise” from different permissible sit-
uations, mutual relationships of measurable sets
and the effects of transformations of the underly-
ing space on them.
Clearly, the “values” of such physical constants
cannot be changed “without” destroying the the-
ory and this situation is, precisely, as per Einstein’s
theorem [16] (p. 63) quoted earlier.
This above is recognizable as an extremely im-
portant issue for any complete physical theory.
Whether such theoretically obtained values of the
fundamental physical constants are also their ex-
perimentally determined values is then another ex-
tremely important issue for us.
Notably, an observer, possessing any conscious-
ness or not, has only the “background” role to play
in the Universal Theory of Relativity. Nowhere
in this theory, in its explanations of physical phe-
nomena, do we require the “intervention” by an
“observer.” The problems of incorporating a con-
scious observer within its conceptual framework do
not therefore arise. Newton’s theory also had the
same role for an observer.
Transformation of the underlying space is then
a unique evolution of the points of the space. It
therefore represents unique evolution of a physi-
cal system “fixed” deterministically by the initial
conditions. Consequently, the Universal Theory
of Relativity provides therefore [16] “the complete
description of any individual real situation as it
supposedly exists irrespective of any act of obser-
vation or substantiation.”
Importantly, it should also be clear at this stage
of our considerations that in pursuing the Univer-
sal Theory of Relativity we shall be led to explana-
tions of general physical phenomena that are “rad-
ically different” from those of the newtonian ways
as well as from those of the ways of the orthodox
(probabilistic) quantum theory.
In this above context, it needs to be stressed, and
re-stressed, that all the known experimental results
would be explainable within the overall framework
of the Universal Theory of Relativity by treating
the “standard forces” as corresponding transfor-
mations of some suitable space underlying the Uni-
versal Theory of Relativity.
Needless to say, we will then have to analyze, in
the framework of Universal Relativity, each of the
known physical phenomena case by case to check
if certain new predictions are permissible for the
case under study.
An example of such a type is provided in § III
in the form of an analysis of the torsion balance
experiment. In particular, the use of the newtonian
gravitational force implies that the torsion balance
will always be torqued when some external masses
are moved around it.
As had been remarked earlier, the existence of
torqued motion of the torsion balance is explain-
able in Universal Relativity by treating the new-
tonian total force on it as a corresponding trans-
formation of the space underlying the Universal
Theory of Relativity.
However, in Universal Relativity, there does oc-
cur a situation when the transformation of the un-
derlying space does not act on the torsion balance
to produce its oscillatory motion even when the
external masses are moved around it. In this situ-
ation, a null result obtains irrespective of the speed
of motion of external masses.
Certainly, a very careful torsion balance experi-
ment involving dynamic measurements needs to be
designed to verify this null effect situation. Per-
haps, some very carefully selected geometrical de-
sign of the torsion balance experiment may also be
needed for this purpose.
We conclude this section, § I, with the follow-
ing remarks that highlight the spirit behind our
endeavors of this discussion.
The approach followed in this discussion, of § I,
presents the Universal Theory of Relativity as
an appealing, but not as a simplest, system of
thoughts. We essentially developed the physical
foundations of this theory as being psychologically
“natural” or appealing.
One could however perceive this approach as also
being a logically compelling one. This is primar-
ily because, apart from the concept of transfor-
mation of suitable space, there appears to be no
another sufficiently general mathematical concept
to replace the newtonian notion of force, it also
being in conformity with the general principle of
relativity and, simultaneously, allowing the physi-
cal constructions of reference frames to be affected
by motions of other bodies.
Granted this above and having then laid the
physical foundations for the Universal Theory of
Relativity in sufficient details, let us now turn to
mathematical aspects implied by these consider-
ations. Mathematical foundations for this theory
then rest on the mathematical theories of measures
and dynamical systems, both. This much is a cer-
tain conclusion of the above.
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II. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE UNIVERSAL THEORY OF
RELATIVITY
In Einstein’s (and Descartes’s) conceptions [9],
physical geometry is not any inert stage for the
physical fields. This notion of physical geometry
will be made precise in the following.
As we aim to interest general physics community
here, we provide below basic mathematical notions
[30–32, 34, 35] to be used frequently. A knowledge-
able reader may wish to skip it.
A. Preparatory Mathematical Notions
Sets, Topologies, Groups, Measures ...
Let N be the set of natural numbers, Q that of
rational numbers, R that of real numbers, 2 the
binary set {0, 1} and Z the set of integers.
A collection of all subsets of a chosen set X is
a Power Set, P(X), of X . A set of all k-tuples,
(x1, x2, ..., xk), of elements of X is X
k. The set of
all finite sequences of elements of X , including the
empty sequence, is X<N.
A family F of nonempty sets is said to have the
finite intersection property if the intersection of ev-
ery finite subfamily of F is nonempty.
A cartesian product of sets X and Y is a set
X×Y of all ordered pairs (x, y) with x ∈ X and y ∈
Y . A cartesian product of a sequence of sets X1,
X2, ..., Xn will be, usually, denoted by
∏n
i=1Xi or
by ×ni=1Xi.
A relation R : X → Y is any set of ordered pairs
(x, y). Note that R ⊆ X × Y . A set of all ordered
pairs (y, x) whenever (x, y) ∈ R is an inverse re-
lation R− 1. A composition of relations f and g
is a relation g ◦ f = {(x, z) : for some y, (x, y) ∈ f
and (y, z) ∈ g}. The set △X = {(a, a) : a ∈ X} is
the diagonal (relation) on set X .
The set Gf = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y = f(x)} is
called as the graph of f . The set X is called the
domain and the set Y is called the co-domain of
f . The element x ∈ X is called the pre-image of
y ∈ Y if y = f(x). The set {f(x) : x ∈ X} is called
the range of f .
A single-valued relation is a function, map or a
transformation. It can be many to one. A function
f : X → R is simple if its range is finite.
A function f : X → Y is injective or 1-1 if for
all x, y ∈ X, f(x) = f(y) ⇒ x = y. A function
f : X → Y is surjective or onto if for each y ∈ Y
there is some x ∈ X such that f(x) = y. A 1-1 and
onto function is bijective. A bijection p : A → A
is called a permutation of the set A.
The collection of all functions from set Y to set
X forms a set which is denoted by XY .
An equivalence relation on a set X is a relation
∼ ⊂ X ×X such that for all x, y, z ∈ X
(i) x ∼ x (reflexive)
(ii) x ∼ y ⇒ y ∼ x (symmetric) and
(iii) x ∼ y and y ∼ z ⇒ x ∼ z (transitive).
A set of all y ∈ X such that x ∼ y is the
equivalence class of x, denoted by R[x].
A family D of pairwise disjoint nonempty sub-
sets of a set X such that
⋃
iDi = X : Di ∈ D is a
decomposition or partition of X .
There exists a 1-1 correspondence, ie, bijection,
from the set of all equivalence relations of X and
the set of all decompositions of X .
The decomposition of a set X by an equivalence
relation R is the quotient set of X by R or set of
quotient classes modulo R, denoted by XupslopeR. The
function p : X → XupslopeR, p(x) = R[x] for x ∈ X is
the projection or quotient function.
A strict order on X is a transitive relation, ie,
(xRy and yRz) ⇒ xRz, and ∀ a ∈ X , (a, a) /∈ R.
For any strict order R, aRb and bRa⇒ a = b for
all a, b ∈ X , anti-symmetry.
Two sets A and B are equinumerous or of the
same cardinality if there exists a 1-1 map, bijec-
tion, f from A to B. A set A is finite if there is a
bijection from {0, 1, ..., n}, n ∈ N, onto A. If A is
not finite, it is infinite. A set A is countable if it is
finite or if there exists a bijection from N onto A.
An uncountable set is not countable.
To each setX we can associate a symbol, |X |, its
cardinal number, such that X = Y ⇐⇒ |X | and
|Y | are the same. Some cardinals are denoted by
special symbols, eg, |{0, 1, ..., n − 1}| = n, n ∈ N;
|N| = ℵo and |R| = c. We can add, multiply as well
as compare cardinal numbers by suitably defining
cardinal arithmetic.
Note that we have ℵo < |2N| = 2ℵo = c, and
ℵo+ℵo = ℵo · ℵo = ℵo, and cn = cℵo = c (n > 1),
and |NN| = c etc.
If A ⊂ X , its characteristic function is a many-
one map χ
A
: X → 2, where χ
A
(x) = 1 if x ∈ A
and χ
A
(x) = 0 otherwise. Then, A→ χ
A
defines a
1-1 map from P(X) onto the set 2X . Note that if
a set X has n elements then, the power set P(X)
has 2n elements.
For an extended real-valued function f : X → R,
the set {x ∈ X | f(x) 6= 0} = Support (f) is a
support of f on X .
A real-valued function u : E → R is said to
dominate another function v : E → R if v(ǫ) ≤
u(ǫ) for all ǫ ∈ E.
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A partial order on a set P is a binary relation
R which is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
A set P with a partial order R is a partially ordered
set or a poset. A linear or total or simple order on
a set X is a partial order R on X such that for any
x, y ∈ X either xRy or yRx holds.
For any two sets X and Y , a partial function
f : X → Y is a function with domain a subset of
X and range contained in Y . If f , g are two partial
functions from X to Y then, g is extension of f , or
f is a restriction of g, if domain(f) ⊂ domain(g)
and f(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ domain(f), and we
write g  f or f  g. If f is a restriction of g and
domain(f) = A then, we write f = g|A.
A chain in a set P of a fixed poset (P,R) is a
subset C of P such that R restricted to C is a
linear order. An upper bound for a set A ⊆ P is
an x ∈ P such that yRx for all y ∈ A. An x ∈ P
is called a maximal element of P if for no y ∈ P
different from x, xRy holds.
An element x ∈ L of a linearly ordered set (L,≤)
is the first (last) element of L if x ≤ y (y ≤ x) for
every y ∈ L. A linearly ordered set L is order-
dense if for every x < y there exists z ∈ L such
that x < y < z. Two linearly ordered sets are
order isomorphic if there is a 1-1, order-preserving
map from one onto the other.
A well-order on a setW is a linear order ≤ onW
such that every nonempty subset A ofW has a first
element. If ≤ is a well-order on W then (W,≤),
or simply W , will be called a well-ordered set. For
w,w′ ∈W , we write w < w′ if w ≤ w′ and w 6= w′.
A linearly ordered set (W,≤) is well-ordered if and
only if there is no descending sequence wo > w1 >
w2 > ... in W .
Zorn’s Lemma: If P is a nonempty poset with
every chain in P having an upper bound in P ,
then P has a maximal element. Equivalently, we
have the Axiom of Choice: If {Ai}i∈I is a family
of nonempty sets, then there is a choice function
f : I →
⋃
iAi such that f(i) ∈ Ai for every i ∈ I.
Equivalently, we have the Well Ordering Principle:
every set can be well ordered.
If W1 and W2 are two well ordered sets and
if some f : W1 → W2 is an order preserving
bijection, we call the sets W1 and W2 as being
order isomorphic and f as an order isomorphism.
We write W1 ∼ W2. Order isomorphic sets are of
the same cardinality.
For well ordered set W , let w ∈ W and w− ∈W
be such that w− < w and suppose that there is no
v ∈ W satisfying w− < v < w. If existing, such
w− is a unique member ofW and is the immediate
predecessor of w and w is the successor of w−. If
a well ordered set W has an element w other than
the first element with no immediate predecessor,
such w ∈W is a limit element of W .
For W being a well ordered set and w ∈W , sets
of the formW (w) = {u ∈W : u < w} are called as
the initial segments ofW . Note that a well ordered
setW cannot be order isomorphic to an initial seg-
ment W (u) of itself.
Principles of induction on natural numbers ex-
tend to generally well ordered sets in the form of
the so called complete induction on well ordered
sets - proof by transfinite induction.
For two well ordered sets W1 and W2, let W1 ≺
W2 if W1 is order isomorphic to an initial segment
of W2. Further, let W1 W2 if either W1 ≺W2 or
W1 ∼W2. Then, the Trichotomy Theorem of Well
Ordered Sets states that for any two well ordered
sets W and W ′, exactly one of W ≺W ′, W ∼W ;
and W ′ ≺W holds.
To each well ordered set W , we can associate
a well ordered set t(W ), called the type of W ,
such that W ∼ t(W ) and if W ′ is another well
ordered set then, W ∼ W ′ ⇐⇒ t(W ) = t(W ′).
The fixed types of well ordered sets are called the
ordinal numbers and the class of the ordinal num-
bers will be denoted byON. Clearly, |W | = |t(W )|
and, hence, α = t(W ). We say that an ordinal
α = t(W ) is of cardinality κ if |W | = κ.
Every ordinal α can be uniquely written as α =
β + n where β is a limit ordinal and n finite. We
call α even or odd if n is even or odd.
An ordinal α will be called successor ordinal if
α = β + 1 for some β, otherwise it will be called a
limit ordinal. Note that α is a limit ordinal if and
only if any well ordered set W such that α = t(W )
has no last element.
A set of all countable ordinals is an uncountable
well-ordered set, denoted by ω1, and the type of
t(ω1) will also be denoted by ω1. Then, ω1 is
the first uncountable ordinal. Cardinals are identi-
fied with initial ordinals, and each is then denoted
by the symbol ℵ. Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis
states that c = ℵ1.
Ordinal numbers can be added, multiplied and
compared by defining, suitably, the ordinal arith-
metic with ordinal addition and multiplication as
non-commutative operations in ON.
Now, for s ∈ A<N, A non-empty set, let |s| be
the length of s. Let s = (ao, a1, ..., an−1) ∈ A
<N
and m < n, we write s|m = (ao, a1, ..., am−1). If
t = s|m, we say that t is an initial segment of
s or that s is an extension of t, and we write
t ≺ s or s ≻ t. We write t  s if either t ≺ s
or t = s. We say that s and t are compatible if
one of them is an extension of the other, other-
wise they are said to be incompatible, written s⊥t.
The concatenation (ao, a1, ..., an−1, bo, b1, ..., bm−1)
of s = (ao, a1, ..., an−1) and t = (bo, b1, ..., bm−1)
will be denoted by ŝ t.
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Then, a tree, T , on a set A is a nonempty subset
of A<N such that if s ∈ T and t ≺ s then t ∈ T .
Empty sequence e belongs to all trees. Elements
of T are called nodes of T . A node u of T is called
terminal if for no a ∈ A, û a ∈ T . A tree is called
finitely splitting if for every node s of T , the set
{a ∈ A : ŝ a ∈ T } is finite. The body of a tree T on
a set A is the set [T ] =
{
α ∈ AN : ∀ k (α|k ∈ T )
}
.
Members of [T ] are the infinite branches of T . A
tree T is called well -founded if its body is empty
and if [T ] 6= ∅, T is called ill-founded.
A tree T is well-founded if and only if there is
no sequence {sn} ∈ T such that ... ≻ sn ≻ ... ≻
s1 ≻ so. If T is a tree and u a node of T then, the
set Tu =
{
v ∈ A<N : û v ∈ T
}
forms a tree.
Ko¨nig’s Infinity Lemma states and proves that
a finitely splitting, infinite tree T on a set A is ill-
founded. For a tree T on a finite set A, [T ] 6= ∅
⇐⇒ (∀ k ∈ N) (∃u ∈ T ) (|u| = k). Sets {e}, N<N
etc. form trees on N.
Consider a tree T on a well ordered set (A,≤).
Fix nodes s = (ao, a1, ..., an−1) and t = (bo, b1,
..., bm−1) of T . Set s <KB t if either t ≺ s or if
there is an i = min(m,n) such that aj = bj for
every j < i and ai < bi. Set s ≤KB t if either
s <
KB
t or s = t. The ordering ≤
KB
, the Kleene-
Brouwer order, is a linear order on T .
A tree T on a well ordered set A is well founded
if and only if ≤
KB
is a well order on T . Transfinite
induction extends to well founded trees.
For a well founded tree T , define ρ
T
: T → ON
by ρ
T
(u) = sup {ρ
T
(v) + 1 : u ≺ v, v ∈ T } , u ∈ T .
Define ρ
T
= ρ
T
(e) and call it the rank of T .
Note that ρ
T
(u) = 0 if u is terminal in T . Note
also that every well founded tree on the set 2 is of
finite rank.
Of importance is Cantor’s Ternary Set C defined
as follows. Take C0 = [0, 1]. Suppose Cn is defined
and is a union of 2n pairwise disjoint closed inter-
vals {Ij : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n} of length 1/3n each. Obtain
Cn+1 by removing the open middle third of each
Ij . Finally, put C =
⋂
n Cn.
Now, let F be some family of subsets of a set X .
Then, let Fσ =
{⋃
n∈NAn : An ∈ F
}
and Fδ ={⋂
n∈NAn : An ∈ F
}
. The family of finite unions
(intersections) of sets in F will be denoted by Fs
(Fd). Also, let ¬F = {A ⊆ X : X \A ∈ F} where
X \ A = Ac denotes the complement of A in X .
Then, evidently,
Fs ⊆ Fσ, Fd ⊆ Fδ, Fσ = ¬(¬F)δ, Fδ = ¬(¬F)σ
For a non-empty set X , a family{
As : s ∈ A
<N
}
of subsets of X is a system of sets, usually written
{As}. A system of sets {As} is called regular if
As ⊆ At whenever s ≻ t.
Now, define
A
A
({As}) =
⋃
α∈AN
⋂
n
Aα|n
In all the interesting cases A is finite or A = N.
When A = N, we write A for A
A
and call it
the Souslin operation. The Souslin operation is
idempotent: A (A(F)) = A (F). The Souslin op-
eration involves uncountable unions. If A = 2, we
write A2 for AA .
For the family F of subsets of a set X , let
A
A
(F) =
{
A
A
({As}) : As ∈ F ; s ∈ A
<N
}
be the family of sets obtained by applying the
Souslin operation on a system of sets in F . Then,
for every family F of subsets of X , we have
F ,Fσ,Fδ ⊆ A(F)
For s ∈ N<N, let Σ(s) = {α ∈ NN : s ≺ α} and
B =
⋂
k
⋃
|s|=k [As × Σ(s)]. Then, it is seen that
A({As}) = πX (B), where πX : X×N
N → X is the
projection map.
Now, any family T of subsets of X , with X
and ∅ being its members and such that it is closed
under arbitrary unions and finite intersections, is
called a Topology on X . A pair (X, T ) is called a
topological Space. Set A ∈ T is open. Set A ⊆ X
is closed if X \ A is open. Sets can be simulta-
neously open and closed, ie, clopen, eg, X and ∅,
trivially. There can be non-trivial clopen sets in a
topology on a set X .
For G ⊆ P(X), there exists topology T on X
containing G such that if T ′ is any topology con-
taining G, then T ⊆ T ′. The family G is said to
generate the topology T on X or G is a subbase
for the topology T on X . If G is countable, T is a
countably generated topology.
A base for a topology T on X is a family B of
sets in T such that every U ∈ T is a union of
elements in B. If G is a subbase for T , then the
family of finite intersections of elements of G is a
base for the topology T . A topological space is said
to be second countable if it has a countable base.
A subspace of a second countable topological space
is second countable.
A space (X, T ) is zero-dimensional if its base
consists of clopen sets. Product of a family of zero-
dimensional spaces is zero-dimensional.
For any A ⊆ X , cl(A) denotes the intersection of
all closed sets containing A and is called the closure
of A. It is the smallest closed set containing A.
The largest open set contained in a set A ⊂ X is
called the interior, int(A), of A. Any set U with
x ∈ int(U) is a neighborhood of x.
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An element x ∈ X is an accumulation point of
A ⊆ X if every neighborhood of x contains a point
of A other than x. The set of all accumulation
points of A is a derivative set of A, denoted by A′.
The elements of A \ A′ are the isolated points of
A. A set A ⊆ X is dense-in-itself if it is non-empty
and has no isolated points.
A set D ⊆ X is dense in X if U
⋂
D 6= ∅ for
every non empty open set U . A topological space
X is separable if it has a countable dense set. R3
is a separable topological space.
For A ⊆ X in (X, T ), a family U of sets whose
union contains A is called a cover of A. A subfam-
ily of U that is a cover of A is called a subcover.
The set A is called compact if every open cover of
A admits a finite subcover.
If X is a compact space, every closed subset of
X is compact. Notably, any closed and bounded
subset of R3 is compact. Also, the Cantor ternary
set is closed and bounded and, hence, is compact
in I = [0, 1].
A map f : X → Y , X and Y being topological
spaces, is called continuous if and only if f− 1(V ) is
open (closed) in X for every open (closed) subset
V in Y .
A continuous image of a compact space or its
compact subset is compact.
A function f : X → Y is a homeomorphism if it
is a bijection and both f and f− 1 are continuous.
A homeomorphism f from X onto a subspace of Y
is called an embedding.
A subset A of a topological space X is called
as a retract of X if there is a continuous function
f : X → A such that f |A is an identity map.
In such a case, f is called a retraction. If X is
metrizable, A = {x ∈ X : f(x) = x} is closed
when A is a retract and f a retraction.
A metric space is a pair (X, d) where X is a set,
d : X ×X → R is a (real-valued) metric function
that satisfies, ∀ x, y, z ∈ X ,
(a) d(x, y) ≥ 0 and d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y,
(b) d(x, y) = d(y, x) (Symmetry property), and
(c) d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y)+d(y, z) (Triangle inequality).
A pseudo-metric space is a pair (X, ℓ) where X
is a set, ℓ : X×X → R is a pseudo-metric function
that satisfies, ∀ x, y, z ∈ X ,
(a′) ℓ(x, y) ≥ 0 and ℓ(x, x) = 0
as well as the above properties (b) and (c) of the
metric function.
Define on set X of a pseudo-metric space (X, ℓ)
an equivalence relation, ∼, such that x ∼ y iff
ℓ(x, y) = 0. Let Y = {∼ [x] : x ∈ X}. Further,
define for A,B ∈ Y a canonical metric function on
Y as e(A,B) = ℓ(x, y) where x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
Now, let Π : X → Y be the natural projection,
ie, for x ∈ X , Π(x) = {y ∈ X : x ∼ y} =∼ [x].
The function Π is an isometry: it preserves the
canonical metric function e.
Define B(x, r) = {y ∈ X : d(x, y) < r}, where
x ∈ X and r > 0, as an open ball with center x
and radius r. Then, defining the family T as the
set of all subsets U of X such that U is the union of
a family of open balls in X , we obtain a topology
induced by the metric d on X .
A topological space (X, T ) whose topology is in-
duced by the metric d is a metrizable (topological)
space. (A pseudo-metric topology is defined ex-
actly as the metric topology.)
Two metrics d1 and d2 (or two pseudo-metrics
ℓ1 and ℓ2) on a set X are said to be topologically
equivalent to each other if they induce the same
topology T on X .
For any two points x = (x1, x2, x3) and y =
(y1, y2, y3) in R3, d(x, y) =
√∑3
i=1 (xi − yi)
2 is
called the usual (Euclidean) metric of R3. It in-
duces a usual topology on R3.
For any set X , function d: d(x, y) = 0 if x = y
and d(x, y) = 1 otherwise, defines a discrete metric
on X . Discrete metric induces a discrete topology
on X consisting of all subsets of X .
Let {xn} be a sequence of elements ofX of (X, d)
and x ∈ X . {xn} is said to converge to x, written
xn → x or limxn = x, if d(xn, x) → 0 as n → ∞.
Such an x is called the limit of {xn}. A sequence
can have at most one limit.
A function f : (X, d)→ (Y, ρ) is called uniformly
continuous on X if for any ǫ > 0 ∃ δ > 0 such that
d(x, y) < δ ⇒ ρ (f(x), f(y)) < ǫ for any x, y ∈ X .
A function f : (X, d) → (Y, ρ) is an isometry if
ρ (f(x), f(y)) = d(x, y) ∀x, y ∈ X .
A subset of a metrizable space is called a Gδ-set
if it is a countable intersection of open sets. Hence,
a closed subset of metrizable space is a Gδ set. The
complement of a Gδ set is called as an Fσ-set. It
is a countable union of closed sets. Every open set
of a metrizable space is an Fσ set.
Let fn, f : (X, d)→ (Y, ρ). Then, the sequence,
(fn), of functions is said to converge pointwise to f
if for all x, fn(x)→ f(x) as n→∞. Furthermore,
we say that fn converges uniformly to f if for any
ǫ > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that whenever
n ≥ N , ρ (fn(x), f(x)) < ǫ for all x ∈ X .
A map f : X → R, X a metric space, is called
as upper-semicontinuous (lower-semicontinuous)
if for every real number a, the set {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥
a} ({x ∈ X : f(x) ≤ a}) is closed.
A sequence {xn} in a metric space (X, d) is
called a Cauchy sequence if for every ǫ > 0, there is
N ∈ N such that d (xn, xm) < ǫ for all m,n ≥ N .
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A metric d on set X is called complete metric if
every Cauchy sequence in (X, d) is convergent. A
metric space is called complete if d is complete on
X . A metric that is topologically equivalent to a
complete metric need not be complete.
An arbitrary subspace of a complete metric
space need not be complete but a closed subspace
is. R3 with the usual metric is complete.
A topological space X is called locally compact
if every point of X has a compact neighborhood.
R3 is a locally compact space.
If {Xi : i ∈ I} is a family of topological spaces,
X =
∏
i∈I Xi, and πi : X → Xi, i ∈ I, then
the smallest topology on X making each projection
map πi continuous is called the product topology.
The set
{
π− 1(U) : U open in Xi, i ∈ I
}
is a sub-
base for the product topology.
For any set A ⊆ X , we define diameter(A) =
sup {d(x, y) : x, y ∈ A}. Clearly, for set A ⊆ X ,
diameter(A) = diameter (cl(A)).
A topological space is completely metrizable if
the topology is induced by a complete metric. A
separable, completely metrizable topological space
is called a Polish space. Clearly, every second
countable, completely metrizable topological space
is a Polish space.
Any countable discrete space is Polish. N and
2 with discrete topologies are Polish. R, Rn, I =
[0, 1], In with the usual topologies are Polish. Ev-
ery Gδ subset of a Polish space X is Polish. The
product of countably many Polish spaces is Pol-
ish. NN, the Hilbert Cube H = [0, 1]N and the
Cantor space 2N = C are Polish.
Note that the space NN is homeomorphic to the
space of positive irrational numbers in the open
interval (0, 1). The homeomorphism is achieved by
associating an infinite sequence (no, n1, n2, ...) to a
continued fraction 1/(no+ (1/n1+(1/n2+ ...))) ∈
(0, 1). Therefore, we shall also refer to Υ = NN as
the space of irrational numbers.
Notice that each of the topological spaces Υ×Υ,
Υk, k = 1, 2, 3, ..., Υk×Υl (k, l = 1, 2, 3...) and ΥN
are homeomorphic to NN.
Every Gδ subset of NN is homeomorphic to a
closed subset of NN. Every Polish space is a con-
tinuous image of NN.
For every Polish space X , there is a closed set
F ⊆ NN and a 1-1, continuous surjection g : F →
X such that g (U
⋂
F ) is an Fσ set in X for every
open set U ∈ NN.
Every uncountable Polish space X contains a
homeomorph of the Cantor Ternary Set and a
homeomorph also of NN. Every uncountable Polish
space is of cardinality c.
Every closed subspace of a Polish space is Pol-
ish. If Xo, X1, X2, ... is a finite or infinite se-
quence of Polish spaces then, so is their product
Y =
∏∞
i=0Xi a Polish space. Every compact met-
ric space is a Polish space.
Spaces NN and C are important to us. A com-
plete metric on NN compatible with its topology is
ρ(α, β) = 1/ (min{n : α(n) 6= β(n)} + 1) if α 6= β
and ρ(α, β) = 0 otherwise. For s ∈ N<N let
Σ(s) = {α ∈ NN : s ≺ α}. The family of sets
{Σ(s) : s ∈ N<N} is a clopen base for NN. Hence,
NN is a zero-dimensional Polish space.
For each s ∈ N<N, Σ(s) is homeomorphic to NN.
EveryGδ subset of NN is homeomorphic to a closed
subset of NN.
Also, for every Polish space X , there is a closed
subset F ⊆ NN and a 1-1, continuous surjection
g : F → X such that g (U
⋂
F ) is an Fσ set in X
for every open set U in NN.
Let A be a discrete topological space and the
set X = AN be equipped with product topology.
Then, X is a zero-dimensional completely metriz-
able space, it is Polish if and only if A is countable.
The set
{
α ∈ AN : s ≺ α
}
with s ∈ A<N is the base
for its topology. We also denote it by Σ(s).
If f is a continuous function on a subset of a
metric space with values in a Polish space Y then,
there exists a continuous extension of f to a Gδ
set. Lavrentiev’s Theorem proves further that: Let
A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y , X and Y being Polish spaces.
Suppose f : A → B is a homeomorphism. Then,
there exist Gδ subsets A ⊆ A1 ⊆ X and B ⊆ B1 ⊆
Y and a homeomorphism f1 : A1 → B1 which
extends f .
A topological space X is a Polish space if and
only if it is homeomorphic to a Gδ subset of the
Hilbert cube. Every Gδ subset G of a completely
metrizable (Polish) space is completely metrizable
(Polish). The converse of the above, Alexandrov’s
Theorem, is also true.
Let X be a compact metrizable space and Y
a Polish space. Let C(X,Y ) be the set of con-
tinuous functions from X into Y . Let a com-
patible complete on Y be ρ and define δ(f, g) =
supx∈X ρ (f(x), g(x)) , f, g ∈ C(X,Y ). It is a com-
plete metric on C(X,Y ). The topology on C(X,Y )
induced by the complete metric δ above is called
the topology of uniform convergence.
If (X, d) is a compact metric space and (Y, ρ) is
Polish, then C(X,Y ) equipped with the topology
of uniform convergence is Polish.
For non-empty A ⊆ X of (X, d) and ∀x ∈ X ,
define d (x,A) = min {d(x, a) : a ∈ A}. It is the
distance from the point x to the set A.
Now, for a topological space (X, T ), consider the
family K(X) of all non-empty compact subsets of
X . The topology on K(X) generated by compact
subsets of X of the form {K ∈ K(X) : K ⊆ U}
and {K ∈ K(X) : K
⋂
U 6= ∅}, U open in X , is
called the Vietoris topology.
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The sets [Uo, U1, ..., Un] = {K ∈ K(X) : K ⊆ Uo
& K
⋂
Ui 6= ∅, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, with Uo, U1, ..., Un open
in X , form a base for K(X). The set of all finite,
non-empty subsets of X is dense in K(X).
On the family K(X), we define the Hausdorff
metric δH as
δH(K,L) = max
(
max
x∈K
d(x, L), max
y∈L
d(y,K)
)
The Hausdorff metric δH induces the Vietoris
topology onK(X). IfX is separable, so isK(X). If
(X, d) is a complete metric space, so is (K(X), δH).
If (X, d) is Polish, so is (K(X), δH).
If X is a metrizable space, then the setKf (X) =
{L ∈ K(X) : L is finite} is an Fσ set. Any com-
pact, dense-in-itself set is called perfect. Then,
for a separable and metrizable space X , the set
Kp(X) = {L ∈ K(X) : L is perfect} is Gδ.
For a locally compact Polish space X and a
base B(X) for its Polish topology, B(X) can be
given a topology generated by sets of the type:
(S ∈ B(X) : S
⋂
K = ∅&S
⋂
U1 6= ∅&S
⋂
U2 6=
∅&...&S
⋂
Un 6= ∅) whereK ranges over the com-
pact subsets of X and U1, U2, ..., Un range over
open sets in X . It is called the Fell topology, and
B(X) with the Fell topology is Polish.
A subset A of (X, T ) is no-where dense if cl(A)
has empty interior, ie, if X \ cl(A) is dense. For
every closed set A, A \ int(A) is nowhere dense.
Then, a set A is nowhere dense iff every nonempty
open set U contains another nonempty open set V
such that A
⋂
V = ∅.
A set A ⊆ X is meager or of first category in
X if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets.
Every meager set is contained in a meager Fσ set.
A set which is not meager is of second category in
X . A subset A is co-meager in X if X\A is meager
in X . A ⊆ X is co-meager in X iff it contains a
countable intersection of dense open sets.
Let (X, d) be Polish and d a complete metric
with diameter(X) < 1. Fix a nonempty set A. A
Souslin scheme on X is a system
{
Fs : s ∈ A<N
}
of subsets of X such that
(i) cl(Fŝ a) ⊆ Fs for all s and a
(ii) for all α ∈ AN, diameter(Fα|n)→ 0 as n→∞.
A Souslin scheme is a Lusin scheme if in addition
to (i) and (ii) above the following is also satisfied:
(iii) for every s, t ∈ A<N, s⊥t⇒ Fs
⋂
Ft = ∅.
A Cantor scheme is a Lusin scheme with A = 2
and each Fs is closed and nonempty.
For a Souslin scheme
{
Fs : s ∈ A<N
}
, equip
AN with the product of discrete topologies on A.
Then,
(a) the set D =
{
α ∈ AN : ∀n
(
Fα|n 6= 0
)}
is a
closed set.
(b) The set
⋂
n Fα|n =
⋂
n cl
(
Fα|n
)
is a singleton
for each α ∈ D.
Define f : D → X as {f(α)} =
⋂
n = Fα|n as
the associated map of the scheme. The map f is
continuous.
Further, if Fe = X and ∀ s (Fs =
⋃
n Fŝ n),
the associated map f is onto X . For a Lusin
scheme f is one to one and, for a Cantor scheme{
Fs : s ∈ 2<N
}
, f is an embedding in X .
The Cantor-Bendixson Theorem proves that ev-
ery separable space X can be written as X =
Y
⋃
Z where Z is countable, Y closed with no iso-
lated point and Y
⋂
Z = ∅. Also, every uncount-
able Polish space X contains a homeomorph of C
and of NN.
An equivalence relation E ⊆ X ×X on a Polish
space is closed (open, Gδ, Fσ etc.) if E is a closed
(open, Gδ, Fσ etc.) subset of X ×X .
An algebra on a setX is a collectionA of subsets
of X such that
(a) X ∈ A,
(b) whenever A ∈ A, Ac ≡ X \A ∈ A,
(c) A is closed under finite unions. As X ∈ A,
∅ ≡ Xc ∈ A.
An algebra closed under countable unions is called
as a σ-algebra.
Note that any σ-algebra is either finite or of car-
dinality at least c.
For any set X , B1 = {∅, X} and B2 = P(X)
are called the indiscrete and discrete σ-algebras,
respectively. If the set X is an uncountable set
then, A = {A ⊆ X : either A or Ac is countable}
is a countable-cocountable σ-algebra.
A measurable space is an ordered pair (X,A)
with A being a σ-algebra of the subsets of the set
X . Members of the σ-algebra A are called as the
measurable sets.
An intersection of a non-empty family of σ-
algebras on a set X is a σ-algebra.
Let S be the family of all σ-algebras on X con-
taining a family G of subsets of X . Clearly, S is
always nonempty. Then, the intersection of all the
members of S is the smallest σ-algebra, σ(G), con-
taining G. σ(G) is said to be generated by G. A
σ-algebra A is said to be countably generated if it
has a countable generator.
If Ao, A1, ..., An ∈ A, A is a σ-algebra on set X ,
then the sets
⋂
nAn = (
⋃
nA
c
n)
c
, lim supnAn ≡⋂
n
⋃
m≥nAm and lim infnAn ≡
⋃
n
⋂
m≥nAm will
always be some of the measurable sets in the mea-
surable space (X,A).
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Now, for (X,A) with A = σ(G), suppose x, y ∈
X are such that for every G ∈ G, x ∈ G if and only
if y ∈ G. Then, for all A ∈ A, x ∈ A if and only if
y ∈ A because B = {A ⊆ X : x ∈ A⇐⇒ y ∈ A} is
a σ-algebra containing G.
Next, if (X,B) is a measurable space, G a gen-
erator of B, then there exists a countable G′ ⊆ G
such that A ∈ σ(G′).
Let D ⊆ P(X) and Y ⊆ X . We set D|Y =
{B
⋂
Y : B ∈ D}. If (X,B) is measurable space
and Y ⊆ X then, B|Y is an induced σ-algebra on
Y , also called the trace of B. If G generates B
then, G|Y generates B|Y .
Unless stated otherwise, a subset of a measurable
space will be assumed to be equipped with the trace
or the induced σ-algebra.
A collection M of subsets of a set X is called
monotone class if it is closed under countable
non-increasing intersections and countable non-
decreasing unions. The Monotone Class Theorem
states that the smallest monotone class M con-
taining an algebra A on a set X equals σ(A), the
σ-algebra generated by A.
The σ-algebra generated by the topology on a
measurable spaceX is called a Borel σ-algebra and
will be denoted by BX . Sets in BX will be called
Borel in X . For an uncountable Polish space, the
Borel σ-algebra is of cardinality c.
Unless explicitly stated to the contrary, a metriz-
able space will be assumed to be equipped with its
Borel σ-algebra.
Note that the Borel σ-algebra of a metrizable
space X equals the smallest family BO (BC) of
subsets of X that contains all open (closed) sets
and that is closed under countable intersections
and countable unions, ie, BX = BO = BC .
The Borel σ-algebra BX of a metrizable space X
can also be seen to equal the smallest family of sub-
sets of X that contains all open (closed) subsets of
X and that is closed under countable intersections
and countable disjoint unions.
A measurable set A 6= ∅ of a measurable space
(X,A) is an A-atom if it has no non-empty mea-
surable proper subset. No two distinct atoms in-
tersect. A measurable space is atomic if X is the
union of its atoms. For metrizable X , (X,BX) is
atomic, singletons being BX-atoms.
A measurable map is a map f : (X,A)→ (Y,B)
such that f− 1(B) ∈ A for every B ∈ B. A map f
is then measurable if and only if f− 1(B) ∈ A for
every B ∈ G where G generates B.
A measurable function f : (X,BX) → (Y,BY )
is called Borel measurable or simply Borel. If X
and Y are metrizable spaces then, every continuous
function f : X → Y is Borel.
Let (Xi,Ai), i ∈ I, be a family of measur-
able spaces and X =
∏
iXi. The σ-algebra on
X generated by
{
π− 1i (B) : B ∈ Ai, i ∈ I
}
where
πi : X → Xi are the projection maps, is called the
product σ-algebra. It is denoted by
⊗
iAi. It is
the smallest σ-algebra such that each πi is mea-
surable. The product σ-algebra on X × Y where
(X,A) and (Y,B) are measurable spaces, will be
denoted simply by A
⊗
B.
Unless stated otherwise, we shall assume that the
product of measurable spaces is equipped with the
product σ-algebra.
Now, let (fn) be a sequence of measurable maps
from a space X to space Y , both measurable
spaces, converging point-wise to f . Then, f : X →
Y is a measurable function.
If X is a measurable space then, every Borel
function f : X → R is the point-wise limit of a
sequence of simple Borel functions.
If f : (X,A)→ (Y,B) and g : (Y,B)→ (Z, C) are
measurable, then so is g ◦f : (X,A)→ (Z, C) mea-
surable. Also, a map f : (X,A) → (
∏
Xi,
⊗
iAi)
is measurable if and only if its composition with
each projection map is measurable.
For metrizable spaces X and Y , let B(X,Y )
be the smallest class of functions from X to Y
containing all continuous functions and closed un-
der taking point-wise limits of sequences of func-
tions. Functions belonging to B(X,Y ) are called
the Baire functions. Every Baire function is Borel
but the converse is not true.
However, for every metrizable X , every Borel
f : X → R is Baire. If a, b ∈ R and f, g : X → R
are Baire, then so is af + bg Baire. For B ⊆ X ,
with metrizable X , the map χ
B
: X → R is a
Baire function. The Lebesgue-Hausdorff Theorem
proves that every real-valued Borel function on a
metrizable space is a Baire function.
Some results that help reduce measurability
problems to corresponding topological problems
are as follows.
Given a metrizable space (X, T ) and sequence
(Bn) of its Borel subsets, there is a metrizable
topology T ′ such that T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ BX and each
Bn ∈ T ′. Topology generated by T
⋃
{Bn : n ∈
N}
⋃
{Bcn : n ∈ N} is such a topology.
(If T and T ′ are topologies on X with T ⊆ T ′,
then T ′ is finer or stronger or larger than T and
T is coarser or weaker or smaller than T ′.Caution:
coarser and finer or weaker and stronger are also
used in the sense opposite to the above.)
Next, if (X, T ) is Polish then, for every Borel set
B ∈ X there is a finer Polish topology TB on X
with B clopen in TB and σ(T ) = σ(TB).
Also, for every sequence (Bn) of Borel sets in a
Polish space (X, T ), there is a finer topology T ′ on
X generating the same Borel σ-algebra and mak-
ing each Bn clopen. Note also that every Borel
subspace of a Polish space is Polish.
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Moreover, let (X, T ) be a Polish space, Y a sep-
arable metric space and f : X → Y be a Borel
map. Then, there is a finer Polish topology T ′ on
X generating the same Borel σ-algebra such that
f : (X, T ′)→ Y is continuous.
A Bernstein Set is a set A of real numbers with
both A
⋂
C and (R\A)
⋂
C being uncountable for
any uncountable closed subset C of R.
A map f from a measurable space X to a mea-
surable space Y is bimeasurable if it is measurable
and f(A) is measurable for every measurable sub-
set A of X . A bimeasurable bijection is an iso-
morphism. Thus, a bijection f : X → Y is an
isomorphism if and only if both f and f− 1 are
measurable. If X and Y are measurable spaces
and f : X → Y , g : Y → X are 1-1 bimeasurable
maps then, X and Y are isomorphic.
When X and Y are metrizable spaces equipped
with Borel σ-algebras and f : X → Y is an iso-
morphism, f is called a Borel isomorphism and, X
and Y as Borel isomorphic. Note that the Borel
σ-algebra of a countable metrizable space is dis-
crete and, hence, two countable metrizable spaces
are Borel isomorphic if and only if they are of the
same cardinality.
A Standard Borel Space (SBS) is a measurable
space isomorphic to some Borel subset of a Pol-
ish space. Then, a metrizable space X is stan-
dard Borel if (X,BX) is standard Borel. A SBS
equipped with a probability measure will be called
a Standard Probability Space (SPS).
For a compact metric space X , the space, K(X),
of nonempty compact sets with Vietoris topology,
being Polish, is a standard Borel space. Interest-
ingly, its Borel σ-algebra BK(X) is generated by
sets of the form {K ∈ K(X) : K
⋂
U 6= ∅} where
U varies over open sets in X .
Now, let X be a Polish space and F (X) denote
the set of all nonempty closed subsets of X . Equip
F (X) with the σ-algebra E(X) generated by sets of
the form {F ∈ E(X) : F
⋂
U 6= ∅}, where U varies
over open sets of X . The space (F (X), E(X)) is
called the Effros Borel Space of X .
If X is compact, E(X) = BK(X), ie, the Effros
Borel space of a compact metrizable space is stan-
dard Borel. The Effros Borel Space of a Polish
space is standard Borel.
For a Polish space X , the Borel space of F (X)
equipped with the Fell topology is exactly the same
as the Effros Borel Space as a compact subset of a
Polish space is closed and bounded.
Now, every standard Borel space X is Borel iso-
morphic to a Borel subset of the Cantor space C.
Next, for every Borel subset B of a Polish space X ,
there is a Polish space Z and a continuous bijec-
tion from Z to B. The Borel isomorphism theorem
states that any two uncountable standard Borel
spaces are Borel isomorphic.
Note here that two Standard Borel Spaces can
be Borel isomorphic if and only if they are of the
same cardinality.
Every Borel subset of a Polish space is a con-
tinuous image of NN and a one-to-one, continuous
image of a closed subset of NN. For every infinite
Borel subset X of a Polish space, |BX | = c.
The set of all Borel maps from X to Y , these
being uncountable Polish spaces, is of cardinality
c. For X a Polish space, A ⊆ X , and f : A → A
being a Borel isomorphism, f can be extended to
a Borel isomorphism g : X → X . We also note
that for an uncountable Polish space X and a map
f : X → R, there is no Borel map g : X → R
satisfying g(x) ≤ f(x) for all x.
Now, for a nonempty set X and an algebra A on
X , a measure on A is a map µ : A → [0,∞] such
that
(i) µ(∅) = 0,
(ii) µ is countably additive, ie, if Ao, A1, ... are
pairwise disjoint in A with
⋃
nAn ∈ A then,
µ (
⋃
nAn) =
∑∞
o µ(An).
WhenA is understood from the context, we shall
simply say that µ is a measure on X . A measure
µ is called finite if µ(X) < ∞; it is σ-finite if X
can be written as a countable union of sets in A of
finite measure. It is called a probability measure
if µ(X) = 1. Further, if all subsets of sets of mea-
sure zero are measurable, a measure is said to be
a complete measure.
If m is a measure on (X,A), then a set E ∈
A is of finite m-measure if m(E) < ∞; is of σ-
finite m-measure if ∃ {Ei}, i ∈ N, Ei ∈ A such
that E ⊆
⋃∞
i=1Ei and m(Ei) < ∞, ∀ i ∈ N. If
m(A), A ∈ A is finite (σ-finite) then the measure
m is finite (σ-finite) measure on A. A measure is
totally finite or totally σ-finite if m(X) is finite or
σ-finite.
A measure space is a triple (X,A, µ) where A
is a σ-algebra on X and µ a measure. A measure
space is called a probability space if µ is a proba-
bility measure on it.
For (X,A) being a measurable space, A ∈ A
and x ∈ X , let δx(A) = 1 if x ∈ A and δx(A) = 0
otherwise. Then, δx is a measure on A and will be
called the Dirac measure at x.
For a nonempty set X , A ⊆ X , let µ(A) denote
the number of elements in A, µ(A) = ∞ if A is
infinite. Then µ is a measure on P(X), called the
counting measure.
Now, if (X,A, µ) is a measure space then, it is
easy to see that
(i) µ is monotone,
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(ii) µ is countably sub-additive,
(iii) if the An’s are measurable and nondecreasing
then, µ (
⋃
nAn) = lim µ (An), and
(iv) if µ is finite and (An) is a non-increasing se-
quence of measurable sets then, µ (
⋂
nAn) =
lim µ(An).
If (X,B) is a measurable space, A an algebra
such that σ(A) = B, and suppose µ1 and µ2 are
finite measures on (X,B) such that µ1(A) = µ2(A)
for every A ∈ A, then µ1(A) = µ2(A) for every
A ∈ B. Furthermore, if A is an algebra on X and
µ is a σ-finite measure on A then, there exists a
unique measure ν on σ(A) that extends µ.
Now, let A be the algebra on R consisting of
finite disjoint unions of non-degenerate intervals.
For any interval I, let |I| denote the length of I.
Let Io, I1, ..., In be pairwise disjoint intervals and
let A =
⋃n
k=0 Ik. Set λ(A) =
∑n
k=0 |Ik|. Then, λ
is a σ-finite measure on A. There is then a unique
measure on σ(A) = BR extending λ. We call this
measure the Lebesgue measure on R and denote it
by λ itself.
Let (Xn,An, µn), n ∈ N, be a sequence of proba-
bility spaces and X =
∏
nXn. For any nonempty,
finite F ⊆ N, let πF : X →
∏
n∈F Xn be the canon-
ical projection map.
Define A =
{
π− 1F (R) : R ∈
⊗
n∈F An, F finite
}
.
Then, A is an algebra that generates the product
σ-algebra
⊗
nAn. Define further
∏
n µn on A by∏
n µn
(
π− 1F (R)
)
= (×
i∈F
µi) (R) as a probability
measure on A. Then, there exists a unique proba-
bility measure on
⊗
nAn that extends
∏
n µn. We
will call this extension the product of the µn’s and
denote it by
∏
n µn. If (Xn,An, µn) are the same,
say, µn = µ for all n, then we denote the product
measure by µN.
Let X be a finite set with n (n > 0) elements
and A = P(X). The uniform measure on X is the
measure µ on A such that µ ({x}) = 1/n for every
x ∈ X . Let µ be the uniform probability measure
on the set 2. The product measure µN on C is a
Lebesgue measure denoted also by λ.
Let (X,A, µ) be a measure space. A subset A
of X will be called µ-null or simply a null set if
there is a measurable set B containing A such that
µ(B) = 0. The measure space (X,A, µ) will be
called complete if every null set is measurable in
it. The counting measure and the uniform measure
on a finite set are complete.
If (X,B, µ) is a complete σ-finite measure space,
then B is closed under the Souslin operation.
An ideal on a nonempty set X is defined to be
a nonempty family I of subsets of X such that we
have
(i) X /∈ I,
(ii) whenever A ∈ I, P(A) ∈ I, and
(iii) I is closed under finite unions.
A σ-ideal is an ideal closed under countable unions.
Notably, the family Nµ of all µ-null sets is a σ-
ideal.
If E is any collection of subsets of X , then there
exists a smallest σ-ideal containing E , the intersec-
tion of all σ-ideals containing E . It is called the
σ-ideal generated by E and is obtained by taking
all sets of the form B
⋂
E with B ∈ BX , E ∈ E and
taking countable unions of such sets. Alternatively,
the family I = {A ⊆ X : A ⊆
⋃
nBn, Bn ∈ E} is
the smallest σ-ideal containing E .
The σ-algebra generated by A
⋂
Nµ is called the
µ-completion or simply the completion of the mea-
sure space X . We shall denote the completion of
the measure space as A¯µ and call the sets in A¯µ as
µ-measurable.
Note that A¯µ consists of all sets of the form
A△N where A ∈ A, N is null and △ denotes the
symmetric difference of sets. Further, µ¯ (A△N) =
µ(A) is a measure on the completion. It can also
be shown that the set A is µ-measurable if and
only if there exist measurable sets B and C such
that B ⊆ A ⊆ C and C \B is null.
The set function µ∗ : P(X) → [0,∞] defined
by µ∗(A) = inf {µ(B) : B ∈ A&A ⊆ B} is called
the outer measure induced by µ. Clearly, for every
set A there is a set B ∈ A such that A ⊆ B and
µ(B) = µ∗(A). Also, if B′ is another measurable
set containing A then B \B′ is null.
Then, sets in B¯λ
R
, λ being the Lebesgue measure
on the set of real numbers, are the Lebesgue mea-
surable sets. Note that |B| = c < 2c and that
there are Lebesgue measurable sets which are not
Borel. The Bernstein set, mentioned earlier, is not
Lebesgue measurable, for example. Note also that
the Lebesgue measure onR is translation invariant,
ie, for every Lebesgue measurable set E and every
real number x, λ(E) = λ(E + x) where E + x =
{y + x : y ∈ E}. Moreover, for every Lebesgue
measurable set E, the map x→ λ (E
⋂
(E + x)) is
continuous. Then, if E ⊆ R is Lebesgue measur-
able with positive Lebesgue measure, then the set
E − E = {x − y : x, y ∈ E} can be shown to be a
neighborhood of 0.
If X is a metrizable topological space and µ is
a finite measure on X then, for every Borel set
B, we have µ(B) = sup {µ(F ) : F ⊆ B, F closed}
= inf {µ(U) : U ⊇ B, U open}. We call µ a regular
measure on X .
A signed measure is an extended, real-valued,
countably additive set function µ on the class, A,
of all measurable sets of a measurable space (X,A)
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with µ(∅) = 0, and µ assuming at most one of the
values +∞ and −∞.
If µ is a signed measure on a measurable space
(X,A), we call a set E µ- positive (negative) if,
∀ F ∈ A, E
⋂
F is measurable and µ(E
⋂
F ) ≥ 0
(µ(E
⋂
F ) ≤ 0). The empty set is both µ-positive
and µ-negative in this sense.
If µ is a signed measure on (X,A), then there ex-
ist two disjoint sets A,B ∈ A such that A
⋃
B = X
and A is µ-positive while B is µ-negative. The sets
A and B are said to form the Hahn Decomposition
of X relative to µ. Note that the Hahn decompo-
sition is not unique.
For every E ∈ A, we define µ+(E) = µ(E
⋂
A),
the upper variation of µ, and µ−(E) = µ(E
⋂
B),
the lower variation of µ, and |µ| (E) = µ+(E) +
µ−(E), the total variation of µ, where A,B are as
in the Hahn decomposition. [Note that |µ(E)| and
|µ|(E) are not the same.]
The upper, the lower and the total variations
(of µ) are measures and µ(E) = µ+(E) − µ−(E)
∀ E ∈ A, the Jordon decomposition. If µ is finite
or σ-finite, then so are µ+ and µ−; at least one of
µ+ and µ− is always finite.
A simple function on (X,A) is f =
∑n
i=1 αiχEi
where Ei ∈ A, χEi is the characteristic function
of the set Ei and αi ∈ R. This simple function f
is µ-integrable if µ(Ei) < ∞ ∀ i for which αi 6= 0.
The µ-integral of f is
∫
f(x)dµ(x) or
∫
f dµ =∑n
i=1 αiµ(Ei).
If, ∀ ǫ > 0, limn→∞ m ({x ∈ X : |fn(x)−f(x)| ≥
ǫ}) = 0, a sequence {fn} of a.e. finite-valued mea-
surable functions is said to converge in measure to
a measurable function f .
Given two integrable simple functions f and g
on a measure space (X,A), define now a pseudo-
metric ρ(f, g) =
∫
|f − g| dµ. A sequence {fn} of
integrable simple functions is mean fundamental if
ρ(fn, gm)→ 0 if n,m→∞.
An a.e. finite-valued, measurable function f on
(X,A) is µ-integrable if there is a mean fundamen-
tal sequence {fn} of integrable simple functions
which converges in measure to f .
Lebesgue-Radon-Nikodym (LRN) Theorem [34]
states that: If (X,A,m) is a totally σ-finite mea-
sure space and if a σ-finite measure ν on A is abso-
lutely continuous relative to m, then there exists a
finite valued measurable function f on X such that
ν(E) =
∫
E
f dµ for every measurable set E ∈ A.
The function f is unique: if also ν(E) =
∫
E
g dµ,
then f = g (mod µ), ie, equality holding modulo a
set of µ-measure zero or µ-a.e.
If µ is a totally σ-finite measure and if ν(E) =∫
E
f dµ ∀ E ∈ A, we write f = dνdµ or dν = f dµ.
We call dνdµ the LRN-derivative and all properties
of “differential” hold for it µ-a.e.
A measure on a Standard Borel Space is a Borel
Measure. A Borel measure µ on a SBS X is
continuous if µ ({x}) = 0 for every x ∈ X .
Now, if X is a Polish space, µ a finite Borel
measure and ǫ > 0 then, there exists a compact
subset K of X such that µ (X \K) < ǫ.
To prove this above, we consider a compati-
ble metric d ≤ 1 on X and a regular system
of sets {Fs : s ∈ N<N} of nonempty closed
sets such that Fe = X , Fs =
⋃
n Fŝ n and
diameter(Fs) ≤ 1/2|s|. The existence of such a
system of sets is provable by induction on |s|.
Next, define positive integers no, n1, ... such that
for every s = (mo,m1, ...,mk−1) with mi ≤ ni,
µ
(
Fs \
⋃
j≤nk
Fŝ j
)
< ǫ/(2k+1.no.n1....nk−1). The
setK =
⋂
k
⋃
s Fs where the union varies over all s,
is the required, closed and totally bounded, com-
pact set for which µ (X \K) < ǫ.
Then, for a Polish space X , a finite Borel mea-
sure µ on X , for every Borel set B and for every
ǫ > 0, there is a compact set K ⊆ B such that
µ (B \K) < ǫ.
Let µ be a probability measure on I = [0, 1].
Then, the function F (x) = µ ([0, 1]) , x ∈ I is
called as a distribution function of µ. It is a
monotonically increasing, right-continuous func-
tion such that F (1) = 1.
Next, if µ is a continuous probability measure
on a standard Borel space X , then there is a Borel
isomorphism h : X → I such that for every Borel
subset B of I, λ(B) = λ
(
h− 1(B)
)
.
Let (X,A) be a measurable space and Y a
second countable metrizable space. A transition
probability on X×Y is a map P : X×BY → [0, 1]
such that (i) for every x ∈ X , P (x, .) is a proba-
bility on Y and (ii) for every B ∈ BY , the map
x → P (x,B) is measurable. Then, for every
A ∈ A
⊗
BY , the map x → P (x,Ax) is measur-
able. In particular, for every A ∈ A
⊗
BY such
that P (x,Ax) > 0, πX (A) is measurable.
Recall that a set of the first Baire category is a
countable union of nowhere dense sets. A subset
E of X is said to have the Baire Property (BP) if
E can be expressed as a symmetric difference of an
open set G and a setM of the first Baire category,
ie, expressible as the union E ≡ G△M = (G \
M)
⋃
(M \G). If E has the property of Baire, then
so does its complement in X . Clearly, open sets
and meagre sets inX have BP. Note also that every
Borel subset of a metrizable topological space has
the Baire property.
The collection D of all subsets of a topologi-
cal space X having the Baire property forms a σ-
algebra to be called the Baire σ-algebra. Note that
the Baire σ-algebra of a topological space is closed
under the Souslin operation.
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A spaceX is called a Baire Space if no nonempty
open subset of X is of first category in X or equiv-
alently in itself. Every open subset of a Baire space
is a Baire space but a closed subset need not be.
Every completely metrizable topological space is a
Baire space, the converse not being true.
If X is a standard Borel space, every Borel sub-
set of X has the property of Baire since the σ-
algebra of sets with the property of Baire includes
the Borel σ-algebra of X . The collection of subsets
of X with the property of Baire is a σ-algebra gen-
erated by open subsets together with the subsets
of the first Baire category. Subsets of first Baire
category in X form a σ-ideal in the σ-algebra of
sets with the property of Baire.
For A,B ∈ BX , we write A = B (modN ) if
A \B and B \A, both, belong to N .
A subset B ⊂ X , B ∈ B, is said to be
decomposable if it is expressible as a union of two
disjoint sets from BX \ N . Clearly, every such de-
composable set belongs to BX \ N .
We say that the Borel σ-algebra BX of subsets
of X satisfies the countability condition if every
collection of pairwise disjoint sets from BX \ N is
either finite or countably infinite.
Now, a homeomorphism of a topological space
X into the topological space X ′ is an isomorphism
if it is 1-1 and if the inverse mapping is also a
homeomorphism.
The pivotal concept of the measure theory is,
however, not an isomorphism of measure spaces,
but the concept of an isomorphism modulo zero.
Then, if upon removing from the corresponding
spaces appropriate sets of zero measure we ob-
tain an isomorphism, we say that the spaces are
isomorphic modulo zero.
This above is achieved by the completion of the
measure space X with respect to the σ-ideal, Nµ,
of µ-null sets.
In this mathematical framework, it is often
enough to check a result only for certain charac-
teristic functions to conclude that it holds for all
measurable functions. For this purpose, we use the
concept of a semi-algebra.
A semi-algebra on X is a collection S of subsets
of X which is closed under finite intersections and
such that the complement of any S ∈ S is a finite
disjoint union of members of S. A semi-algebra S
generates a σ-algebra B on X if B is the smallest
σ-algebra containing S.
Then, whenever results hold good for the char-
acteristic functions of the members of the semi-
algebra S, those results hold good also for the
members of the σ-algebra B.
For (X,A, µ) a measure space, let K(µ) be the
set of all measurable sets with finite µ-measure.
For any E,F ∈ K(µ), let ρ(E,F ) = µ(E△F ). The
function ρ so defined is a metric on K(µ) and the
metric space (K(µ), ρ) is called the metric space of
or associated to (X,A,m).
Note that the metric space of a finite measure al-
gebra (B, µ) is complete. A measure algebra (B, µ)
is called as separable if the metric space associated
to it is separable.
Carathe´odory’s Theorem: If (B, µ) is a normal-
ized, separable and non-atomic measure algebra,
then there is an isomorphism from (B, µ) onto the
measure algebra of the unit interval (0, 1).
Let (X,A, µ) be a space with complete and nor-
malized measure µ. Let us denote by F (F) the
Borel structure generated by a family F of mea-
surable subsets of X .
A countable collection, F = {Fi : i ∈ I}, of
measurable subsets Fi of a measure space (X,A, µ)
is said to be a basis of the space X if
(1) for any A ∈ A there is a set B ∈ F (F) such
that B ⊂ A, µ (B \A) = 0,
(2) for any x1, x2 ∈ X , x1 6= x2, there is an i ∈ I
such that either x1 ∈ Fi & x2 /∈ Fi or x2 ∈ Fi
& x1 /∈ Fi.
Now, suppose ei = ±1 and F
(ei)
i = Fi if ei = 1
and F (ei) = X \ Fi if ei = − 1. Then, to any
sequence of numbers {ei : i ∈ I} corresponds the
intersection
⋂
i∈I F
(ei)
i with every such intersection
containing no more than one point of X .
Then, the space (X,A, µ) is called complete
with respect to the basis F if all the intersections⋂
i∈I F
(ei)
i are nonempty.
Moreover, the space (X,A, µ) will be called
complete (mod 0) with respect to the basis F if X
can be included as a subset of full measure into a
certain measure space (X¯, A¯, µ¯) which is complete
with respect to its own basis F¯ = {F¯i : i ∈ I} and
satisfying F¯i
⋂
X = Fi for all i ∈ I.
A space which is complete (mod 0) with respect
to one of its basis is also complete (mod 0) with
respect to any other basis.
A measure space (X,A, µ) which is complete
(mod 0) with respect to one of its basis is called as
a Lebesgue Space.
The notion of Lebesgue space is very wide. Still,
Lebesgue spaces possess many nice properties. To
mention one here, any automorphism T of a mea-
sure space (X,A, µ) induces an isomorphism S of
the σ-algebra A onto itself as: S(A) = TA,A ∈ A.
For a Lebesgue space, the converse that any iso-
morphism of the σ-algebra induces an automor-
phism of the measure space is also true.
A Lebesgue space is isomorphic (mod 0) to the
ordinary Lebesgue space of the unit interval. The
unit interval is therefore a representative object of
the Lebesgue spaces.
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Let (X,A, µ) and (Y,B, ν) be Lebesgue spaces
and Φ : (A¯, µ¯) → (B¯, ν¯) a homeomorphism of the
associated measure algebras. Then, there exists
a set of measure zero A ⊂ X and a measurable
function φ : X \ A → Y such that φ− 1 coincides
with Φ as a map (A¯, µ¯) → (B¯, ν¯). In this case,
we shall say that the map Φ arises from a point
homeomorphism (mod 0).
Therefore, for Lebesgue spaces, the notions of
point homeomorphism (mod 0) and homeomor-
phism of associated measure algebras of sets of zero
measure essentially coincide.
Theorem: If X is a complete separable metric
space and B is the completion of its Borel σ-algebra
with respect to a Borel probability measure µ on
X , then (X,B, µ) is a Lebesgue space.
A partition of a measure space (X,A, µ) is,
by definition, any family Ξ = {Ci : i ∈ I} of
nonempty disjoint subsets of X such that
⋃
iCi =
X . Moreover, if
⋃
iCi = X (mod 0), then we call
Ξ as a partition (mod 0).
The sets A ∈ A which are the unions of the
members of Ξ are called measurable with respect
to Ξ or simply Ξ-sets.
A partition Ξ is called measurable if there is a
countable family, G = {Gi : i ∈ I}, of subsets of X
which are Ξ-sets and such that for all C1, C2 ∈ Ξ
there is an i ∈ I such that either C1 ⊂ Gi & C2 *
Gi or C2 ⊂ Gi & C1 * Gi.
The quotient space of a Lebesgue space by a
measurable partition, ie, XupslopeΞ, is Lebesgue.
There of course exists an equivalence relation
between the measurable partitions of a Lebesgue
space and the complete σ-algebras on it.
The elements C ∈ Ξ of a measurable partition
can themselves be transformed into spaces with
measure µC and these measures play the role of
conditional probabilities. Thus, a system of mea-
sures {µC}, C ∈ Ξ is said to be a canonical system
of conditional measures belonging to the partition
Ξ if
(i) µC is defined on some σ-algebra AC of subsets
of C,
(ii) the space (C,AC , µC) is Lebesgue,
(iii) ∀A ∈ A, the set A
⋂
C ∈ AC for almost all
C ∈ XupslopeΞ, the function µC (A
⋂
C) is mea-
surable on XupslopeΞ and
∫
XupslopeΞ µC (A
⋂
C) dµ.
Every measurable partition possesses a canoni-
cal system of conditional measures and this system
is unique (mod 0), ie, any other system of con-
ditional measures coincides with it for almost all
C ∈ XupslopeΞ. Conversely, if some partition of X pos-
sesses a canonical system of conditional measures
then it is a measurable partition.
The forward image of a measurable subset of X
under a measurable function f need not be mea-
surable, in general.
Lusin’s Theorem: If f is a measurable function
from a Standard Borel Space into another Stan-
dard Borel Space and if f is countable to zero, ie,
if the inverse image of every singleton set is at most
countable, then the forward image under f of a
Borel set is Borel.
Now, a one-one measurable map T of a Borel
space (X,B) onto itself such that T− 1 is also mea-
surable is called a Borel automorphism.
That is to say, a Borel automorphism of (X,B)
is a one-one and onto map T : X → X such that
T (B) ∈ B ∀ B ∈ B.
An automorphism ofX ontoX is, in general, not
a Borel automorphism. But, if (X,B) is a Standard
Borel Space then a measurable one-one map of X
onto X is a Borel automorphism.
Ramsay-Mackey Theorem: If T : X → X is a
Borel automorphism of the standard Borel space
(X,BX), then there exists a topology T on X such
that
(a) (X, T ) is a complete, separable, metric space
(b) Borel sets of (X, T ) are precisely those in BX
(c) T is a homeomorphism of (X, T ).
Note that X is same for (X,BX) and (X, T ).
Alternatively, if X is the underlying set and if
T is a Borel automorphism on a SBS (X,B) and
C ⊆ B is a countable collection, then there exists
a complete separable metric topology, ie, Polish
topology, T , on X such that
(1) T generates the σ-algebra B
(2) T is a homeomorphism of (X, T )
(3) C ⊆ T , and lastly,
(4) T has a clopen base, ie, sets which are both
open and closed are in T .
If To is a Polish topology on X which generates
B, {Ti, i ∈ N} are Polish topologies on X with
To ⊆ Ti ⊆ B then ∃ a Polish topology T∞ (⊆ B)
such that
⋃∞
i=1 Ti ⊆ T∞ and T∞ is the topology
generated by all finite intersections of the form⋂n
i=1 Gi, Gi ∈ Ti for i, n ∈ N.
Further, givenB ∈ B, there exists a Polish topol-
ogy T¯ , To ⊆ T¯ ⊆ B such that B ∈ T¯ . Moreover,
T¯ can be chosen to have a clopen base.
We also note that, for any countable collection
(Bj)
∞
j=1 ⊆ B, there exists a Polish topology T
(which can be chosen to have a clopen base) such
that To ⊆ T ⊆ B and for all j, Bj ∈ T .
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Further, if T is a homeomorphism of a Polish
space X then there exists a compact metric space
Y and a homeomorphism τ of Y such that T is
isomorphic as a homeomorphism to the restriction
of τ to a τ -invariantGδ subset of Y . We can choose
the τ -invariant set to be dense in Y . This result is
due to N. Krylov and N. Bogoliouboff.
Combined with the theorem of Ramsay and
Mackey, this shows that a Borel automorphism on
a Standard Borel Space can be viewed as a re-
striction of a homeomorphism of a compact metric
space to an invariant Gδ subset.
Topological Group is a triple (G, ⋄, T ) where G
is a set, ⋄ is a group multiplication on G and T is
a topology on G such that
(i) the multiplication map m : G × G → G is
continuous relative to T ,
(ii) the inversion function i : G→ G is continuous
relative to T , and
(iii) if e is the group identity, then the singleton
set {e} is closed in G, ie, G \ {e} ∈ T .
When considering only the group properties of a
topological group, we refer to it as an algebraic
group and group properties as algebraic properties.
Also, a ⋄ b ≡ ab for a, b ∈ G.
In what follows, we adopt two useful notations:
(a) if A,B ⊂ G, then AB = {ab : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
and
(b) for A ⊂ G, A− 1 = {a− 1 : a ∈ A}.
Then, a subset H ⊂ G,H 6= ∅, is a subgroup of G
iff HH ⊂ H and H− 1 ⊂ H , both.
A topological space X is called homogeneous
if for every x, y ∈ X , there exists a group ho-
moeomorphism f : X → X such that f(x) = y.
Any topological group is necessarily a homoge-
neous topological space.
A topological group whose underlying space is a
manifold is a group manifold. Group G is a group
manifold if and only if e ∈ G has a neighborhood
U which is homeomorphic to Rn.
Neighborhoods of the identity of a topological
group are called as nuclei.
For x ∈ X , let N be a family of neighborhoods
of x such that every neighborhood of x contains
some member of N. Then, N is called as a local
(neighborhood) base at x.
In particular, a local base N at x has the prop-
erties:
(i) M,N ∈ N⇒M
⋂
N ∈ N,
(ii) M ⊂ N ⊂ X and M ∈ N ⇒ N ∈ N,
(iii) N ∈ N implies that there always exists M ∈
N such that MM− 1 ⊂ N ,
(iv) N ∈ N implies that for all g ∈ G, g− 1Ng ∈
N, and
(v)
⋂
N = {e}.
Given an algebraic group G and family N of
subsets of G with above properties, there exists
a unique topology T for G making G a topological
group and N is exactly the family of nuclei.
If X is a homogeneous space then, a local base
at a single point x ∈ X determines a local base at
every other point of X and, hence, also determines
the entire topology T of X .
A neighborhood S of e ∈ G will be called as
a symmetric neighborhood if S = S− 1. If N is
any neighborhood of e, then N
⋂
N− 1 ⊂ N is a
symmetric neighborhood of e. Consequently, if N
is any neighborhood of e in a topological group G,
then there exists a symmetric neighborhood S of e
with SS = SS− 1 ⊂ N .
If H is any algebraic subgroup of G then the
family GupslopeH is called a coset space of G and is a
quotient set of (G, T ) with quotient topology. The
quotient map q : G → GupslopeH is always open. The
quotient of a topological group modulo a closed
normal subgroup is a topological group under the
quotient topology and the group product.
An open subgroup of a topological group must
be closed as well. The closure of a subgroup of a
topological group is always a subgroup, and the
closure of a normal subgroup is always normal.
The interior of a subgroup need not be a subgroup.
The product of a closed set with a compact set is
closed but not necessarily compact. The quotient
map q : G→ GupslopeH is a closed map whenever H is
a compact subset of G.
There can be subgroups of a topological group
which are neither open nor closed.
Given two topological groups G and G′, and a
continuous function f : G → G′, f is a morphism
of topological groups if and only if f is both a
map of on the underlying topological spaces and
an algebraic morphism (group homomorphism) on
the underlying groups. An onto or surjective mor-
phism is called an epimorphism and a 1-1 or in-
jective morphism is called a monomorphism. An
isomorphism of topological groups is an algebraic
morphism of underlying groups and a homeomor-
phism of underlying topological spaces.
If function f : G→ G′ is an algebraic morphism
from one topological group to another and is con-
tinuous at the single point e of its domain, then f
is continuous at every other point of G and, hence,
is also a topological morphism. Consequently, the
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continuity of a morphism needs to be established
by considering only nuclei.
The group RupslopeZ, where Z is the set of integers,
of additive real numbers modulo integers is topo-
logically isomorphic to circle S1.
If p : X → Y is a map, a cross section to p is a
map s : Y → X which is a right inverse for p, ie,
p ◦ s = 1
Y
, 1
Y
being the identity map of Y . The
cross section is said to be at a point x ∈ X if x is
a value of s, then x = s ◦ p(x).
Let F be the set of functions from X to Y .
The compact-open (CO) topology on F is a unique
topology on F generated by the subbase of all sets
of the form (K,S) = {f : f ∈ F and f(K) ⊂ S},
where K is compact in X and S is open in Y .
The evaluation function, e : F ×X → Y carries
each ordered pair (f, x) to e(f, x) = f(x) ∈ Y . A
topology for F is called admissible if and only if
the evaluation function e is continuous. The CO-
topology is the finest admissible topology.
A Topological Transformation Group (TTG) or
a group of transformations is an admissible group
G of functions on a fixed Hausdorff topological
spaceX with composition of functions as the group
multiplication. Members of G must all be homeo-
morphisms of X onto itself. More formally, a TTG
is a pair (G,X) where G is a topological group
whose elements are permutations of X , X being a
Hausdorff space such that
(i) for all f, g ∈ G and for every x ∈ X , (fg)(x) =
f [g(x)],
(ii) every f ∈ G is a homeomorphism of X onto
itself, and
(iii) the evaluation function, e, is continuous on
G×X → X .
Every TTG on X must contain the identity map
1
X
, which is necessarily also the identity element
of the group G.
The group G is said to act on X and the evalua-
tion is called the action of G on X. A TTG on X
is called as transitive if for all x, y ∈ X there exists
g ∈ G such that g(x) = y. Note that any group
of matrices is non-transitive on Rn as the origin is
left fixed by linear transformations.
A topological group is a Baire space if and only if
it is of second category in itself. Every open subset
of a Baire space is a Baire space. Every completely
metrizable topological space is a Baire space, but
the converse need not be true.
Let X be a topological space, A,U ⊂ X with U
open. Then, A is meager (co-meager, non-meager)
in U if A
⋂
U is meager (co-meager, non-meager)
in U .
Let X and Y be metrizable spaces. A function
f : X → Y is called Baire measurable if for ev-
ery open U ⊂ Y , f− 1(U) has BP. [Caution: Baire
measurable functions are not the same as Baire
functions defined earlier.] Clearly, every Borel
function is Baire measurable.
Let Y be second countable and f : X → Y be
Baire measurable. Then, thee exists a co-meager
set A ⊂ X such that f |A is continuous.
Let G be a completely metrizable topological
group andH a second countable topological group.
Then every Baire measurable morphism ϕ : G →
H is continuous. In particular, every Borel mor-
phism ϕ : G→ H is continuous.
Pettis’s Theorem [68] proves that if G is a Baire
topological group and H a non-meager subset with
BP, then there exists a neighborhood U of the
group identity contained in H− 1H . Consequently,
it follows that every non-meager Borel subgroupH
of a Polish group G is open.
Notation: For E ⊂ X × Y , x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
we set Ex = {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ E} and Ey = {x ∈
X : (x, y) ∈ E}.
If X is a Baire space and Y second countable
and supposing A ⊆ X × Y is closed as well as no-
where dense, then {x ∈ X : Ax is nowhere dense}
is a dense Gδ set.
LetX be a non-empty set, Y a topological space,
A ⊂ X × Y , and U nonempty, open subset in Y .
We set A△U = {x ∈ X : Ax is nonmeager inU} and
A∗U = {x ∈ X : Ax is comeager inU}.
Kuratowski-Ulam Theorem: If X and Y are sec-
ond countable Baire spaces and A ⊆ X×Y has BP,
then the following are equivalent:
(1) A is meager (co-meager),
(ii) {x ∈ X : Ax ismeager (co−meager)} is co-
meager,
(iii) {y ∈ Y : Ay is meager (co−meager)} is co-
meager.
Let (X,A) be a measurable space and Y a Polish
space. For every A ∈ A
⊗
B
Y
and U open in Y ,
the setsA△U , A∗U and {x ∈ X : Ax ismeager inU}
are in A.
Let G be a Polish group that is acting contin-
uously on a Polish space X . For any W ⊆ X
and any nonempty open U ⊆ G, define the Vaught
transforms as: W△U = {x ∈ X : {g ∈ U : g · x ∈
W} is nonmeager} and W ∗U = {x ∈ X : {g ∈ U :
g · x ∈W} is comeager}.
Then, we have
(i) W△U is invariant,
(ii) W is invariant implies that W =W△U ,
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(iii) (
⋃
nWn)
△U
=
⋃
n
(
W△Un
)
,
(iv) if W ⊆ X is Borel and U ⊆ G is open, then
W△U and W ∗U are Borel.
We shall call a σ-algebra B on X Marczewski
complete if for every A ⊆ X there exists Aˆ ∈ B
containing A such that for every B ∈ B containing
A, every subset of Aˆ \B is in B. Such a set Aˆ will
be called a minimal B-cover of A.
Every σ-finite complete measure space is Mar-
czewski complete. Notably, Baire σ-algebra of any
topological space is Marczewski complete.
Marczewski’s Theorem: if (X,B) is a measur-
able space with B Marczewski complete, then B is
closed under the Souslin operation.
We call a collection of point-sets (subsets of
metrizable spaces) as a point-class. For example,
we shall speak of point-classes of open sets, closed
sets, Borel sets etc.
Let X be a metrizable space. For ordinals α,
1 ≤ α < ω1, ie, for countable ordinals, define the
following point-classes by transfinite induction:
Σ
0
1(X) = {U ⊆ X : U open}
Π
0
1(X) = {F ⊆ X : F closed}
for 1 < α < ω1,
Σ
0
α(X) =

⋃
β<α
Π
0
β(X)


σ
and
Π
0
α(X) =

⋃
β<α
Σ
0
β(X)


δ
Finally, for every 1 ≤ α < ω1,
△0α(X) = Σ
0
α(X)
⋂
Π
0
α(X)
Note that △01(X) is the family of all clopen sub-
sets, Σ02(X) is the family of all Fσ subsets, and
Σ
0
2(X) is the family of all Gδ subsets of X . The
families Σ0α(X), Π
0
α(X), and △
0
α(X) are called
additive, multiplicative, and ambiguous classes re-
spectively. If a statement is true for all X , we shall
omit the X in the brackets while stating the family
of point-classes under consideration.
A set in Σ0α is called as an Additive Class α Set,
that inΠ0α as a Multiplicative Class α Set and that
in △0α as an Ambiguous Class α Set.
Following elementary facts about these point-
classes are easy to establish:
(i) Additive classes are closed under countable
unions, and multiplicative classes are closed
under countable intersections,
(ii) All the classes are closed under finite unions
and finite intersections,
(iii) For all 1 ≤ α < ω1, Σ0α = ¬Π
0
α or equiva-
lently, Π0α = ¬Σ
0
α,
(iv) For α ≥ 1, △0α is an algebra.
The following results are also easy to establish:
(i) For every 1 ≤ α < ω1, Σ0α,Π
0
α ⊆ △
0
α+1.
Thus, the following Hierarchy of Borel sets
in which any point-class is contained in ev-
ery point-class to its right is obtained:
Σ
0
1 Σ
0
2 Σ
0
3 ...
△01 △
0
2 △
0
3 ...
Π
0
1 Π
0
2 Π
0
3 ...
(ii) For α > 1, Σ0α =
(
△0α
)
σ
and Π0α =
(
△0α
)
δ
,
it also being true for α = 1 when X is a
zero-dimensional separable metric space,
(iii) For metric space X , we have the result that
BX =
⋃
α<ω1
Σ
0
α(X) =
⋃
α<ω1
Π
0
α(X).
For any uncountable Polish space, the inclusion in
(i) is strict.
Let X be an infinite separable metric space.
Then, |Σ0α(X)| = |Π
0
α(X)| = c and |BX | = c.
Now, note that every set of additive class α > 2
is a countable disjoint union of multiplicative class
< α sets.
Let X and Y be metrizable spaces, f : X → Y a
transformation, and 1 ≤ α < ω1. We say that f is
Borel measurable of class α, or simply of class α,
if f− 1(U) ∈ Σ0α for every open set U . The class 1
functions are the continuous functions.
A characteristic function χA, A ⊆ X , is of class
α if and only if A is of ambiguous class α. Every
class α function is clearly Borel measurable.
Let 1 ≤ α < ω1. Let Γα denote one of the
two point-classes of Π0α or of Σ
0
α sets. For every
second countable metrizable space Y , there then
exists a U ∈ Γα
(
NN × Y
)
such that A ∈ Γα(Y )⇒(
∃x ∈ NN
)
(A = Ux). We shall call such a set U a
universal for Γα.
Let 1 ≤ α < ω1 and Γα the point-class of ad-
ditive or multiplicative class α sets. Then, for ev-
ery uncountable Polish space X , there is a U ∈
Γα(X ×X) universal for Γα(X).
We also have that for X being any uncountable
Polish space and 1 ≤ α < ω1, there exists an addi-
tive class α set that is not of multiplicative class α.
Hence, for every uncountable Polish space X and
for any α, Σ0α(X) 6= Σ
0
α+1(X).
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Then, there does not exist a Borel set U ⊆ X×X
universal for Borel subsets of X for any Polish
space X . A fairly general conclusion is the fol-
lowing: Let a point-class △ be closed under taking
complements and continuous pre-images. Then for
no Polish space X is there a set in △(X ×X) uni-
versal for △(X).
Now, let X be a metrizable space and 1 ≤ α <
ω1. Suppose (An) is a sequence of additive class
α sets in X . Then there exist Bn ⊆ An such that
(a) The Bn’s are pairwise disjoint sets of additive
class α, (b)
⋃
nAn =
⋃
nBn. Consequently, the
Bn’s are of ambiguous class α if
⋃
nAn is so. The
result also holds for α = 1 if X is zero-dimensional
and second countable. This above is known as the
Reduction Theorem for Additive Classes.
Let X be metrizable and 1 ≤ α < ω1. Then for
every sequence (An) of multiplicative class α sets
with
⋂
nAn = ∅, there exist ambiguous class α sets
Bn ⊇ An with
⋂
nBn = ∅. In particular, if A and
B are two disjoint subsets of X of multiplicative
class α, then there is an ambiguous class α set C
such that A ⊆ C and B
⋂
C = ∅. This is also
true for α = 1 if X is zero-dimensional and second
countable. This above is known as the Separation
Theorem for Multiplicative Classes.
Notably, the separation theorem does not hold
for additive classes and the reduction theorem does
not hold for multiplicative classes.
A sequence (An) of sets is called convergent if
lim infnAn = lim supnAn = B, say. In this case,
we say that the sequence (An) converges to B and
write limAn = B. Clearly, when the sequence
(An) is convergent, we have that for every x ∈ X ,
x ∈ An for infinitely many n if and only if x ∈ An
for all but finitely many n.
Now, let X be metrizable and 2 < α < ω1. Sup-
pose A ∈ △0α(X). Then there is a sequence (An)
of ambiguous class < α sets such that A = limAn.
The result is also true for α = 2, provided that X
is separable and zero-dimensional.
Let 2 < α < ω1 and X an uncountable Pol-
ish space. There exists a sequence An in Π
0
α(X)
with lim supAn = ∅ such that there does not exist
Bn ⊇ An in Σ0α(X) with lim supBn = ∅. This
observation is due to A. Maitra, C A Rogers and
J E Jayne.
Theorem: Suppose that X and Y are metrizable
topological spaces with Y being second countable
and 2 < α < ω1. Then for every Borel function
f : X → Y of class α, there is a sequence (fn) of
Borel maps from X to Y of class < α such that
fn → f point-wise.
To prove the above theorem, we use the following
two lemmas:
Lemma 1 Suppose Y is totally bounded. Then
every f : X → Y of class α, α > 1, is the limit of a
uniformly convergent sequence of class α functions
fn : X → Y of finite range.
Lemma 2: Let f : X → Y be of class α > 2 with
range contained in a finite set E = {y1, y2, ..., yn}.
Then f is the limit of a sequence of functions of
class < α with values in E.
Let B ⊆ X × Y . For notational convenience, we
shall denote the projection π
X
(B) of B to X by
∃Y B, ie, ∃YB = {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ B for some y ∈
Y }. The co-projection of B is defined as: ∀Y B =
{x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ B for all y ∈ Y }. Then, clearly,
∀Y B =
(
∃Y Bc
)c
.
For any point-class Γ and any Polish space
Y , we set ∃Y Γ =
{
∃YB : B ∈ Γ(X × Y ), X is a
Polish space}, ie, ∃Y Γ is the family of sets of the
form ∃Y B where B ∈ Γ(X × Y ), X being Polish.
The point-class ∀Y Γ is similarly defined.
Let X be a Polish space. We shall call a Borel
subset of X as a Standard Borel Set. Any A ⊂ X
is called analytic if it is a projection of a Borel
subset B of X × X . The point-class of analytic
sets will be denoted by Σ11. A subset C of X is
called co-analytic if X \ C is analytic. Then, a
subset A of X is co-analytic if and only if it is
the co-projection of a Borel subset of X ×X . The
point-class of co-analytic sets will be denoted by
Π
1
1. Clearly, we have Π
1
1 = ¬Σ
1
1. Finally, we
define △11 = Π
1
1
⋂
Σ
1
1.
All standard Borel sets are both analytic and co-
analytic and, hence, in point-class △11. The con-
verse that every △11 set is Borel was proved by
Souslin. This marked the recognition of descrip-
tive set theory as an independent subject.
The Theory of Analytic and Co-Analytic Sets is
of fundamental importance to the Theory of Borel
Sets and Borel Functions. It imparts the theory of
Borel sets its deductive power.
Proposition: Let X be a Polish space and A ⊆
X . Then, the following are equivalent statements:
(i) A is analytic,
(ii) There is a Polish space Y and a Borel set
B ⊆ X × Y whose projection is A,
(iii) There is a continuous map f : NN → X whose
range is A,
(iv) There is a closed subset C of X × NN whose
projection is A,
(v) For every uncountable Polish space Y there is
a Gδ set B in X × Y whose projection is A.
Proposition: (1) The point-classΣ11 is closed un-
der countable unions, countable intersections and
Borel pre-images. Consequently, Π11 is also closed
under these operations. (2) The point-class Σ11 is
37
closed under projection ∃Y , andΠ11 is closed under
co-projection ∀Y for all Polish Y .
Let B ⊆ X be analytic, in particular, Borel and
f : B → Y a Borel map. Then f(B) is analytic.
Theorem: For every Polish space X , there is an
analytic set U ⊆ NN × X such that A ⊆ X is
analytic if and only if A = Uα for some α, ie, U is
universal for Σ11(X).
Theorem: Let X be an uncountable Polish
space. Then,
(i) There is an analytic set U ⊆ X ×X such that
for every analytic set A ⊆ X , there is an
x ∈ X with A = Ux,
(ii) There is a subset of X that is analytic but not
Borel.
Thus, every uncountable standard Borel space
contains an analytic set that is not Borel.
Now, define for each n ≥ 1, point-classes Σ1n,
Π
1
n and △
1
n by induction on n as follows. Let n
be any positive integer. Let X be a Polish space.
Take
Σ
1
n+1(X) = ∃
X
Π
1
n(X ×X)
Π
1
n+1(X) = ¬Σ
1
n+1(X)
△1n+1(X) = Σ
1
n+1(X)
⋂
Π
1
n+1(X)
Sets thus defined are called the projective sets.
Proposition: Let n be a positive integer.
(i) The point-classes Σ1n and Π
1
n are closed un-
der countable unions, countable intersections
and Borel pre-images.
(ii) △1n is a σ-algebra
(iii) The point-class Σ1n is closed under projec-
tions ∃Y and the point-classΠ1n is closed un-
der co-projections ∀Y , when Y is Polish.
Let B ⊆ X be Σ1n and f : B → Y be a Borel
map. Then, f(B) ∈ Σ1n.
Proposition: For every n ≥ 1, Σ1n
⋃
Π
1
n ⊆
△1n+1. Thus, we have the following Hierarchy of
Projective Sets in which any point-class is con-
tained in every point-class to its right:
Σ
1
1 Σ
1
2 Σ
1
3 ...
△11 △
1
2 △
1
3 ...
Π
1
1 Π
1
2 Π
1
3 ...
Now, let n ≥ 1, Γ be either Σ1n or Π
1
n, and X
a Polish space. There is a U ⊆ NN ×X in Γ such
that A ⊆ X is in Γ if and only if A = Uα for some
α, ie, U is universal for Γ(X).
Theorem: Let X be an uncountable Polish space
and n ≥ 1.
(i) There is a set U ∈ Σ1n(X ×X) such that for
every A ∈ Σ1n(X), there is a x with A = Ux,
(ii) There is a subset of X that is in Σ1n(X) but
not in Π1n(X).
For any Polish space X and for any n ≥ 1, there
is no set U ∈ △1n(X × X) that is universal for
△1n(X).
Theorem: Let X be a Polish space, d a com-
patible complete metric on X , and A ⊆ X . The
following are equivalent statements:
(i) A is analytic,
(ii) There is a regular scheme {Fs : s ∈ N<N} of
closed subsets of X such that for every α ∈
NN, diameter
(
Fα|n
)
→ 0 and A = A ({Fs}),
(iii) There is a system {Fs : s ∈ N<N} of closed
subsets of X such that A = A ({Fs}).
Note that the point-class Σ11 is closed under
the Souslin operation. But, as there are analytic
sets that are not co-analytic, the point-class Π11
is not closed under the Souslin operation. For an
uncountable Polish space X and n ≥ 2, all the
point-classes Σ1n, Π
1
n and △
1
n are closed under the
Souslin operation.
For every Polish space X , there is a pair of an-
alytic sets U0, U1 ⊆ NN×X such that for any pair
Ao, A1 of analytic subsets of X there is an α sat-
isfying Ai = (Ui)α, i = 0, 1.
For an uncountable Polish space X , there is a
sequence (Un) of analytic subsets of X × X such
that for every sequence (An) of analytic subsets of
X there is x ∈ X with An = (Un)x for all n. Also,
there is a set U ∈ A
(
Π
1
1(N
N ×X)
)
universal for
A(Π11(X)).
Note that for any uncountable Polish spaceX , it
can be shown that σ
(
Σ
1
1(X)
)
is not closed under
the Souslin operation.
Now, a subset of NN×NN is closed if and only if
it is the body of a tree T on N× N. We therefore
have the following proposition:
Proposition: Let A ⊆ NN. Then, the following
are equivalent statements:
(i) A is analytic,
(ii) There is a tree T on N × N such that α ∈
A ⇐⇒ T [α] is well-founded, as well as α ∈
A ⇐⇒ T [α] is well-ordered with respect to
≤
KB
.
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Let g : R × R → R be a Borel function. Define
f(x) = supy g(x, y), x ∈ X . If f(x) < ∞ for all x,
the function f need not be Borel.
We can characterize functions f : R → R of
the form f(x) = supy g(x, y), g Borel. We call a
function f : R→ R an A-function if {x : f(x) > t}
is analytic for every real number t.
Let f(x) = supy g(x, y), g : R×R→ R be Borel.
Assume f(x) < ∞. Then, for every real number
t, f(x) > t ⇐⇒ (∃y ∈ R(g(x, y) > t). So, f is an
A-function. Further, the function f dominates a
Borel function.
Moreover, the converse is also true. For every
A-function f : R → R dominating a Borel func-
tion there is a Borel g : R × R → R such that
f(x) = supy g(x, y). Note that not all A-functions
dominate a Borel function.
Let X be a Polish space and A ⊆ X . We say
that A is Σ11-complete if A is analytic and for every
Polish space Y and for every analytic B ⊆ Y , there
is a Borel map f : Y → X such that f− 1(A) =
B. Notice that no Σ11-complete set is Borel. This
provides us a technique to establish the non-Borel
nature of analytic sets.
Let X and Y be Polish spaces and A ⊆ X , B ⊆
Y . We say that A is Borel reducible to B if there
is a Borel function f : X → Y such that f− 1(B) =
A. Note that if an analytic set A is Borel reducible
to B and A is a Σ11-complete set then, B is also
Σ
1
1-complete.
Now, note that we can also define Π11-complete
sets analogously and the above results also hold for
Π
1
1-complete sets.
Proposition: Let X be an uncountable Polish
space and let K(X) be the family of all non-empty
compact subsets of X . Then U(X) = {K ∈
K(X) : K is uncountable} is Σ11-complete. Fur-
thermore, the set {K ∈ K(X) : K is countable}
is Π11-complete.
Proposition: (Marczewski) The set DIFF of ev-
erywhere differentiable functions f : [0, 1] → R
is Π11-complete. In particular, it is a co-analytic,
non-Borel subset of the space of real-valued con-
tinuous functions on [0, 1].
Let µ be a σ-finite measure on (X,BX), X
Polish. Then every analytic subset of X is µ-
measurable. Further, every analytic subset of a
Polish space has the Baire Property.
We also note that if X is an uncountable Pol-
ish space and B be either the Baire σ-algebra
or the completion B¯µX with µ being a continuous
probability on X , then no σ-algebra A satisfying
σ(Σ11) ⊆ A ⊆ B is countably generated.
Note that every uncountable analytic set con-
tains a homeomorph of the Cantor ternary set and,
hence, is of cardinality c.
Let X and Y be Polish spaces and f : X → Y
a continuous map with uncountable range. Then
there is a homeomorph of the Cantor set C ⊆ X
such that f |C is 1-1.
Proposition: Let X be Polish and A ⊆ X . The
following are equivalent:
(i) A is analytic,
(ii) There is a closed set C ⊆ X × NN such that
A = {x ∈ X : Cx is uncountable},
(iii) There is a Polish space Y and an analytic
set B ⊆ X × Y such that A = {x ∈ X :
Bx is uncountable}.
Simpson’s Theorem: If X an analytic subset of a
Polish space, Y a metrizable space, and f : X → Y
a Borel map, then f(X) is separable.
Every Borel homomorphism ϕ : G → H from
a completely metrizable group G to a metrizable
group H is continuous.
A set A of real numbers has strong measure zero
if for every sequence (an) of positive real numbers,
there exists a sequence (In) of open intervals such
that |In| ≤ an and A ⊆
⋃
n In.
Then,
(i) Every countable set of real numbers has strong
measure zero,
(ii) Every strong measure zero set is of (Lebesgue)
measure zero,
(iii) Family of all strong measure zero sets is a
σ-ideal.
Further, if A ⊆ [0, 1] is a strong measure zero set
and f : [0, 1] → R is a continuous map, then the
set f(A) has strong measure zero. Note that not
all (Lebesgue) measure zero sets of real numbers
have strong measure zero. The Cantor ternary set
is not a strong measure zero set.
No set of real numbers containing a perfect set
has strong measure zero. The Borel Conjecture is
that no uncountable set of real numbers is a strong
measure zero set. Also, no uncountable analytic
A ⊆ R has strong measure zero.
There is a set A of real numbers of cardinality
c such that A
⋂
C is countable for every closed,
nowhere dense set C. Such a set is a Lusin Set.
Every Lusin set has strong measure zero.
A co-analytic set is either countable or of cardi-
nality ℵ1, ie, of cardinality c.
The following separation theorems and the dual
results - the reduction theorems - are among some
of the most important results on analytic and co-
analytic sets.
First Separation Theorem (Analytic Sets): Let
A and B be disjoint analytic subsets of a Polish
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space X . Then there is a Borel set C such that
A ⊆ C and B
⋂
C = ∅. In this case, we say that
C separates A from B.
Theorem: (Souslin) A subset A of a Polish space
X is Borel if and only if it is both analytic and co-
analytic, ie, △11(X) = BX .
Suppose Ao, A1, ... are pairwise disjoint analytic
subsets of a Polish space X . Then there exist
pairwise disjoint Borel sets Bo, B1, ... such that
Bn ⊇ An for all n.
Let E ⊆ X × X be an analytic equivalence re-
lation on a Polish space X . Suppose A and B are
disjoint analytic subsets of X . Assume that B is
invariant with respect to E, ie, B is a union of E-
equivalence classes. Then there is an E-invariant
Borel set C separating A from B.
Let A be an analytic subset of a Polish space, Y
a Polish space, and f : A → Y a 1-1 Borel map.
Then f : A→ f(A) is a Borel isomorphism.
Let X and Y be two Polish spaces, A ⊆ X be
analytic, and f : A → Y be any map. Then the
following are equivalent statements:
(i) f is Borel measurable,
(ii) graph(f) is Borel in A× Y , and
(iii) graph(f) is analytic.
Solovay Coding of Borel Sets - Let (ri) be an
enumeration of the rational numbers and let J be
the pairing function on N×N defined as J(m,n) =
2m(2n + 1). We define the Solovay coding recur-
sively as follows:
(s-i) α ∈ NN codes [ri, rj ] if α(0) = 0(mod 3),
α(1) = i, and α(2) = j,
(s-ii) Suppose αi ∈ NN codes Bi ⊆ R, i = 0, 1, ...;
then α ∈ NN codes
⋃
iBi if α(0) = 1(mod 3)
and α (J(m,n)) = αm(n),
(s-iii) Suppose β ∈ NN codes B, α(0) ≡ 2(mod 3),
and α(n+ 1) = β(n). Then α codes Bc,
(s-iv) α codes B ⊆ R only as per (s-i), (s-ii) and
(s-iii) above.
Then, we have the following:
(i) Every α ∈ NN codes at most one subset of R,
(ii) Every Borel subset of R is coded by some α ∈
NN,
(iii) If a subset of R is coded by α, it is Borel.
Next, we define a function Φ : NN × N → NN
with the property that if α codes a Borel set B,
then Φ(α, .) recovers the Borel sets from which B
is constructed.
To achieve this above, we fix an enumeration
(sn), without any repetition, of N<N such that
sn ≺ sm ⇒ n ≤ m with s0 being the empty se-
quence.
Set Φ(α, 0) = α, α ∈ NN. Let n > 0 and sup-
pose that Φ(α,m) has been defined for all α ∈ NN
and for all m < n. Let m < n and u be such
that sn = ŝm u. Define for i ∈ N, Φ(α, n)(i) =
0 if Φ(α,m)(0) ≡ 0(mod 3), = Φ(α,m)(J(u, i))
if Φ(α,m)(0) ≡ 1(mod 3), = Φ(α,m)(i + 1) if
Φ(α,m)(0) ≡ 2(mod 3).
Then, the graph of Φ is Borel and, hence, Φ is
Borel measurable. Also, by induction on n, we see
that if α codes a Borel set, then for all n, Φ(α, n)
codes a Borel set.
Now, for β ∈ NN, define β¯ ∈ NN such that for ev-
ery n ∈ N, sβ¯(n) = (β(0), β(1), ..., β(n − 1)). The
map β → β¯ is continuous.
Now, define the co-analytic set C =
{
α ∈ NN :
(∀β)(∃n)Φ
(
α, ¯β(n)
)
= 0
}
. Then C is closed under
Solovay’s coding (s-i) - (s-iv).
Solovay then constructed an example of a non-
Borel measurable function f : C × R → 2N whose
graph is Borel in C × R× 2N.
Next, let X and Y be Polish spaces, A ⊂ X
Borel, and f : X → Y a 1-1 Borel map. Then,
f(A) is Borel.
Let X be standard Borel and Y be metrizable.
Suppose there is a 1-1 Borel map f from X onto
Y . Then Y is standard Borel and f a Borel iso-
morphism.
If T and T ′ be two Polish topologies on X such
that T ′ ⊆ σ(T ). Then, σ(T ) = σ(T ′).
Blackwell-Mackey Theorem: Let X be an ana-
lytic subset of a Polish space and A be a countably
generated sub σ-algebra of the Borel σ-algebra BX .
Let B ⊆ X be a Borel set that is a union of atoms
of A. Then B ∈ A. (This result is not true if X is
co-analytic.)
Let X be an analytic subset of a Polish space
and A1 and A2 be two countably generated sub σ-
algebras of the Borel σ-algebra BX with the same
set of atoms. Then A1 = A2. In particular, if A
is a countably generated sub σ-algebra containing
all the singletons, then A = BX .
The Generalized First Separation Theorem: Let
(An) be a sequence of analytic subsets of a Polish
space X such that
⋂
nAn = ∅. Then there ex-
ist Borel sets Bn ⊇ An such that
⋂
nBn = ∅. If
(An) satisfies the conclusion of this result, we call
it Borel separated.
Let (En) be a sequence of subsets of X , k ∈
N, and Ei =
⋃
nEin for i ≤ k. Suppose (En) is
not Borel separated. Then there exist no, n1, ..., nk
such that the sequence Eono , E1n1 , ..., Eknk , Ek+1,
Ek+2, ... is not Borel separated.
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Let (An) be a sequence of analytic subsets
of a Polish space X such that lim supAn = ∅.
Then there exist Borel sets Bn ⊇ An such that
lim supBn = ∅. This result is not true for co-
analytic An’s.
Weak Reduction Principle for Co-Analytic Sets:
Let Co, C1, C2, ... be a sequence of co-analytic
subsets of a Polish space such that
⋃
Cn is Borel.
Then there exist pairwise disjoint Borel sets Bn ⊆
Cn such that
⋃
Bn =
⋃
Cn.
Let E be an analytic equivalence relation on a
Polish space X . Suppose Ao, A1, A2, ... are in-
variant analytic subsets of X such that
⋂
An = ∅.
There then exist invariant Borel sets Bn ⊇ An with⋂
nBn = ∅. Hence, if Co, C1, C2, ... is a sequence
of invariant co-analytic sets whose union is Borel,
then there exist pairwise disjoint invariant Borel
sets Bn ⊆ Cn with
⋃
Bn =
⋃
Cn.
For the following considerations marked by *,
let X and Y be fixed Polish spaces and (Vn) be a
countable base for Y .
* Let Ao and A1 be disjoint analytic subsets
of X × Y with the sections (Ao)x, x ∈ X , closed
in Y . Then there exists a sequence (Bn) of Borel
subsets of X such that A1 ⊆
⋃
n (Bn × Vn) and
Ao
⋂⋃
n (Bn × Vn) = ∅.
* Structure Theorem for Borel Sets with Open
Sections: Suppose B ⊆ X×Y is any Borel set with
Bx open, x ∈ X . Then there is a sequence (Bn) of
Borel subsets of X such that B =
⋃
(Bn × Vn).
* Let Ao and A1 be disjoint analytic subsets of
X × Y with sections (Ao)x and (A1)x closed for
all x ∈ X . Then there exist disjoint Borel sets Bo
and B1 with closed sections such that Ao ⊆ Bo
and A1 ⊆ B1.
* Suppose B ⊆ X × Y is a Borel set with the
sections Bx closed. Then there is a Polish topology
T finer than the given topology on X generating
the same Borel σ-algebra such that B is closed rel-
ative to the product topology on X × Y , X being
equipped with the new topology T .
* Let Ao and A1 be disjoint analytic subsets f
X × Y with sections (Ao)x being compact. Then
there exists a Borel subset Bo in X × Y with com-
pact sections separating Ao from A1.
* Let Ao, A1 ⊆ X × Y be disjoint and analytic
with the sections (Ao)x, (A1)x closed. Then there
exists a Borel map u : X × Y → [0, 1] such that
y → u(x, y) is continuous for all x and u(x) = 0 if
x ∈ Ao and u(x) = 1 if x ∈ A1. This result does
not hold for co-analytic Ao, A1.
* Let B ⊆ X × Y be Borel with sections closed
and f : B → [0, 1] a Borel map such that y →
f(x, y) is continuous for all x. Then there is a
finer topology T on X generating the same Borel
σ-algebra such that when X is equipped with it,
B is closed and f continuous. Hence, there is a
Borel extension F : X × Y → [0, 1] of f such that
y → F (x, y) is continuous for all x. Notably, [0, 1]
can be replaced by any compact convex subset of
Rn in this result. However, this result does not
hold for co-analytic B.
* In general, projection of a Borel set need not
be Borel. However, if B ⊆ X × Y is Borel and
the sections Bx are open (convex) (compact) in Y ,
then πX(B) is Borel in X . The projection πX(B)
is also Borel when for every x ∈ πX(B), (i) the sec-
tions Bx contains exactly one point, (ii) Bx is non-
meager (iii) P (x,Bx) > 0, where P is any transi-
tion probability on X × Y . Furthermore, if Y is
σ-compact (or, equivalently, locally compact) then
the projection of every Borel set B in X × Y with
x-sections closed in Y is Borel.
Now, let (G, ⋄) be a Polish group and H a closed
subgroup. Suppose E = {(x, y) : xy− 1 ∈ H}, ie,
E is the equivalence relation induced by the right
cosets of H . Then the σ-algebra of invariant Borel
sets is countably generated. The converse of this
result is also true.
Let G be a Polish group and H its Borel sub-
group. Suppose that the σ-algebra of invariant
Borel sets is countably generated. Then the sub-
group H is closed.
Let X be a Polish space and G a group of its
homeomorphisms such that for every pair U, V
of non-empty open sets there is g ∈ G with
g(U)
⋂
V 6= ∅. Suppose A is a G-invariant Borel
set, ie, g(A) = A for all g ∈ G. Then either A or
Ac is meager in X .
Let x ∈ X . The set Gx = {g ∈ G : gx = x} is
called the stabilizer of x. Clearly, Gx is a subgroup
of the group G.
Let (G, ⋄) be a Polish group, X a countably gen-
erated measurable space with singletons as atoms
and (g, x) → gx an action of G on X . Suppose
that for a given x, the map g → gx is Borel. Then
the stabilizer Gx is closed.
Let G be a Polish group, X a Polish space, and
a(g, x) = gx an action of G on X . Assume that gx
is continuous in x for all g and Borel in g for all x.
Then the action is continuous.
If (G, ⋄) is a group with a Polish topology such
that the group operation (g, h)→ gh is Borel, then
g → g− 1 is continuous.
Note that if (G, ⋄) is a group with a Polish topol-
ogy such that the group operation is separately
continuous in each variable, then G is a topologi-
cal group.
As a substantial generalization of the above, we
have the result that: If (G, ⋄) is a group with a
Polish topology such that h → gh is continuous
for every g ∈ G, and g → gh for all h. Then G is
a topological group. This follows by showing that
the group operation gh is jointly continuous. Also,
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for every meager set I and for every g, Ig = {hg :
h ∈ I} is meager.
As a further generalization of the same result,
we have that: If (G, ⋄) is a group with a topol-
ogy that is metrizable, separable, and Baire, and
if the multiplication gh is continuous in h for all
g and Baire measurable in g for all h, then G is a
topological group.
A norm on a set S is a map ϕ : S → ON. Let
ϕ be a norm on a set S. Define ≤ϕ as the binary
relation x ≤ϕ y ⇔ ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(y). Then ≤ϕ is
(i) reflexive,
(ii) transitive,
(iii) connected, ie, for every x, y ∈ S, at least one
of x ≤ϕ y or y ≤ϕ x holds, and
(iv) there is no sequence (xn) of elements in S
such that xn+1 <ϕ xn for all n, where x <ϕ
y ⇔ ϕ(x) < ϕ(y)⇔ x ≤ϕ y and¬y ≤ϕ x.
Such a binary relation, satisfying (i)-(iv) above is
called as a pre-well-ordering on S.
Let X be a Polish space and A ⊆ X be co-
analytic. A norm ϕ on A is called a Π11-norm if
there are binary relations ≤
Π
1
1
ϕ ∈ Π11 and ≤
Σ
1
1
ϕ ∈ Σ11
on X such that for y ∈ A, x ∈ A andϕ(x) ≤
ϕ(y)⇔ x ≤
Π
1
1
ϕ y ⇔ x ≤
Σ
1
1
ϕ y.
Then, everyΠ11 set A in a Polish spaceX admits
a Π11-norm ϕ : A→ ω1.
Let X be a Polish space and A ⊆ X co-analytic.
A norm ϕ : A → ON is a Π11-norm if and only if
there are binary relations ≤
Σ
1
1
ϕ and <
Σ
1
1
ϕ , both in
Σ
1
1, such that for every y ∈ A, x ∈ A & ϕ(x) ≤
ϕ(y) ⇔ x ≤
Σ
1
1
ϕ y and x ∈ A & ϕ(x) < ϕ(y) ⇔
x <
Σ
1
1
ϕ .
Let A ⊆ X and ϕ be a norm on A. Define ≤∗ϕ
and <∗ϕ on X as: x ≤
∗
ϕ y ⇔ x ∈ A&(y /∈ A or (y ∈
A&ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(y))) and x <∗ϕ y ⇔ x ∈ A&(y /∈
A or (y ∈ A&ϕ(x) < ϕ(y))).
Let X be a Polish space, A ⊆ X co-analytic, and
ϕ a norm on A. Then ϕ is a Π11-norm if and only
if both ≤∗ϕ and <
∗
ϕ are co-analytic.
Let us identify a tree T on N with its character-
istic function χ
T
∈ 2N
<N
, ie, Tr = {T ∈ 2N
<N
:
T is a tree onN}. Note that Tr is a Gδ set in 2N
<N
,
when 2N
<N
is equipped with the product of dis-
crete topologies on 2 and, hence, is a Polish space.
Let WF = {T ∈ Tr : T is well founded}. WF is
Π
1
1-complete and co-analytic.
Next, identify binary relations on N with points
of 2N×N and equip 2N×N with the product of dis-
crete topologies on 2. Let LO = {α ∈ 2N×N :
α is a linear order}. Then LO is Borel. Define
WO = {α ∈ 2N×N : α is a well order}. Then WO
is co-analytic and Π11-complete since there exists
a continuous map R : Tr → 2N×N such that
WF = R− 1(WO).
Boundedness Theorem for Π11-Norms: Suppose
A is a Π11 set in a Polish space X and ϕ : A →
ω1 a norm on A. Then for every Σ
1
1 set B ⊆ A,
sup{ϕ(x) : x ∈ B} < ω1. Hence, A is Borel if and
only if sup{ϕ(x) : x ∈ A} < ω1.
Reduction Principle for Co-analytic Sets: Let
(An) be a sequence of Π
1
1 sets in a Polish space X .
Then there is a sequence (A∗n) of Π
1
1 sets such that
they are pairwise disjoint, A∗n ⊆ An, and
⋃
nA
∗
n =⋃
nAn.
Let X be Polish and A0, A1 be co-analytic sub-
sets of X . Then there exist pairwise disjoint co-
analytic sets A∗0, A
∗
1 contained in A0, A1 respec-
tively such that A∗0
⋃
A∗1 = A0
⋃
A1.
Note that analytic sets do not satisfy the reduc-
tion principle and the co-analytic sets do not sat-
isfy the separation theorems.
A very useful parametrization of Borel sets is
provided by the following: Let X be a Polish
space. Then there exist sets C ∈ Π11
(
NN
)
and
V ∈ Π11
(
NN ×X
)
, U ∈ Σ11
(
NN ×X
)
such that
for every α ∈ C, Uα = Vα and △11(X) = {Uα :
α ∈ C}. In particular, there are a co-analytic set
and an analytic set contained in NN ×X that are
universal for △11(X).
Note that in the above we cannot replace C ∈
Π
1
1 by C ∈ Σ
1
1.
A Choquet-capacity on a Polish space X is a
set-map or a set-function I : P(X) → [0,∞] such
that
(i) I is monotone, ie, A ⊆ B =⇒ I(A) ≤ I(B),
(ii) A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ ... =⇒ lim I(An) = I(A)
where A =
⋃
nAn. We say that I is going
up.
(iii) I(K) < ∞ for every compact K ⊆ X , and
lastly,
(iv) For every compactK and every t > 0, I(K) <
t implies that there is an open set U ⊇ K
such that I(U) < t. In this case, we say that
I is right-continuous over compacta.
Let µ∗ be the associated outer measure corre-
sponding to a finite Borel measure µ on a Polish
space. Then, for any A ⊆ X , µ∗ = inf{µ(B) : B ⊇
A,A is Borel} is a capacity on X .
In general, if I is a capacity on a Polish space
X and I∗ : P(X) → [0,∞] be defined as I∗(A) =
inf{I(B) : B ⊇ A,B is Borel}. Then I∗ is a capac-
ity on X .
Let X be Polish and define I : P(X ×X) → 2
by I(A) = 0 if π1(A)
⋂
π2(A) = ∅, and I(A) =
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1 otherwise, where π1 and π2 are two projection
maps on X × X . For A ⊆ X × X , let R[A] =
π1(A) × π2(A). Then I is a capacity on X × X .
This I is the separation capacity on X ×X .
Let X , Y be Polish spaces and f : X → Y be a
continuous function. Suppose that I is a capacity
on Y . Define If (A) = I(f(A)), A ⊆ X . Then If is
a capacity on X .
Let I be a capacity on a Polish space. Sup-
pose (Kn) is a non-increasing sequence of compact
subsets of X decreasing to, say, K. Then, I(Kn)
converges to I(K).
Consider I : P → 2 defined by I(A) = 0 if A is
contained in a Kσ set and I(A) = 1 otherwise. But
I is not a capacity since I is not right-continuous
over compacta.
Let X be a Polish space, I a capacity on X , and
A ⊆ X . We say that A is I-capcitable if I(A) =
sup{I(K) : K ⊆ A compact}. A subset A is called
as universally capacitable if it is I-capacitable with
respect to all capacities I on X .
Let X , Y be Polish spaces and f : X → Y a
continuous map. Assume A ⊆ X is universally
capacitable. Then f(A) is universally capacitable.
(This is almost the only known stability property
of the class of universally capacitable sets.) Note
that the complement of a universally capacitable
set need not be universally capacitable.
Let I be a capacity on a Polish space X and A ⊆
X universally capacitable. Then I(A) = I∗(A)
where I∗(A) = inf{I(B) : B ⊇ A,B Borel}, as
defined earlier.
Note that the space NN of irrational numbers is
universally capacitable.
The Choquet Capacitability Theorem: Every
analytic subset of a Polish space is universally ca-
pacitable.
Further, let X be Polish and I be the separation
capacity on X×X . Assume that a rectangle A1×
A2 be universally capacitable. If I(A1 × A2) =
0 then there is a Borel rectangle B = B1 × B2
containing A1 ×A2 of I-capacity 0.
Second Separation Theorem for Analytic Sets:
Let X be a Polish space and A,B two analytic
subsets. There exist disjoint co-analytic sets C and
D such that A \B ⊆ C and B \A ⊆ D.
Suppose X is a Polish space and let (An) be a
sequence of analytic subsets of X . Then there ex-
ists a sequence (Cn) of pairwise disjoint co-analytic
subsets of X such that An \
⋃
m 6=nAm ⊆ Cn.
Let X be a Polish space and (An) a sequence of
analytic subsets ofX . Then there exists a sequence
(Cn) of co-analytic subsets of X such that we have
An \ lim supAm ⊆ Cn and lim supCn = ∅.
Note that the Generalized First Separation Prin-
ciple does not hold for co-analytic sets.
Let X be a Borel subset of a Polish space, Y
Polish and f : X → Y Borel. Then Zf = {y ∈ Y :
f− 1(y) is a singleton} is co-analytic.
Let X , Y be Polish and B ⊆ X × Y a Borel set.
Then the set Z = {x ∈ X : Bx is a singleton} is
co-analytic.
If X , Y are Polish and B a Borel subset of X ×
Y such that for every x ∈ X the section Bx is
countable, then πX(B) is Borel.
Let X , Y be Polish and f : X × Y a countable-
to-one Borel map. Then f(B) is Borel for every
Borel set B in X .
Let X be Standard Borel, Y polish, A ⊆ X × Y
analytic with πX(A) uncountable and that ∀x ∈
πX(a), the section Ax is perfect. Then there is a
C ⊆ πX(A) homeomorphic to the Cantor ternary
set and a 1-1 Borel map f : C × 2N → A such that
πX (f(x, α)) = x, ∀x and every α.
Now, the Axiom of Choice states that every fam-
ily {Ai : i ∈ I} of nonempty sets admits a choice
function. It however does not specify the proce-
dure by which we can make the choice of such sets.
This situation leads to selection criteria or the se-
lection theorems.
A multifunction G : X → Y is a map with
domain X and whose values are nonempty sub-
sets of Y . For any A ⊂ Y , we put G− 1(A) =
{x ∈ X : G(x)
⋂
A 6= ∅}. We call {(x, y) ∈
X × Y : y ∈ G(x)} the graph of the multifunc-
tion G and will denote it by gr(G). We have
G− 1(A) = πX (gr(G)
⋂
(X ×A)).
A selection of a multifunction G : X → Y is a
point map s : X → Y such that s(x) ∈ G(x) for
every x ∈ X .
Let A denote a class of subsets of X . We re-
strict ourselves to cases where A is the σ-algebra
or X being a Polish space and A being one of the
additive class Σ0α(X).
For a Polish Y , a multifunction G : X → Y
is called A-measurable (strongly A-measurable) if
G− 1(U) ∈ A for every open (closed) set U in Y .
We will often omit the prefix A.
Suppose X is a measurable space, Y is a Polish
space and F (Y ) is the space of all nonempty closed
sets in Y with the Effros Borel structure. Then a
closed-valued multifunction G : X → Y is measur-
able if and only if G : X → F (X) is measurable as
a point map.
A multifunction G : X → Y is called as lower-
semicontinuous (upper-semicontinuous) if G− 1(U)
is open (closed) for every open (closed) set U ⊆ Y .
If g : X → Y be a continuous open (closed) onto
map then G(x) = g− 1(x) is lower semicontinuous
(upper semicontinuous).
Let Y be metrizable, G : X → Y strongly A-
measurable, and A closed under countable unions.
Then G is A-measurable.
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Let (X,A) be a measurable space, Y Polish and
G : X → Y a closed-valued measurable multifunc-
tion. Then gr(G) ∈ A
⊗
BY . The converse of this
is, in general, not true.
If X , Y are two Polish spaces and if A is a sub-
algebra of BX , then every compact-valued multi-
function G : X → Y whose graph is in A
⊗
BY is
seen to be A-measurable.
Now, let B ⊆ X × Y . A set C ⊆ B is called as
a uniformization of B if for every x ∈ X , the sec-
tion Cx contains at most one point and πX(C) =
πX(B). That is to say, C is a uniformization of
B if it is the graph of a function f : πX(B) → Y .
Such a map f will be called section of B.
A Borel set B ⊆ X × Y admits a Borel uni-
formization if and only if πX(B) is Borel and B
admits a Borel section.
If C1 and C2 are disjoint co-analytic subsets of
[0, 1] that cannot be separated by Borel sets and if
Bs be a closed subset of [0, 1]×Σ(s) whose projec-
tion is [0, 1] \ Cs, s = 1 or 2, and if B = B1
⋃
B2,
then B is a closed subset of [0, 1]×NN whose pro-
jection is [0, 1]. Such a set B does not admit a
Borel uniformization.
Let D be the partition of X and A ⊂ X . We
put A∗ =
⋃
{P ∈ D : A
⋂
P 6= ∅}. Thus, A∗ is the
smallest invariant set containing A and is called
the saturation of A.
Let X be a Polish space and A family of subsets
of X . A partition D will be called A-measurable
if the saturation of every open set is in A. We
then say that the partition D of a Polish space
X as closed, Borel, etc. if it is closed, Borel etc.
in X × X . It is said to be lower- semicontinuous
(upper-semicontinuous) if the saturation of every
open (closed) set is open (closed).
A cross-section of D is a subset S of X such that
S
⋂
A is a singleton for every A ∈ D. A section of
D is a map f : X → X such that for any x, y ∈ X
(i) xDf(x) and (ii) xDy ⇒ f(x) = f(y). To each
section f we canonically associate a cross-section
S = {x ∈ X : x = f(x)} of D.
If X is Polish and D is a Borel equivalence rela-
tion on X , then the following are equivalent:
(i) D has a Borel section
(ii) D admits a Borel cross section.
(Notice that we use here and elsewhere the same
symbol D to denote a partition of X and a Borel
equivalence relation on X.)
A partition D is said to be countably separated
if there is a Polish Y and a Borel map f : X → Y
such that xDx′ ⇔ f(x) = f(x′).
For a partition D on a Polish space X , the fol-
lowing are equivalent statements:
(i) D is countably-generated,
(ii) There exists a Polish space Y as well as a
sequence of Borel maps fn : X → Y such
that ∀x, y (xDy ⇔ ∀n (fn(x) = fn(y))),
(iii) There then exists a sequence (Bn) of in-
variant Borel subsets of X such that for
all x, y (xDy ⇔ ∀n (x ∈ Bn ⇔ y ∈ Bn)), in
short, X × Y \ D =
⋃
n (Bn ×B
c
n).
Every closed equivalence relation D on a Polish
space X is countably generated. Every Borel mea-
surable partition of a Polish space into Gδ sets is
countably separated.
Let D be a partition of a Polish space X and let
XupslopeD denote the set of all D-equivalence classes.
Suppose q : X → XupslopeD be the canonical quotient
map. Then XupslopeD equipped with the largest σ-
algebra making q measurable is called the quotient
Borel space. The quotient σ-algebra then consists
of all subsets E of XupslopeD such that q− 1(E) is a
Borel subset in X .
If D is any countably separated partition of a
Polish space X , then the quotient Borel space
XupslopeD is seen to be Borel isomorphic to some ana-
lytic set in a Polish space.
Importantly, note however that the quotient of
a Standard Borel space by an equivalence relation
need not at all be isomorphic to the Borel σ-algebra
of a metric space.
Let D be a Borel partition of a Polish space X .
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) D is countably separated,
(ii) The σ-algebra B∗ of D-invariant Borel sets is
countably generated.
Now, let Y denote a Polish space, d < 1 a com-
patible complete metric on Y , X a nonempty set,
and L an algebra of subsets for the results marked
by * below.
* Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem: Every
L
σ
-measurable, closed-valued multifunction F :
X → Y admits an L
σ
-measurable selection.
The proof for the above theorem rests on the
following two lemmas.
* Suppose An ∈ Lσ . Then there exists Bn ⊆ An
such that the Bn’s are pairwise disjoint elements
of L
σ
and
⋃
nAn =
⋃
nBn.
* Let fn : X → Y be a sequence of Lσ -
measurable functions converging uniformly to f :
X → Y . Then f is L
σ
-measurable.
For a Polish space X and F (X) being the space
of nonempty closed subsets of X with Effros Borel
structure, there is a measurable s : F (X) → X
such that s(F ) ∈ F for all F ∈ F (X).
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Let (T, T ) be a measurable space and Y a sep-
arable metric space. Then every T -measurable,
compact-valued multifunction F : T → Y admits
a T -measurable selection.
If Y is a compact metric space, X a metric space
and f : Y → X a continuous onto map then, there
is a Borel map s : X → Y of class 2 such that f ◦ s
is the identity map on X .
Suppose T is a nonempty set, L an algebra on T ,
and X a Polish space. Let F : T → X is a closed-
valued L
σ
-measurable multifunction. Then there
is a sequence (fn) of Lσ -measurable selections of
F such that F (t) = cl ({fn(t) : n ∈ N}) , t ∈ T .
Results of this kind are generally also called by
the name of Castaing’s Theorems.
Furthermore, let T be a nonempty set, L be an
algebra on T , X be a Polish space, and F : T → X
be a closed-valued L
σ
-measurable multifunction.
Then there is a map f : T × NN → X such that
(i) for every α ∈ NN, t→ f(t, α) is L
σ
-measurable,
and (ii) for every t ∈ T , f(t, .) is a continuous
map from NN onto F (t). Moreover, suppose that
s : T → X is an L
σ
-measurable selection for F
and ǫ > 0. Then the multifunction G : T → X
defined as G(t) = cl (F (t)
⋂
B(s(t), ǫ)) , t ∈ T is
L
σ
-measurable.
The Bhattacharya-Srivastava Theorem: Let F :
X → Y be closed-valued as well as strongly L
σ
-
measurable. Suppose Z is a separable metric space
and g : Y → Z a Borel map of class 2. Then there
is an L
σ
-measurable selection f of F such that g◦f
is L
σ
-measurable.
Now, let X , Y be two compact metric spaces,
f : X → Y a continuous onto map. Suppose that
A ⊆ Y and 1 ≤ α < ω1, ie, countable ordinals.
Then f− 1(A) ∈ Π0α(X)⇔ A ∈ Π
0
α(Y ). Moreover,
for 1 ≤ α < ω1, Z a separable metric space, and
g : X → Z being a Borel map of class α, there is a
class 2 map s : Y → X such that g ◦ s is of class α
and f (s(y)) = y for all y.
Scha¨l’s Selection Theorem: Let (T, T ) be a mea-
surable space, Y be a separable metric space,
G : T → Y is a T -measurable compact-valued mul-
tifunction, v be a real-valued function on gr(G),
that is the point-wise limit of a non-increasing
sequence (vn) of T
⊗
BY |gr(G)-measurable func-
tions on gr(G) such that for each n and each
t ∈ T , vn(t, .) is continuous on G(t). Let v∗(t) =
sup {v(t, y) : y ∈ G(t)} , t ∈ T . Then there is a T -
measurable selection g : T → Y for G such that
v∗(t) = v(t, g(t)) for every t ∈ T .
Theorems of the above type are also known as
Dubins-Savage Selection Theorems in the dynamic
programming literature.
Theorem (Effros): Every lower-semicontinuous
or upper-semicontinuous partition D of a Polish
space X into closed sets admits a Boreal measur-
able section f : X → X of class 2. In particular,
they admit a Gδ cross section.
Effros-Mackey Cross Section Theorem: Suppose
H is a closed subgroup of a Polish group G and
D be the partition of G consisting of all the right
cosets of H . Then D admits a Borel measurable
section of class 2. In particular, it admits a Gδ
cross section.
Every Borel measurable partition D of a Polish
space X into closed sets admits a Borel measurable
section f : X → X . In particular, it admits a Borel
cross section. This is one of the most frequently
used cross section theorems.
Miller’s Theorem: Let (G, ⋄) be a Polish group,
X Polish, and a(g, x) = g ⋄x an action of G on X .
Suppose for a given x ∈ X that g → g ⋄ x is Borel.
Then the orbit {g ⋄ x : g ∈ G} of x is Borel.
If a section is measurable with respect to all
continuous probability measures then it is called
universally measurable.
Let X , Y be Polish spaces, B ⊆ X × Y Borel,
and C an analytic uniformization of B. Then C is
Borel.
Von Neumann’s Theorem: Let X , Y be Polish
spaces, A ⊆ X × Y analytic, and A = σ
(
Σ
1
1(X)
)
- the σ-algebra generated by the analytic subsets
of X . Then there exists an A-measurable section
u : πX(A)→ Y of A.
Every analytic subset A of the product of Polish
spaces X , Y admits a section u that is universally
measurable as well as Baire measurable. Further-
more, if A is Borel, then the graph of the section
u is co-analytic.
Note that a 1-1 Borel map defined on a co-
analytic set need not be a Borel isomorphism, al-
though those with domain analytic are.
Let X , Y be Polish spaces and f : X → Y Borel.
Then there is a co-analytic set C ⊆ X such that
f |C is 1-1 and f(C) = f(X).
Let (X, E) be a measurable space with E closed
under the Souslin operation, Y a Polish space, and
A ∈ E
⊗
BY . Then πX(A) ∈ E , and there is an
E-measurable section of A.
If (X,A, P ) be a complete probability space, Y a
Polish space, and B ∈ A
⊗
BY , then πX(B) ∈ A,
and B admits an A-measurable section. This is
essentially the form in which Von Neumann proved
his theorem originally.
Burgess’s Theorem: Let a Polish group G act
continuously on a Polish space X , inducing an
equivalence relation EG. Suppose EG is countably
separated. Then it admits a Borel cross section.
A Large Section Condition is the one where sec-
tions do not belong to a σ-ideal with appropriate
computability property, eg, the σ-ideal of meager
sets or the σ-ideal of null sets. A Small Section
Condition is the one for which the sections do
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belong to a σ-ideal with appropriate computabil-
ity property, eg, the σ-ideal of of countable sets or
the σ-ideal of Kσ sets.
Theorem (Novikov): Let X , Y be Polish spaces
and A a countably generated sub σ-algebra of BX .
Suppose B ∈ A
⊗
BY is such that the sections Bx
are compact. Then πX(B) ∈ A, and B admits an
A-measurable section.
Theorem (Lusin): Let X , Y be Polish spaces
and B ⊆ X × Y Borel with sections Bx countable.
Then B admits a Borel uniformization.
Let X be Polish and D a countably separated
partition of X with all equivalence classes count-
able. Then D admits a Borel cross section.
Clearly, Novikov’s theorem and Lusin’s theorem
are uniformization theorems for Borel sets with
small sections.
LetX , Y be Polish. A map I : X → P (P(Y )) is
called Borel on Borel if for every Borel B ⊆ X×Y ,
the set {x ∈ X : Bx ∈ I(x)} is Borel.
Some of the important Borel on Borel maps are:
(i) Let P be a transition probability on X × Y
withX , Y being Polish. Then the map I(x) :
X → P (P(Y )) defined by I(x) = {N ⊆ Y :
P (x,N) = 0} is Borel on Borel.
(ii) If X , Y are Polish and I(x) the σ-ideal of all
meager sets in Y , then I is Borel on Borel.
(iii) If X , Y are Polish and G : X → Y is a closed-
valued Borel measurable multifunction, then
define I : X → P (P(Y )) as: I(x) = {I ⊆
Y : I ismeager inG(x)}. Then I is Borel on
Borel.
Theorem (Kechris): Let X , Y be Polish. Now,
assume that x → Ix is a Borel on Borel map as-
signing to each x ∈ X a σ-ideal Ix of subsets of Y .
Suppose B ⊆ X × Y is a Borel set such that for
every x ∈ πX(B), Bx /∈ Ix. Then πX(B) is Borel,
and B admits a Borel section.
Theorem (Kechris-Sarbadhikari): If B is a Borel
subset of the product of two Polish spaces X , Y
with Bx non-meager in Y for every x ∈ πX(B),
then B admits a Borel uniformization.
Thus, every Borel set B ⊆ X × Y with Bx a
dense Gδ set admits a Borel uniformization.
Theorem (Blackwell and Ryll-Nardzewski): Let
X , Y be Polish spaces, P a transition probability
on X×Y , and B ⊆ X×Y Borel with P (x,Bx) > 0
for all x ∈ πX(B). Then πX(B) is Borel, and B
admits a Borel uniformization.
LetX , Y be Polish, A a countably generated sub
σ-algebra of BX , and P a transition probability on
X×Y with x→ P (x,B) asA-measurable for every
B ∈ BY . For every E ∈ A
⊗
BY and every ǫ > 0,
there is an F ∈ A
⊗
BY contained in E such that
Fx is compact and P (x, Fx) ≥ ǫ.P (x,Ex).
Theorem (Blackwell and Ryll-Nardzewski): Let
X , Y be Polish, A a countably generated sub σ-
algebra of BX , P a transition probability on X×Y
with x → P (x,B) as A-measurable for every B ∈
BY . Suppose B ∈ A
⊗
BY is such that P (x,Bx) >
0 for all x ∈ πX(B). Then πX(B) ∈ A, and B
admits an A-measurable section.
Theorem (Lusin): IfX and Y are Polish and B a
Borel set with Bx countable, then B is a countable
union of Borel graphs.
A subset A of X is called a partial cross section
if A
⋂
C is at most a singleton for every member
C of the partition D of X .
If D is a countably separated partition of Polish
X into countable sets, then there is a sequence
(Gn) of partial Borel cross sections of D with⋃
nGn = X and if Gn and Gm are distinct, then
Gn
⋃
Gm is not a partial cross section.
LetX be Polish andG a group of Borel automor-
phisms on X , ie, each member of G is a Borel iso-
morphism of X onto itself and G is a group under
composition. Define xEGy ⇔ (∃g ∈ G)(y = g(x)).
Then EG is an equivalence relation on X . EG is
called the equivalence relation induced by G. It is
clearly analytic, and Borel if G is countable. The
converse of this result also holds.
Every Borel equivalence relation on a Polish
space X with its equivalence classes being count-
able is seen to be induced by a countable group of
Borel automorphisms.
Theorem (Miller): Every partition D of a Polish
space X into Gδ sets such that the saturation of
every basic open set is simultaneously Fσ and Gδ
admits a section s : X → X that is Borel measur-
able of class 2. In particular, such partitions admit
a Gδ cross section.
Theorem (Srivastava): Every Borel measurable
partition D of a Polish spaceX into Gδ sets admits
a Borel cross section.
Let X be a Polish space and Φ ⊆ P(X). We
then say that Φ is Π11 on Π
1
1 if for every Polish
space Y and every Π11 subset D of Y × X , {y ∈
Y : Dy ∈ Φ} ∈ Π11.
The Reflection Theorem: Let X be Polish and
Φ ⊆ P(X) Π11 on Π
1
1. For every Π
1
1 set A ∈ Φ
there is a Borel B ⊆ A in Φ.
If X , Y are Polish and A ⊆ X×Y analytic with
sections Ax countable, then every co-analytic set
B containing A contains a Borel set E ⊇ A with
all sections countable.
Theorem (Lusin): Every analytic set with count-
able sections, in the product of two Polish spaces,
can be covered by countably many Borel graphs.
Let X be Polish, E an analytic equivalence re-
lation on X , and C ⊆ X × X a co-analytic set
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containing E. Then there is a Borel equivalence
relation B such that E ⊆ B ⊆ C.
Let X be Polish, P analytic, C co-analytic, and
E(P ) ⊆ C. Then there is a Borel set containing P
such that E(B) ⊆ C.
For every analytic equivalence relation E on a
Polish space X there exist Borel equivalence rela-
tions Bα, α < ω1, such that E =
⋂
α<ω1
Bα.
Let X be Polish and C be a sub σ-algebra of the
Borel σ-algebra BX . A weak complement of C is
another sub σ-algebra D of BX such that C
∨
D =
BX where C
∨
D = σ (C
⋃
D). A weak complement
D is called as minimal if no proper sub σ-algebra
is a weak complement.
A complement of C is a sub σ-algebra D such
that C
∨
D = BX and
⋂
D = {∅, X}.
If X is Polish and C is a countably generated sub
σ-algebra of BX , then every weak complement of C
contains a countably generated weak complement.
If X is Polish, C ⊆ BX , and if D is a minimal
weak complement, then C
⋂
D = {∅, X}, ie, D is
also a complement.
Let X be an uncountable Polish space, then the
countable-cocountable σ-algebra does not have a
complement.
Theorem: Every countably generated sub σ-
algebra of the Borel σ-algebra of a Polish space
has a minimal complement.
LetX be Polish and C a countably generated sub
σ-algebra of BX . Suppose D is a countably gener-
ated sub σ-algebra of BX such that every atom A
of D is a partial cross section of the atoms of C.
Further, assume that for any two distinct atoms
C1, C2 of D, C1
⋃
C2 is not a partial cross section
of the set of atoms of C. Then D is a minimal
complement of C.
Uniformization Theorem (Arsenin & Kunugui):
Let B ⊆ X×Y be a Borel set, X and Y being Pol-
ish, such that Bx is σ-compact for every x. Then
πX(B) is Borel, and B admits a Borel uniformiza-
tion.
Theorem (Saint Raymond): Let X , Y be Polish
spaces and A,B ⊆ X×Y be analytic sets. Assume
that for every x, there is a σ-compact set K such
that Ax ⊆ K ⊆ Bcx. Then there exists a sequence
of Borel sets (Bn) such that the sections (Bn)x are
compact, A ⊆
⋃
nBn and B
⋂⋃
nBn = ∅.
Let X , Y be Polish spaces and A ⊆ X × Y
a Borel set with sections Ax σ-compact. Then
A =
⋃
nBn, where each Bn is Borel with (Bn)x
compact for all x and for all n.
Let B ⊆ X × Y be a Borel set with sections Bx
that are Gδ sets in Y . Then there exist Borel sets
Bn with open sections such that B =
⋂
nBn.
Let B ⊆ X × Y be a Borel set with sections Bx
that are Fσ sets in Y . Then there exist Borel sets
Bn with closed sections such that B =
⋃
nBn.
Now, recall that the family F (X) of all closed
subsets of a Polish space X with the Effros Borel
structure is a Standard Borel Space. A family B ⊆
F (X) is called hereditary if whenever A ∈ B and
B is a closed subset of A, then B ∈ B.
A derivative on X is a map D : F (X) → F (X)
such that for A,B ∈ F (X) (i) D(A) ⊆ A, and (ii)
A ⊆ B ⇒ D(A) ⊆ D(B).
Some examples of derivatives are:
(i) Let B ⊆ F (X) be hereditary. Define DB(A) =
{x ∈ X : (∀ openU ∋ x)(cl(A
⋂
U) /∈ B)}.
Then DB is a derivative on X . Note that
if B consists of sets with at most one point,
DB(A) is the usual derived set of A.
(ii) Another important example is obtained by
considering B to be the family of all compact
subsets of X .
Note the following property of DB: Let B be
hereditary Π11. Then the set {(A,B) ∈ F (X) ×
F (X) : A ⊆ DB(B)} is analytic.
Let X be Polish, D : F (X)→ F (X) a derivative
on X , A ⊆ X closed, and α any countable ordinal.
Define Dα(A) by induction on α as follows:
D0(A) = A
Dα(A) = D(Dβ(A)), if α = β + 1, and
Dα(A) =
⋂
β<αD
β(A), if α is limit.
Hence, {Dα(A) : α < ω1} is a non-decreasing
transfinite sequence of closed sets. Then there is
an α < ω1 such that D
α(A) = Dα+1(A). The least
of such α will be denoted by |A|D. We then set
D∞(A) = D|A|D (A) and
ΩD = {A ∈ F (X) : D∞(A) = ∅}.
Now, let X be a Polish space and B ⊆ F (X)
hereditary. Then ΩDB = Bσ
⋂
F (X).
Let X be a Polish space and D a derivative on
X such that {(A,B) ∈ F (X)×F (X) : A ⊆ D(B)}
is analytic. Then we have that
(i) ΩD is co-analytic, and
(ii) for all analyticA ⊆ ΩD, sup {|A|D : A ∈ A} <
ω1.
Let F ⊆ F
(
NN
)
be a hereditaryΠ11 family. Sup-
pose X is a Polish space and H ⊆ X×NN a closed
set such that Hx ∈ Fσ. Then there exists a se-
quence (Hn) of Borel sets such that H =
⋃
nHn
and (Hn)x ∈ F for all x.
Now, every countably separated partition of a
Polish space into σ-compact sets admits a Borel
cross section.
Let X , Y be two Polish spaces and A,B two
disjoint analytic subsets of X × Y such that Ax
is closed and nowhere dense for all x. Then there
exists a Borel C ⊆ X × Y such that the sections
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Cx are closed and nowhere dense, and such that
A ⊆ C and C
⋂
B = ∅.
Let X , Y be Polish spaces and A,B disjoint an-
alytic subsets of X × Y . Assume that the sections
Ax are meager in Y . Then there is a sequence (Cn)
of Borel sets with sections nowhere dense such that
A ⊆
⋃
n Cn and (
⋃
n Cn)
⋂
B = ∅.
For every Borel set B ⊆ X×Y with sections Bx
co-meager in Y , there is a sequence (Bn) of Borel
sets such that (Bn)x is dense and open for every x
and
⋂
Bn ⊆ B.
Let X , Y ne Polish spaces. For 1 ≤ α < ω1,
let Fα denote the family of all Borel subsets of
X×Y with x-sections of multiplicative class α and
let G = ¬Fα. By transfinite induction, we define
families Σ∗α, Π
∗
α of subsets of X × Y as follows.
Take Π∗0 to be the subsets of X × Y of the form
B × V , B Borel and V open. For α > 0, set Σ∗α =(⋃
β<αΠ
∗
β
)
σ
and Π∗α = ¬Σ
∗
α.
Clearly, Σ∗α ⊆ Gα and Π
∗
α ⊆ Fα. Note that
Π
∗
2 = G2 and Σ
∗
2 = F2. Furthermore, Σ
∗
1 is pre-
cisely the family of all Borel sets with sections that
are open.
Louveau’s Theorem: For every 1 ≤ α < ω1,
Σ
∗
α = Fα.
Theorem (Becker-Kechris): Suppose a Polish
group G acts continuously on a Polish space X and
A is an invariant Borel subset of X . Then there
is a finer Polish topology on X making A clopen
with the action still continuous.
Theorem (Becker-Kechris): Suppose a Polish
group G acts on a Polish space and the action is
Borel. Then there is a finer topology on X making
the action continuous.
Weak Topologcal Vaught Conjecture: Suppose a
Polish group G acts continuously on a Polish space
X . Then, under Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis,
the number of orbits in ≤ ℵo or equals 2ℵo .
Let E be an equivalence relation on a Polish
space X . In this case, we then say that E has
perfectly many equivalence classes if there is a
nonempty, perfect subset of X consisting of pair-
wise E-inequivalent elements.
Topological Vaught Conjecture: Suppose a Pol-
ish group G acts continuously on a Polish space X .
Then the number of equivalence classes is count-
able or perfectly many.
Theorem (Burgess): Suppose E is an analytic
equivalence relation on a Polish spaceX . Then the
number of equivalence classes is ≤ ℵ1 or perfectly
many.
The topological Vaught conjecture is equivalent
to the following statement: Suppose G is a Polish
group acting on a Standard Borel Space X and the
action is Borel. Then the number of orbits is ≤ ℵ0
or perfectly many.
Theorem: The topological Vaught Conjecture
holds if G is a locally compact Polish group.
Suppose X is a Polish space and E an equiv-
alence relation on X which is meager in X × X ,
Then E has perfectly many equivalence classes.
Theorem (Stern): Let E be an analytic equiva-
lence relation on a Polish space X with all equiva-
lence classes Fσ. Then the number of equivalence
classes is ≤ ℵ0 or perfectly many.
Silver’s Theorem: Suppose E is a co-analytic
equivalence relation on a Polish space X . Then
the number of equivalence classes is countable or
perfectly many.
Suppose {Aα : α < ω1} is a family of Borel sub-
sets of a Polish space X and E is the equivalence
relation defined on X as xEy ⇔ ∀α(x ∈ Aα ⇔ y ∈
Aα), x, y ∈ X . Then the number of E-equivalence
classes is ≤ ℵ1 or perfectly many.
Suppose Z is a subset of a Polish space X of car-
dinality > ℵ1 such that no two distinct elements of
Z are E-equivalent. Then there exists an α < ω1
such that both Z
⋂
Aα and Z
⋂
Acα are of cardi-
nality > ℵ1.
Note that the orbit {gx : g ∈ G} of every point
x of a Polish space X under a continuous action
of a Polish group G is Borel. So the equivalence
relation Ea on X induced by the action is analytic
with all equivalence classes Borel.
Theorem (Stern): Let E be an analytic equiva-
lence relation on a Polish spaceX such that all but
countably many equivalence classes are Fσ or Gδ.
Then the number of equivalence classes is ≥ ℵ0 or
perfectly many.
Theorem (Stern): Assume analytic determinacy.
Let E be an analytic equivalence relation on a
Polish space X such that all but countably many
equivalence classes are of bounded Borel rank.
Then the number of equivalence classes is ≤ ℵ0
or perfectly many.
In closing this rapid survey of some mathemati-
cal results, we also note the following.
Let A be a subset of a Polish space X . A scale
on A is a sequence of norms ϕn on A such that
xi ∈ A, xi → x, and ∀n(ϕn(xi) → µn), ie, ϕn(xi)
is eventually constant and equals µn after a certain
stage, imply that x ∈ A and ∀n (ϕn(x) ≤ µn).
If for each n, ϕn : A→ κ, then we say that (ϕn)
is a κ-scale.
Given some ordinal κ, let the lexicographical
ordering <lex be defined on κ
n by the follow-
ing. Let (µ(0), µ(1), ..., µ(n− 1)) <lex (λ(0), λ(1),
..., λ(n − 1)) ⇔ ∃ i < n [∀ j < i (µ(j) = λ(j))
& (µ(i) < λ(i))].
The lexicographical ordering is a well-order with
order type κn. Denote by 〈µ(0), µ(1), ..., µ(n −
1)〉 the ordinal < κn corresponding to (µ(0), µ(1)
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, ..., µ(n− 1)) under the isomorphism of (κn, <lex)
with κn.
Now, note that given some scale (ϕn) on A ⊆
NN, we can always define a new scale as follows
ψn(α) = 〈ψ0(α), α(0), ϕ1(α), α(1), ..., ϕn(α), α(n)〉
The scale (ψn) has the following additional prop-
erties
(i) ψn(α) ≤ ψn(β) ⇒ ∀m ≤ n (ψm(α) ≤
ψm(β)), and
(ii) If αi ∈ A ψn(αi)→ µn, then αi → α for some
α ∈ A.
Let A be a subset of a Polish space X . A scale
(ϕn) defined on A is called as a very good scale if
(i) ϕn(x) ≤ ϕn(y)⇒ ∀m ≤ n (ϕm(x) ≤ ϕm(y)),
(ii) If xi ∈ A and ϕn(xi) → µn for all n, then
xi → x for some x ∈ A.
Given a very good scale (ϕn) on A, we can
then select a unique point from A as follows. Let
A0 = {x ∈ A : ϕ0(x) is least, sayµ0}, A1 =
{x ∈ A : ϕ1(x) is least, sayµ1}, A2 = {x ∈ A :
ϕ2(x) is least, sayµ2}, and so on. Thus, we have
A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ ... and if xi ∈ Ai, then
ϕn(xi) = µn for all i > n. Since (ϕn) is a very
good scale, there is an x ∈ A such that xi → x.
Moreover, x ∈ An for all n.
Now, let y be any other point in
⋂
nAn. Con-
sider the sequence x, y, x, y, ... which is convergent
as (ϕn) is a very good scale. Therefore, x = y.
Thus
⋂
nAn is a singleton. The above procedure
then selects a unique point from A, called as the
canonical element of A determined by (ϕn).
A scale (ϕn) on a co-analytic subset A of a Polish
space X is called as a Π11-scale if each ϕn is a Π
1
1-
norm on X .
If (ϕn) is a Π
1
1-scale on a co-analytic A ⊆ N
N,
then (ϕn) defined as ψn is also Π
1
1-scale.
Theorem: Every co-analytic subset of NN admits
a very good Π11-scale.
As a corollary of the above, we have the result:
Let X be a Polish space and A ⊆ X co-analytic.
Then A admits a very good Π11-scale.
Kondo’s Theorem: Let X , Y be Polish spaces.
Every co-analytic set C ⊆ X × Y admits a co-
analytic uniformization.
Categorical Matters
Now, a category C is a structure comprising the
following mathematical data
(C-i) a class whose members A, B, ... are called
objects of C,
(C-ii) for each pair of objects A, B, there is given
a set C(A,B), called the set of morphisms
from A to B: we write f : A→ B to indicate
that f ∈ C(A,B),
(C-iii) for each triple of objects A, B, C, a law of
composition C(A,B)×C(B,C)→ C(A,C) is
well defined for morphisms
which is subject to the following two axioms
(C-iv) Associativity: If f : A → B, g : B → C
and h : C → D, then (fg)h = f(gh).
(C-v) Identities: For each A ∈ C, there exists
a morphism eA ∈ C(A,A) such that for all
f : A → B, eAf = f , and for all g : C → A,
geA = g.
[We have adopted a right-handed notation for
representing morphisms. Many authors use left-
handed one or some other notation.]
As can be established, the class of all topologi-
cal spaces forms a category with (categorical) mor-
phisms as continuous maps between them.
Then, consider a class of standard Borel spaces.
Since each standard Borel space is also a topolog-
ical space, these spaces form a category that sat-
isfies conditions (C-i) to (C-v) and an additional
mathematical condition, that of each of its objects
being isomorphic to some Borel subset of a Polish
space. This additional condition is easily seen to
be compatible with the conditions (C-i) to (C-v)
of this class being a category.
We then have the Category of Standard Borel
Spaces with continuous maps being (categorical)
morphisms between objects of this category.
Then, each member of the category of standard
Borel spaces is “related” to another of its members
by a categorical morphism. In particular, it will be
related to R3 [See also [37].].
We have summarized above relevant definitions
and results (without proofs). We note, in advance,
that the physical space of Universal Relativity will
be taken as a specific Standard Borel Space (of
cardinality c or ℵ1). Many of the aforementioned
results about measurable sets, Borel point-classes,
measurable partitions, group of Borel automor-
phisms etc. will then be relevant.
Furthermore, results related to countable sets
will be relevant to us when we will define appropri-
ate notion of a point-object. It is then the reason
why some of the results related to countable sets
have also been mentioned above.
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Dynamical systems
Differential equations of classical mechanics led
to the study of (the generalized concept of) dy-
namical systems.
There are the following three major situations
for the mathematical analysis of the evolution of
the (topological) space X , namely,
(i) X is a topological space and T is a homeomor-
phism. Such studies are called by the name
of Topological Dynamics.
(ii) X is a measure space and T is a measure-
preserving transformation. Related studies
are called the Measurable Dynamics.
(iii) X is a differentiable manifold and T is a dif-
feomorphism. Related studies are called by
the name of Differentiable Dynamics.
The above three cases of course overlap consider-
ably and it is possible to switch from one to another
situation, as per convenience. It is often reward-
ing to view the same example from all the three
perspectives, when permissible.
In the general context of dynamical systems,
Poincare´ pointed out that if a cross section existed
for a continuous flow on a compact manifold, one
could, equivalently, study the complete flow using
a homeomorphism of the cross section onto itself
induced by the flow.
Further, Birkhoff, in particular, pointed out the
equivalence of the existence of a global cross sec-
tion and a flow parameter that increased along
streamlines of the flow. He explicitly showed that
the original flow could be reconstructed with the
knowledge of the cross section, the induced homeo-
morphism and the value of flow parameter for first
return of points in the cross section.
The theory of dynamical systems is fundamen-
tal to the present studies. Hence, to build the re-
quired mathematical vocabulary, we provide below
a rapid survey of its concepts. A knowledgeable
reader may wish to skip it.
If X is a space, its evolution is a transformation
Tt : X → X where t is the parameter labelling
the transformation. In general, we shall be inter-
ested in a one-parameter family {Tt : t ∈ R} of
transformations of X onto itself.
When the laws governing the space X do not
change with the parameter t, we have Ts+t = TsTt,
in which case, Tt is called a flow or a group action
of R on X, ie, action of the additive group of the
real line on X .
We could, sometimes, also confine ourselves to
actions of the additive group of Z, the set of inte-
gers, ie, to iterates of a single Borel automorphism
of a Standard Borel Space.
Let (X,B) be a Standard Borel Space. Then,
Tt, t ∈ R is called as a jointly measurable flow of a
Borel automorphism on X if, for each t ∈ R, Tt is
a Borel automorphism of X such that
(1) the map (T, x) 7→ Ttx from R × X → X is
measurable, where R × X is endowed with
the usual product Borel structure
(2) T0x = x ∀ x ∈ X and,
(3) Tt+sx = Tt ◦ Tsx for all t, s ∈ R and for all
x ∈ X .
As noted before, we shall be dealing with a
certain standard Borel space (of cardinality c).
Therefore, for convenience, a one-point compact-
ification of space X as Xˆ = X
⋃
{∞} and the ex-
tension of the dynamical system T to Tˆ in R× Xˆ
with Tˆ (t,∞) = ∞ for any t ∈ R will be always
assumed. We will, however, omit the overhead hat
on relevant quantities.
We shall, generally, refer to the pair (X,Tt) as a
dynamical system.
Let us define the following sets under the action
of a dynamical system Tt on X :
• the future limit of a point x ∈ X as:
Ω+(x) = {y ∈ X : Ttx→ y when t→∞}
• the past limit of a point x ∈ X as:
Ω−(x) = {y ∈ X : Ttx→ y when t→ −∞}
A point x ∈ X is said to be an invariant point of the
dynamical system if Tt({x}) = {x} for all t. When
we only have Ω+(x) = Ω−(x), we shall say that
y is a limit point of T and x may “wander” in X
for the intermediate values of t. A point x will be
called a point of asymptotic rest of the dynamical
system T if Ω+(x) = Ω−(x) = {x}.
In general, we shall also adopt the following no-
tations: for S ⊂ X and I ⊂ R,
• T (I, S) ≡ TI(S) = {T (t, x) : t ∈ I, x ∈ S},
• T (S) = T (R, S),
• T+(S) = T ([0,∞), S),
• T−(S) = T ((−∞, 0], S).
Then, T (I, S) is the history of set S for some in-
terval of the parameter t, T (S) is the entire history
of set S, T+(S) is the future history of set S, and
T−(S) is the past history of set S.
Then, a set S is said to be invariant under the
dynamical system if Tt(S) = S, ∀ t ∈ R.
Now, let (X,B, µ) be a complete probability
space, ie, a set X with its σ-algebra B of measur-
able subsets and a countably additive non-negative
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set function µ on B with µ(X) = 1 and B contain-
ing all subsets of sets of measure zero.
Let T : X → X be a 1-1 and onto map such that
T and T− 1, both, are measurable, ie, T− 1B =
TB = B. [Notice that T may be well-defined and
one-one, onto only after a set of measure zero is
discarded from X .]
Now, let µ
(
T− 1A
)
= µ (A) for all A ∈ B. Such
a transformation is called as a measure preserving
transformation (MPT).
For our studies related to dynamical systems, a
fundamental system will then be (X,B, µ, T ) with
T being a MPT. For the one-parameter case, we
will assume that Tt is a MPT for all t ∈ R, the map
(t, x) 7→ Ttx is jointly measurable from R ×X →
X , T0 being the identity map.
Now, if T : X → X is a MPT, then the set {T n :
n ∈ Z} is the orbit of a point x ∈ X representing
a complete history of the system from infinite past
to infinite future values of t. The σ-algebra B is
then the family of events with T -invariant measure
µ specifying the t-independent probabilities of the
occurrence of these history events.
A function f : X → R on a measurable space X
is a measurable function if Support (f)
⋂
f− 1(M)
is a measurable set where M is any Borel subset
of the real line R.
Basic Ergodic Theorem: Given a measure pre-
serving transformation T of a probability space
(X,B, µ), let B ∈ B be any measurable set. De-
fine Sn(x) = #{i : 0 ≤ i < n, T ix ∈ B} and
An(x) = Sn(x)/n, x ∈ X . Then, for µ-almost ev-
ery x ∈ X , there exists A(x) = limn→∞ An(x).
Moreover,
∫
X A(x) dµ(x) = µ(B). [The symbol #,
in general, indicates that the quantity under con-
sideration is a number.]
Consider now those functions f : X → R for
which
∫
X
|f |pdµ is defined and is finite. Define
the “distance” between two functions as d(f, g) ={∫
X
|f − g|pdµ
}1/p
. The resulting metric space is
known as the Lp-space associated to the measure
space (X,A, µ) and is denoted by Lp(X,A, µ). A
classical result, Riesz-Fisher Theorem, proves that
Lp-spaces are complete.
Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem: If f ∈ L1(X,A, µ),
then limn→∞
1
n
∑n−1
t=0 f (T
tx) exists µ-a.e. and in
L1(X,A, µ).
Kingman’s Ergodic Theorem: Let f1, f2, ...∈
L1(X,A, µ) be such that supn
∫
fndµ > −∞ and
fn+m(x) ≤ fn(x)+fm(T nx) for each n,m > 1 and
µ-a.e. x ∈ X . Then, limn→∞
1
nfn(x) exists µ-a.e.
and is in L1(X,A, µ). [Birkhoff’s theorem treats
the case fn(x) =
∑n−1
t=0 f1(T
tx).]
The next important issue for us is that of the iso-
morphism of dynamical systems. Let (X,A, µ, T )
and (X ′,A′, µ′, T ′) be two dynamical systems.
Then, they are said to be isomorphic if there exists
a map ϕ : X → X ′, an isomorphism, such that
(i-1) the map ϕ is measurable,
(i-2) for each A′ ∈ A′, µ(ϕ− 1A′) = µ′(A′),
(i-3) for µ-almost every x ∈ X , ϕ(Tx) = T ′(ϕx),
(i-4) the map ϕ is invertible, ie, there exists a
measurable and measure preserving map ψ :
X ′ → X such that ψ(ϕx) = x for µ-almost
every x ∈ X and ϕ(ψx′) = x′ for µ′-almost
every x′ ∈ X ′.
If only properties (i-1) to (i-3) hold, ϕ will be called
a homomorphism and (X ′,A′, µ′, T ′) is said to be
a factor space of (X,A, µ, T ).
Now, a measure preserving transformation T is
said to be ergodic if whenever f : X → R is a
measurable function such that f(Tx) = f(x) for µ-
almost every x ∈ X , then f is µ-almost everywhere
equal to a constant.
Note that when T is ergodic, A(x) = µ(B) for
µ-a.e. x ∈ X in the basic ergodic theorem.
It turns out that a system is ergodic if and only
if the orbit of almost every (a.e.) point x ∈ X
“visits” each set of positive measure, that is to say,
if µ(A) > 0 and µ(B) > 0 then µ (T nA
⋂
B) > 0
for some n ∈ Z.
A recurrence property is that if µ(A) > 0 then
µ (T nA
⋂
A) > 0 for some n ∈ Z. A property
which implies the ergodicity of a system is that of
strong mixing: limn→∞ µ (T
nA
⋂
B) = µ(A)µ(B)
for all A,B ∈ B.
The question of characteristics that are identi-
cal for two systems, the issue of ergodic invari-
ants, leads us to the problem of an appropriate
classification of systems.
Let (X,B, µ.T ) be a system. Further, let f :
X → (0,∞) be a measurable function on X . Con-
struct a one-parameter flow Υ = {(x, t) : 0 ≤
t < f(x)} under the graph of f . Essentially, each
point x ∈ X flows such that we identify the points
(x, f(x)) and (Tx, 0). This flow Υ preserves the
product of µ with Lebesgue measure and is called
as a flow built under the function f .
Under suitable conditions, every flow on the sys-
tem (X,B, µ, T ) can be represented as flow built
under a function.
The Glimm-Effros Theorem [32] states that: If
X is a complete separable metric space and G a
group of homeomorphisms of X onto itself such
that for some non-isolated point x ∈ X , the setGx,
the orbit of x under G, is dense in X , then there is
a continuous probability measure µ on Borel sub-
sets of X such that every G-invariant Borel set has
measure zero or one.
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A group G of homeomorphisms of a Polish space
X admits a recurrent point x if there exists a se-
quence (gn)
∞
n=1 of elements in G such that gnx 6=
x ∀ n and gnx→ x as n→∞. A recurrent point x
is not isolated in the closure of Gx and its G-orbit
is clearly dense in the closure of Gx.
A Borel set W is said to be G-wandering if the
sets gW, g ∈ G are pairwise disjoint. We writeW
G
for the σ-ideal generated by G-wandering Borel
sets, it consists of countable unions of G-wandering
sets of X .
Now, a group action is called free if, for each
x ∈ X , g 7→ gx is 1-1. Then, in this case, we have
the result that: If a group of homeomorphisms G
of a Polish space X acts freely and does not admit
a recurrent point, then X ∈ W
G
.
Now, since a SBS is Borel-isomorphic to the
Borel space of the unit interval X = [0, 1] equipped
with the σ-algebra generated by its usual topology,
we can restrict our discussion to it as and when it
is convenient.
Then, for any x ∈ X , let the orbit of x un-
der T be the set {T nx|n ∈ Z}. We call a point
x ∈ X a periodic point of X if T nx = x for some
integer n and call the smallest such integer the
period of x under T .
For A ⊆ X and x ∈ A, we say that the point
x is recurrent in A if T nx ∈ A for infinitely many
positive (fimp) n and for infinitely many negative
(fimn) n and we call the point x a recurrent point.
For a metric space (X, d), a point x ∈ X is recur-
rent if lim infn→∞ d(x, T
nx) = 0.
Two Borel automorphisms, T1 on a Borel space
(X1,B1) and T2 on a Borel space (X2,B2), are said
to be isomorphic if there exists a Borel isomor-
phism φ : X1 → X2 such that φT1 φ− 1 = T2.
We also say that Borel automorphisms T1 and T2
are weakly equivalent or orbit equivalent if there
exists a Borel automorphism φ : X1 → X2 such
that φ (orb(x, T1)) = orb (φ(x), T2), ∀ x ∈ X1.
If two Borel automorphisms are isomorphic then
they are also orbit-equivalent. However, the con-
verse is, in general, not true.
Now, we say that a Borel automorphism T is
an elementary Borel automorphism or that the
orbit space of T admits a Borel cross-section or
that T admits a Borel cross-section iff there exists
a measurable set B which intersects each orbit un-
der T in exactly one point.
Clearly, if n is the period of x under T , then
the set {x, Tx, T 2x, ..., T n−1x} consists of distinct
points of X . Now, for every positive integer n, let
En = {x |Tx 6= x, ..., T n−1x 6= x, T nx = x}, and
E∞ = {x |T nx 6= x for all integers n}. Then, each
En, n < ∞, is Borel, Em
⋂
En = ∅ if m 6= n, and⋃∞
n=1En = X . Clearly, each En is a T -invariant
Borel subset of X .
Now, if y ∈ {x, Tx, ..., T n−1x}, then we clearly
see that {x, Tx, ..., T n−1x} = {y, T y, ..., T n−1y}.
Moreover, due to the natural order on [0, 1], if y =
min{x, Tx, ..., T n−1x}, then y < Ty, y < T 2y, ...,
y < T n−1y, y = T ny. Then, we can define Bn =
{y ∈ En | y < Ty, ..., y < T
n−1y}.
Then, for n < ∞, Bn is a measurable subset of
En and it contains exactly one point of the orbit
of each x ∈ En. Note, however, that B∞ need not
be measurable.
Now, X \ E∞ =
⋃∞
n=1
⋃n−1
k=0 T
kBn. The set
B =
⋃∞
k=1Bk is Borel and has the property that
the orbit of any point in X \ E∞ intersects B in
exactly one point. Let cn(T ) denote the cardi-
nality of Bn, n < ∞. The sequence of integers
{c∞(T ), c1(T ), c2(T ), ...} is called the cardinality
sequence associated to T .
If T1 and T2 are orbit equivalent, then their asso-
ciated cardinality sequences are the same. Also, if
T1 and T2 are elementary and the associated cardi-
nality sequences are the same, then T1 and T2 are
isomorphic and orbit equivalent.
A measurable subset W ⊂ X is T -wandering or
wandering under T if T nW, n ∈ Z, are pairwise
disjoint. Clearly, a wandering set intersects the
orbit of any point in at most one point, it never
intersects the orbit of a periodic point.
The σ-ideal generated by all T -wandering sets
in B will be denoted by W
T
and will be called a
Shelah-Weiss ideal of T [38].
Note that if T is a homeomorphism of a sepa-
rable metric space (X, d) and T has no recurrent
points then W
T
= B, ie, there is a wandering set
W such that X =
⋃∞
n=−∞ T
nW .
A subset A ⊂ orb(x, T ) is called bounded below
(bounded above) if the set of integers n such that
T nx ∈ A is bounded below (bounded above). A
subset A ⊂ orb(x, T ) is called bounded iff it is
both bounded above and below. A set which is
not bounded is called unbounded.
A sufficient condition for a set N ∈ B to be a T -
wandering set, ie, a sufficient condition for N ∈ B
to belong to W
T
, is that ∀ x ∈ X , N
⋂
orb(x, T )
is either bounded above or below.
One of the very basic results of the study of Borel
automorphisms is:
Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma: Let T be a Borel
automorphism of a SBS (X,B). Then, given A ∈ B
∃ N ∈ W
T
such that ∀ x ∈ Ao = A \N the points
T nx return to A fimp n and fimn n.
Now, note also that if x ∈ Ao = A \ N then
T kx returns to Ao fimp k and fimn k because N is
T -invariant and x /∈ N .
Also, if A ∈ B, and if Ao = A \ N is as in the
Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma, then
⋃∞
k=−∞ T
kA =⋃∞
k=0 T
kA (modW
T
).
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Now, suppose that N ⊆ B is a σ-ideal such that
TN = T− 1N = N and W
T
⊆ N . Clearly, given
A ∈ B, ∃ N ∈ N such that ∀ x ∈ Ao = A\N , T nx
returns to Ao fimp n and fimn n.
Of particular interest to us is a finite or σ-finite
measure m on B. The σ-ideal of m-null sets in B
will be denoted by Nm.
A Borel automorphism T is dissipative relative
to m if there exists a T -wandering setW in B such
that m is supported on
⋃∞
n=−∞ T
nW .
On the other hand, a Borel automorphism T is
conservative with respect to m or m-conservative
if m(W ) = 0 ∀ T -wandering sets W ∈ B. Clearly,
for any m-conservative T , W
T
⊆ Nm.
Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma for m-conservative
T : If T is m-conservative and if A ∈ B is given,
then for almost every (f.a.e.) x ∈ A the points T nx
return to A fimp n and fimn n.
Further, if m is a probability measure on B, ie,
m(X) = 1, and is T -invariant, ie, m ◦ T− 1 = m,
then W
T
⊆ Nm, TNm = T− 1Nm = Nm.
Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma (Measure Theory):
If a Borel automorphism T on (X,B) preserves a
probability measure on B, and if A ∈ B is given,
then f.a.e. x ∈ A the points T nx return to A fimp
n and fimn n.
Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma (Baire Category):
If T is a homeomorphism of a complete separable
metric space X which has no T -wandering non-
empty open set, then for every A ⊆ X with the
property of Baire (in particular, for any Borel set
A) there exists a set N of the first Baire category
(which is Borel if A is Borel) such that for each
x ∈ A \N , the points T nx return to A \N fimp n
and fimn n.
Now, a measure-preserving automorphism T
on a Standard Probability Space (X,B, µ) is a
Bernoulli-Shift or B-shift if there exists a finite or
a countably infinite partition P = {P1, P2 ...} of
X into measurable sets such that
(a)
⋃∞
n=−∞ T
nP generates BX up to µ-null sets
(b) the family {T nP |n ∈ Z} is independent in
the sense that for all k, for all distinct inte-
gers n1, n2, ..., nk, and for all P1, P2, ..., Pik
∈ P , the sets T n1Pi1 , T
n2Pi2 , ..., T
nkPik are
independent, ie, µ (T n1Pi1
⋂
...
⋂
T nkPik) =∏k
j=1 µ
(
T njPij
)
which in view of the mea-
sure preserving character of T is equal to
µ(Pi1)...µ(Pik ).
We call the partition P satisfying the above an
independent generator of T .
T is m-deterministic (otherwise, non determin-
istic) if ∀ n, Pn = Pn+1 (mod m) in that, given
A ∈ Pn, ∃ B ∈ Pn+1 such that m (A△B) = 0. If
T is deterministic, Pn = Pk (modm), ∀ n, k.
A non-deterministic Borel automorphism T is a
Kolmogorov Shift or K-shift if
⋂∞
n=−∞ Pn consists
of sets with probability zero or one.
A B-shift is a K-shift and is of non-deterministic
nature in the above sense.
Now, a measure preserving Borel automorphism
T on a probability space (X,B,m) is said to be
ergodic if for every T -invariant A ∈ B, m(A) = 0
or m(X \A) = 0. Note that such a T is ergodic iff
every real-valued measurable T -invariant function
f is constant a.e.
Now, if T is measure-preserving, ergodic and for
some singleton {x} ∈ B, m ({x}) > 0, then x must
be a periodic point of T . A non-trivial measure-
preserving ergodic system is therefore the one for
which m is non-atomic.
The system (X,B,N , T ) is called a Descriptive
Dynamical System [32] [69].
Now, T is said to be descriptively ergodic or that
T is said to act in a descriptively ergodic manner
if TN = N and if TA = A, A ∈ B implies either
A ∈ N or X \A ∈ N .
Nadkarni’s Theorem [32] states: if (X,B,N , T )
is a descriptive dynamical system such that
(a) every member of B \ N is decomposable
(b) B satisfies the countability condition
(c) T is descriptively ergodic
(d) X is bounded,
then there exists a finite measure µ on B such that
(1) N = {B ∈ B : µ(B) = 0}
(2) µ is continuous
(3) T is µ-measure preserving, and
(4) T is ergodic, ie, TA = A, A ∈ B implies that
µ(A) = 0 or µ(X \A) = 0.
As a corollary of this theorem, we also have:
Let (X,B,N , T ) be a descriptive dynamical sys-
tem such that
(a) every member of B \ N is decomposable,
(b) B satisfies the countability condition
(c) T is descriptively ergodic,
(d) ∃ B ∈ B \ N which is bounded
Then, there exists a unique continuous σ-finite
measure m on B such that its null sets in B form
precisely the ideal N and T is ergodic and measure
preserving with respect to m.
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Furthermore, it can also be shown [32] that: for
a SBS (X,B) and T : X → X a Borel automor-
phism, there exists a finite continuous measure m
on B so that T is non-singular and ergodic iff
there exists a σ-ideal N ⊆ B such that the sys-
tem (X,B,N , T ) has the following properties
(i) every member of B \ N is decomposable
(ii) B satisfies the countability condition
(iii) T is descriptively ergodic
(iv) ∃ B ∈ B \ N which is bounded
Now, let C = 2N, the countable product of two
point space 2 with product topology, with the two
point space 2 being given the discrete topology and
B its Borel σ-algebra.
If we drop from above X the countable set of
those sequences of zeros and ones which have only
finitely many zeros or finitely many ones, then the
remaining set, say, Y , can be mapped one-one into
[0, 1) by the map ξ(x1, x2, ...) =
∑∞
i=1 xi/2
i. The
image of Y under this map is [0, 1) \ D where D
is the set of rational numbers of the form k/2n,
0 ≤ k ≤ 2n, n ∈ N.
Now, if x = (x1, x2, ...) ∈ Y and if k is
the first integer such that xk = 0, then let
us define the map, say, V = ξ− 1Tξ as V x =
(0, 0, ..., 0, 1, xk+1, xk+2, ...). Then, V replaces all
the ones up to the first zero by zeros and replaces
the first zero by one, leaving all other coordinates
of x unchanged.
We call the map V on Y the Diadic Adding
Machine (DAM) or the Odometer.
Now, a measure preserving automorphism T on
a probability space (X,B,m) is ergodic iff ∀ A,B ∈
B, 1n
∑n−1
k=0 m
(
A
⋂
T kB
)
→ m (A
⋂
B) as n→∞.
There are two properties stronger than ergodicity
which are also relevant to us.
A measure preserving automorphism T on a
probability space (X,B,m) is said to be weakly
mixing iff ∀ A,B ∈ B, 1n
∑n−1
k=0 |m
(
A
⋂
T kB
)
−
m (A
⋂
B) | → 0 as n → ∞. A measuring pre-
serving automorphism T on (X,B,m) is said to be
mixing if ∀ A,B ∈ B, m
(
A
⋂
T kB
)
→ m (A
⋂
B)
as n→∞.
If a measure preserving Borel automorphism T is
mixing then it is weakly mixing, and if T is weakly
mixing then it is ergodic. However, a ergodic T
need not be weakly mixing and mixing. Also, an
ergodic and weakly mixing automorphism T need
not be mixing.
Let T1 be a measure preserving Borel automor-
phisms on a probability space (X1,B1,m1) and
T2 be that on (X2,B2,m2). We say that T1 and
T2 are metrically isomorphic if ∃ X ′1 ⊆ X1 with
m1 (X1 \X ′1) = 0, X
′
2 ⊆ X2 with m2 (X2 \X
′
2) =
0 and an invertible, ie, a one-one, onto, measurable
map with measurable inverse, measure preserving
map φ : X ′1 → X
′
2 such that φT1φ
− 1 = T2.
A measure preserving automorphism T gives rise
to a Unitary Operator, U
T
, as: U
T
f = f ◦ T, f ∈
L2(X,B,m). The unitary operator is linear, in-
vertible with U− 1
T
f = f ◦ T− 1 and L2-norm pre-
serving, ie, ||U
T
f ||
2
= ||f ||
2
.
We say that λ is an eigenvalue of U
T
if ∃ a non-
zero f ∈ L2(X,B,m), such that f ◦T = λf . Then,
f is an eigenfunction with eigenvalue λ. An eigen-
value is simple, if up to a multiplicative constant,
it admits only one eigenfunction.
Let L2o(X,B,m) = {f ∈ L
2(X,B,m) |
∫
fdm
= 0}, the subspace of functions orthogonal to the
constant functions. It is U
T
-invariant.
Now, 1 is always an eigenvalue of U
T
and that 1
is a simple eigenvalue of U
T
iff T is ergodic. Fur-
ther, since U
T
is unitary, all eigenvalues of U
T
are
of absolute value one.
Then, weakly mixing automorphisms T are pre-
cisely those for which U
T
has no eigenvalue other
than 1. Also, T is ergodic iff 1 is not an eigenvalue
of U
T
on L2o(X,B,m).
If U
T
and U
T ′
are unitarily equivalent, T and T ′
are spectrally isomorphic. If measure preserving T
and T ′ are metrically isomorphic, then U
T
and U
T ′
are unitarily equivalent.
A measure preserving automorphism T on a SPS
(X,B,m) has discrete spectrum if U
T
admits a
complete set of eigenfunctions. Then, if T1 and
T2 are spectrally isomorphic and T1 has a discrete
spectrum, then T2 also has a discrete spectrum and
the corresponding unitary operators have the same
set of eigenvalues.
But, spectrally isomorphic measure preserving
automorphisms are not necessarily metrically iso-
morphic, in general. However, if the measure pre-
serving automorphisms defined on a SPS are er-
godic with discrete spectrum and are admitting
the same set of eigenvalues, then such spectrally
isomorphic measure preserving automorphisms are
metrically isomorphic.
Note that in the case of a SPS, U
T
can have at
most a countable number of eigenvalues, all of ab-
solute value one. Furthermore, in the same case,
the eigenvalues of U
T
form a subgroup of the cir-
cle group S1. Also, for each eigenvalue λ we can
choose an eigenfunction fλ of absolute value one
so as to have fλ.fν = fλν a.e.
Any two B-shifts are spectrally isomorphic but,
in general, any two B-shifts are not metrically iso-
morphic. Any two K-shifts are spectrally isomor-
phic but, in general, any two K-shifts are not met-
rically isomorphic.
For a finite partition P = {P1, P2, ..., Pk} of
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X by members of B, we define the entropy of
P to be
∑
− m(Pi) logem(Pi) and denote it by
H(P). Then, we can define the entropy of P
relative to automorphism T defined as: h(P , T ) =
lim sup 1n H
(∨n−1
k=0 T
− 1P
)
, where
∨n−1
k=0 T
− 1P is
used to denote the partition generated by T− 1P ,
k = 0, ..., n − 1. Note that the lim sup is indeed
an increasing limit.
Then, we have the entropy of the automorphism
T , denoted as h(T ), as: h(T ) = sup h(P , T ), where
the supremum is taken over all finite partitions P
of X . Note that h(T ) is an invariant of the metric
isomorphism.
Then, if T is a B-shift with independent gener-
ating partition P = {P1, P2, ...} then its entropy
is h(T ) =
∑
− m(Pi) logem(Pi). Now, any two
B-shifts with the same entropy can be shown to be
metrically isomorphic.
For any set A ∈ B, the set
⋃∞
k=−∞ T
kA is called
as the saturation of A with respect to T or simply
the T -saturation of A. We denote it by s
T
(A). A
point x ∈ A is said to be a recurrent point in A if
T nx returns to A fimp n and fimn n.
By Poincare´ Recurrence Lemma, we can write A
as a disjoint union of two measurable sets B andM
such that every point of B is recurrent in B (hence
also in A) and no point of M is recurrent so that
M ∈ W
T
. Clearly, it follows that
⋃∞
n=0 T
nB =⋃∞
n=−∞ T
nB = s
T
(B), since every point of B is
recurrent in B.
Now, given x ∈ B, let n
B
(x) denote the smallest
positive integer such that T nx ∈ B. Then, we can
decompose B into pairwise disjoint sets Bk, k ∈ N,
where Bk = {x ∈ B | nB (x) = k} or, equivalently,
Bk = {x ∈ B | Tx /∈ B, ..., T k−1x /∈ B, T kx ∈ B}.
Further, we have T kBk ⊆ B and that Bk, TBk, ...,
T k−1Bk are pairwise disjoint.
Further, let Fℓ = T
ℓ
(⋃
k> ℓBk
)
and note also
that Fℓ = TFℓ−1 \ B, where Fo = B. Now, we
have
⋃∞
k=0 T
kB =
⋃∞
k=0
⋃k−1
i=0 T
kBk =
⋃∞
k=0 Fk =⋃∞
k=−∞ T
kB = s
T
(B), with the middle two unions
being pairwise disjoint unions.
We call the set B as the base and the union⋃∞
k=1 T
k−1Bk as the top of the construction. The
above construction is called as the Kakutani tower
over base B.
Now, if m is any T -invariant probability mea-
sure on B and if we write B⋆ =
⋃∞
k=0 T
kB,
then we have m (B⋆) =
∑∞
k=1
∑k−1
i=0 m
(
T iBk
)
=∑∞
k=1 km (Bk) =
∫
B
n
B
(x) dm.
Let m(B) ≥ 0. Then, we call the quantity
1
m(B)
∫
B nB (x) dm = m(B⋆)/m(B) as the mean
recurrence time of B. Recall A = B
⋃
M , M ∈
W
T
. Then, m(M) = m(M⋆) = 0. Hence, m(A) =
m(B) and m(A⋆) = m(B⋆). Thus, the above is
also the mean recurrence time of A.
Clearly, if T is ergodic and m(B) > 0 then we
have B⋆ = X (mod m) since it is T -invariant and
of positive measure.
Now, consider the transformation S defined over
B⋆ as:
S(x) =


T (x) ifx /∈
⋃∞
k=1 T
k−1Bk = Top
T−k+1(x) if x ∈ T k−1Bk, k = 1, 2, ...
Then, S is periodic, the period being k for points
in Bk, and S agrees with T everywhere except at
the top of the Kakutani tower. Further, if B⋆ = X ,
then S is defined on all of X .
Now, suppose C1 ⊇ C2 ⊇ C3 ⊇ ... is a sequence
of sets in B decreasing to an empty set and such
that ∀ n, we have
(i) every point of Cn is recurrent, and that
(ii)
⋃∞
k=0 T
kCn = X .
Let Sn be the periodic automorphism as defined
above with B = Cn. Then, ∀ n, Sn and Sn+1
agree except on the Top Tn+1 of the Kakutani
tower whose base is Cn+1. But Tn ⊇ Tn+1 and
since Cn decreases to ∅, Tn also decreases to ∅.
Then, given any x, ∃ n(x) such that ∀ k ≥ n(x),
Sk(x) are all the same and equal to T (x). Thus, T
is a limit in this sense of the sequence of periodic
automorphisms. Therefore, we obtain the periodic
approximation of automorphism T .
Rohlin’s Lemma states that: If T is ergodic with
respect to the σ-ideal of null sets of a finite measure
m, then given ǫ > 0 and n ∈ N, ∃ a set C such
that C, TC, ..., T n−1C are pairwise disjoint and
m
(
X \
⋃n−1
k=o T
kC
)
< ǫ.
Now, let B ∈ B be such that every point of
B is recurrent. Following Kakutani, the induced
automorphism on B (mod W
T
), denoted as T
B
,
is then defined as: T
B
(x) = T n(x), x ∈ B, where
n = n
B
(x) is the smallest positive integer for which
T n(x) ∈ B. Note that T
B
(x) = T k(x) if x ∈ Bk,
k = 1, 2, 3..... Then, TB is one-one, measurable
and invertible with T− 1(x) = T n(x) where n is
the largest negative integer such that T n(x) ∈ B.
Thus, T
B
is a Borel automorphism on B.
The induced Borel automorphism, T
B
, on B has
following properties:
• orb(x, T
B
) = B
⋂
orb(x, T ), x ∈ B
• T
B
is elementary iff T restricted to s
T
B is
elementary
• W ⊆ B is T
B
-wandering if and only if W is
T -wandering
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• W
T
B
=W
T
⋂
B
• if T is ergodic and preserving a finite mea-
sure m then T
B
is ergodic and preserves m
restricted to B,
• If N is a σ-ideal in B, W
T
⊆ B, and if T
is ergodic with respect to N , then T
B
is er-
godic with respect to the restriction of N to
B. In particular, if T is ergodic with respect
to a finite continuous measure m then T
B
is
ergodic with respect to the restriction of m
to B
• if C ⊆ B, then a point of C is recurrent with
respect to T iff it is recurrent with respect to
T
B
. If every point of C is recurrent then we
have T
C
= (T
B
)
C
.
A broadened view of the induced automorphism
defines it on a set A ∈ B even if not every point
of A is recurrent. For this, let us consider a set
B = {x ∈ A | x is recurrent in A}. By Poincare´
Recurrence Lemma, A\B ∈ W
T
and every point of
B is recurrent in B. Then, the broadened induced
automorphism T
A
is defined on all of A iff every
point of A is recurrent; otherwise T
A
is defined on
A (mod W
T
). All the earlier properties of the in-
duced automorphism remain valid (mod W
T
) un-
der this broadened definition of T
A
. Note however
that the stricter point of view is necessary for the
descriptive aspects.
Now, consider a Borel automorphism T on
(X,B) and let f be a non-negative integer-valued
measurable function on X .
Let Bk+1 = {x | f(x) = k}, k = 0, 1, 2, ...,
Ck =
⋃
ℓ>k Bℓ, Fk = Ck × {k}, Y =
⋃∞
k=0 Fk.
If Z = X × {0, 1, 2, ...}, then Y ⊆ Z is the set
Y = {(x, n) 0 ≥ n ≥ f(x)} = Points in Z below
and including the graph of f .
Define Λ on Y as:
Λ(k, j) =


(b, j + 1) if b ∈ Bk and0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1
(Λ(b), 0) if b ∈ Bk and j = k − 1
This Λ is a Borel automorphism on the space
Y . We call it the automorphism built under the
function f on the space X . We call X the base
space of Λ and f the ceiling function of Λ. Note
that if we identify X with X × {0}, then Λ
X
= T
and we write Λ = T f .
The automorphism built under a function has
the following properties:
• If B ∈ B with every point of B being recur-
rent and B⋆ = X , then T is isomorphic to
(T
B
)f , where f(x) = n
B
(x),
• If A ⊆ Y is the graph of a measurable func-
tion ξ on X , then (T f )
A
and T are isomor-
phic by x 7→ (x, ξ(x)). In particular, (T f)
A
and T are isomorphic when A = graph of f ,
• If A ⊆ Y is measurable then we can find
a measurable B with the same saturation
as A under T f and such that ∀ x ∈ X ,
B
⋂
{(x, i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ f(x)} is at most a sin-
gleton. Indeed, B = {(x, i) ∈ A | (x, j) /∈
A, 0 ≤ j < i} can be chosen,
• Given T f and T g, they are isomorphic to
automorphisms induced by T f+g on suitable
subsets. If Y1 = {(x, i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ f(x) + g(x)}
on which T f+g is defined, then the sets
{(x, i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ f(x)} and {(x, i) | 0 ≤ i ≤
g(x)} are subsets of Y1 on which T f+g in-
duces automorphisms which are isomorphic
to T f and T g respectively,
• If m is a σ-finite T -invariant measure on X ,
then ∃ a unique σ-finite T f -invariant mea-
surem
Y
on Y such thatm
Y
restricted toX×
{0} is m. The measure m
Y
is finite iff m(X)
is finite and
∫
f dm is finite. Then, we have
m
Y
(Y ) =
∑∞
k=1 km(Bk+1) =
∫
f dm <∞.
• T f is elementary iff T is elementary.
Now, given two Borel automorphisms T1 and T2,
we say that T1 is a derivative of T2, and write
T1 ≺ T2, if T1 is isomorphic to (T1)A for some
A ∈ B with
⋃∞
k=0 T
k
1 A = X . If T1 is a derivative
of T2, we call T2 the primitive of T1. Two Borel
automorphisms are said have a common derivative
if they admit derivatives which are isomorphic.
Similarly, two automorphisms are said to have a
common primitive if they admit primitives which
are isomorphic. If T1 ≺ T2, then clearly T2 = T
f
1
for some f .
Then, a lemma due to von Neumann states that:
Two Borel automorphisms have a common deriva-
tive iff they have a common primitive.
Now, we say that two Borel automorphisms T1
and T2 are Kakutani equivalent, and we write
T1∼
K
T2, if T1 and T2 have a common primitive, or,
equivalently the automorphisms T1 and T2 have a
common primitive. The Kakutani equivalence is
reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Therefore, the
Kakutani equivalence is an equivalence relation for
Borel automorphisms.
Suppose N is a σ-ideal in B. Then, we say
that T1 and T2 are Kakutani equivalent (mod N )
if we can find two sets M,N ∈ N , M being
T1-invariant and N being T2-invariant, such that
T1|X\M ∼K
T2|X\N . When N is the σ-ideal of m-null
sets of a probability measure m invariant under T1
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and T2 both, we get the measure theoretic Kaku-
tani equivalence of Borel automorphisms [41].
Given a Borel automorphism T , a system of pair-
wise disjoint sets (Co, C1, ..., Cn) ∈ B is called a
column if Ci = T
iCo, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Co is called the
base of the column and Cn is called the top of the
column. If Do ⊆ Co, then (Do, TDo, ..., T nDo) is
called a sub-column of (Co, ..., Cn).
Two columns (Co, ..., Cn) and (Bo, ..., Bm) are
said to be disjoint if Ci
⋂
Bj = ∅ ∀ i 6= j. A finite
or a countable system of pairwise disjoint columns
is called a T -tower.
A T -tower with r pairwise distinct columns may
be written as {Cij | 0 ≤ i ≤ n(j), 1 ≤ j ≤ r}
where {C0j , ..., Cn(j)j} is its j-th column.
Sets Cij are constituents of the T -tower,
⋃
k C0k
is a base of the T -tower and
⋃
k Cn(k)k is a top of
the T -tower. The number of distinct columns in a
T -tower is a rank of the T -tower.
A T -tower is said to refine a S-tower if every
constituent of T -tower is a subset of a constituent
of the S-tower.
T has rank at most r if there is a sequence
Tn, n ∈ N, of Tn-towers of rank r or less such
that Tn+1 refines Tn and the collection of sets in
Tn, taken over all n, generates B. Then, T has
rank r if T has rank at most r but does not have
rank at most r − 1. If T does not have rank r for
any finite r, then T has infinite rank.
Given a Borel automorphism T on (X,B), a
partition P of X , P ⊆ B, is a generator of
T if
⋃∞
k=1 T
kP generates B. A set A ∈ B is
decomposable (mod W
T
) if we can write A as a
disjoint union of two Borel sets C and D such that
s
T
(C) =s
T
(D) =s
T
(A (modW
T
)).
Let P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn} ⊆ B be a partition of X
and let a measurable C be such that
⋃∞
k=0 T
kC =
X . Then, on the basis of the first return time n(x)
of each x ∈ C and pairwise disjoint sets Ei = {x ∈
C | n(x) = i} with union
⋃
iEi = C, there exists a
countable partition of {D1, D2, ...} of C such that
each Pi is a disjoint union of sets of the form T
kDi,
k = 1, 2, ..., i = 1, 2, ....
Now, a one-one and onto map T : X → X such
that T kx 6= x for all k 6= 0, and for all x ∈ X is
called a free map.
Every free Borel automorphism T on a SBS
(X,B) is [42] orbit equivalent to an induced au-
tomorphism by the DAM.
Further, every Borel set A ∈ B is clearly decom-
posable (mod W
T
) for T being a free Borel auto-
morphism on a countably generated and countably
separated SBS.
Furthermore, given a free Borel automorphism T
on a countably generated and countably separated
SBS (X,B), there exists a sequence Cn, n ∈ N,
of Borel sets decreasing to an empty set with
s
T
(Cn) =sT (X \ Cn) = X ∀ n, such that ∀ n the
sets Cn, TCn, ..., T
n−1Cn are pairwise disjoint,
and such that
⋂∞
n=1 Cn = C∞, say, is T -wandering.
Given a Borel automorphism T on a countably
generated and countably separated SBS (X,B),
there exists a sequence Tn, n = 1, 2, ... of peri-
odic Borel automorphisms on X such that ∀ x,
Tx = Tnx for all sufficiently large n.
Hence, the descriptive version of Rohlin’s the-
orem [43] on generators is obtained [40] as: every
free Borel automorphism on a countably generated
and countably separated SBS admits a countable
generator in a strict sense.
Note also that T admits a countable generator iff
T admits at most a countable number of periodic
points [44].
Now, two subsets of X , A,B ∈ B, are said to
be equivalent by countable decomposition, and we
write A ∼ B, if
(a) A =
⋃∞
i=1Ai, Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅ for i 6= j, and
Ai ∈ B, i = 1, 2, ...
(b) B =
⋃∞
i=1Bi, Bi
⋂
Bj = ∅ for i 6= j, and
Bi ∈ B, i = 1, 2, ...
(c) there exist n1, n2, ... ∈ N such that ∀ i ∈
N, T niAi = Bi (modN ).
The equivalence by countable decomposition is an
equivalence relation on B.
Note that if Ai ∈ B, i ∈ N are pairwise disjoint
and Bi ∈ B, i ∈ N are pairwise disjoint and if
∀ i ∈ N, Ai ∼ Bi then
⋃∞
i=1Ai ∼
⋃∞
i=1 Bi.
If A ∼ B, then we say that B is a copy of A
and then, A and B have the same measure with
respect to a T -invariant σ-finite measure.
Further, we say that A and B are equivalent by
countable decomposition (mod m), and we write
A ∼ B (mod m), if there exist sets M and N in B,
of m-measure zero, such that A△M ∼ B△N .
A set A ∈ B is said to be T -compressible in
the sense of Hopf if there exists B ⊆ A such that
A ∼ B and m(A \ B) > 0. Clearly, if the set X
is Hopf T -compressible then every of its subsets
B ∈ B is Hopf T -compressible.
If µ is a T -invariant finite measure on B and hav-
ing the same null sets as m, then A ∼ B (mod m)
implies that µ(A) = µ(B). Whenever such a µ ex-
ists, no measurable sets of positive measure can be
compressible in the sense of Hopf and, in particu-
lar, X is not Hopf T -compressible.
In a descriptive setting, one can dispense with
the measure and consider only a SBS (X,B) and a
free Borel automorphism T on it.
Then, given A,B ∈ B, we write A ≺≺ B if there
exists a measurable subset C ⊆ B such that A ∼ C
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and s
T
(B \ C) = s
T
B, which is the smallest T -
invariant set containing B.
Now, we say that A is T -compressible if A ≺≺ A
or, equivalently, if we can write A as a disjoint
union of two sets C, D ∈ B such that A ∼ C,
and s
T
(A) = s
T
(C) = s
T
(D). The sets C and D
together with the automorphism T which accom-
plishes A ∼ C is called a compression of A.
If X is T -compressible, then we say that T is
compressible or that T compresses X .
The above notion of compressibility has the fol-
lowing properties:
• If A ∈ B is T -compressible then any superset
of A in B having the same saturation as A
is compressible. In particular, s
T
(A) is T -
compressible whenever A is T -compressible,
• Since T is a free automorphism, each orbit is
infinite and T -compressible as also the sat-
uration of any T -wandering set. However,
every T -compressible T -invariant set in B is
not the saturation of a T -wandering set in B
except in special cases,
• A finite non-empty set is not T -compressible
nor is a set A T -compressible if the orbit of
some point intersects A in a finite non-empty
set. Further, if there exists a T -invariant
probability measure on B, then no set of pos-
itive measure is T -compressible. In particu-
lar, X is not T -compressible in this case,
• Clearly, a subset of a T -compressible set need
not be T -compressible,
• If E ∈ B is T -invariant, T -compressible,
and if F ∈ B is a T -invariant subset of
E, then F is T -compressible. The count-
able pairwise disjoint union of T -invariant,
T -compressible sets in B is T -compressible.
Clearly, any countable union of T -invariant,
T -compressible sets in B is T -compressible,
• T -compressible sets in B do not form a σ-
ideal in B.
However, T -invariant, T -compressible sets in
B are closed under countable union and tak-
ing of T -invariant subsets in B. Hence, the
collection H of subsets in B whose satura-
tions are T -compressible forms a σ-ideal in
B and we call H the Hopf ideal.
• W
T
= H iff X ∈ W
T
.
Note that the Hopf ideal is also equal to the σ-
ideal generated by T -compressible sets in B. Note
that W
T
⊆ H since the saturation of every T -
wandering set in W
T
is T -compressible.
Let N ⊆ B be a σ-ideal such that
(1) TN = T− 1N = N and
(2) W
T
⊆ N .
The Hopf ideal H; the σ-ideal of m-null sets in B
for any T -invariant σ-finite measure on B; and the
σ-ideal of m-mull sets when T is m-conservative
are few such ideals.
Then, two sets A, B ∈ B are said to be equiva-
lent by countable decomposition (mod N ) if we can
find sets M, N ∈ N such that A△M ∼ B△N .
We then write A ∼ B (mod N ). Note that if
A ∼ B (mod N ) then s
T
(A) = s
T
(B) (mod N ).
We write A ≺≺ B (mod N ) if there exists a set
N ∈ N such that A△N ≺≺ B△N .
A set A is compressible (mod N ) if ∃ N ∈ N
such that A△N is T -compressible. For a T -
invariant set in B all the three notions of com-
pressibility, namely, T -compressibility, compress-
ibility (mod W
T
) and compressibility (mod H),
are equivalent.
Now, suppose that A,B ∈ B are equivalent by
countable decomposition. Let A =
⋃∞
i=1 Ai, B =⋃∞
i=1Bi be pairwise disjoint partitions of A and B
respectively, such that for suitable integers ni, i ∈
N, T niAi = Bi.
The map S : A → B defined by S(x) = T nix
if x ∈ Ai is an orbit preserving isomorphism be-
tween A and B. In case A and B are equivalent
by countable decomposition (mod N ) then S will
be defined between A△N and B△M for suitable
sets M,n ∈ N . Such a S is an orbit preserving
isomorphism between A and B (mod N ).
The following results are then easily obtainable
for A,B,C,D ∈ B:
(a) If A ⊇ B ⊇ C and A ∼ C then A ∼ B
(b) If A ∼ C ⊆ B and B ∼ D ⊆ A then A ∼ B,
(c) If A ⊇ B ⊇ C (mod N ) and A ∼ C (mod N ),
then A ∼ B (mod N ),
(d) If A ∼ C (mod N ), C ⊆ B (mod N ), and
B ∼ D (mod N ), D ⊆ A (mod N ), then
A ∼ B (mod N ).
Note that for (c) and (d) we remove suitable sets
in N from A,B,C,D.
Now, a set A ∈ B is incompressible if it is not
compressible and it is incompressible (mod N ) if
it is not compressible (mod N ). Note however
that A ∈ B is incompressible (mod N ) does not
mean that A△N is incompressible for a suitable
set N ∈ N . Note also that for a set in B to be
incompressible (mod N ) it is sufficient that its sat-
uration is incompressible (mod N ).
Let N be a positive integer. Then, it is easy to
see that there exists B ∈ B such that s
T
(B) = X
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and ∀ x ∈ B, its first return time, n
B
(x), is such
that N ≤ n
B
(x) ≤ 2N .
For any F ∈ B and x ∈ X , let us now de-
fine r⋆ (x, F ) = lim infn→∞
1
n
∑n
k=1 1F (T
kx) and
r⋆ (x, F ) = lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
k=1 1F (T
kx) where
1F is the identity function on set F .
Then, we note that given 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and ǫ >
0, there exists F ∈ B such that s
T
(F ) = X and
b− ǫ < r⋆(x, F ), r⋆(x, F ) < b+ ǫ.
We also note that, if 0 < b < 1, then there exists
F ∈ B such that s
T
(F ) = s
T
(X − F ) and for all
x ∈ X , 0 < r⋆(x, F ) < b.
Further, for any F ∈ B and ǫ > 0, there exists a
measurable G ⊆ F such that s
T
(G) = s
T
(F−G) =
s
T
(F ) and r⋆(x,G) < ǫ (modW
T
).
Now, a key dichotomy: Let E,F ∈ B and let
f = 1
E
− 1
F
. Then, there exists a T -invariant set
N ∈ W
T
such that if x ∈ X \N , then either
(a) for all y ∈ orb(x, T ), there exists n ≥ 0 with∑n
k=0 f(T
ky) ≥ 0, Or
(b) the set of y ∈ orb(x, T ) such that ∀ n ≥ 0,∑n
k=0 f(T
ky) < 0 is unbounded to the left
and right.
These are mutually exclusive conditions.
Furthermore, consider any decomposition of X
into pairwise disjoint T -invariant sets Xo, X1 X2,
N with N ∈ N and Xo, X1 X2 satisfying the prop-
erties
(c) E
⋂
X1 ≺≺ F
⋂
X1,
(d) E
⋂
Xo ∼ F
⋂
Xo,
(e) E
⋂
X2 ≺≺ F
⋂
X2.
Such a decomposition will have the properties
that
• for x ∈ X1 (mod H) the set, say, A(x) =
{y ∈ orb(x, T ) |
∑n
k=0 f(T
ny) > 0 ∀ n ≥
0} is unbounded to left and right,
• for any x ∈ Xo (mod H), for all y ∈
orb(x, T ) ∃ n ≥ 0 such that
∑n
k=0 f(T
ky) =
0,
• for x ∈ X2(mod H), the set, say, B(x) =
{y ∈ orb(x, T ) |
∑n
k=0 f(T
ny) < 0 ∀ n ≥
0} is unbounded to left and right.
Moreover, (mod H), we have that
{x | r⋆(x,E) < r⋆(x, F )} ⊆ X2,
{x | r⋆(x,E) < r⋆(x, F )} ⊆ X2,
{x | r⋆(x,E) > r⋆(x, F )} ⊆ X1,
{x | r⋆(x,E) > r⋆(x, F )} ⊆ X1
Then, we have the following measure free ver-
sion of the Birkhoff point-wise Ergodic Theorem
as: For any E ∈ B, the set of points x for which
limit limn→∞
1
n
∑n−1
k=0 1E(T
kx) does not exist be-
longs to the Hopf ideal H. That is to say, the set
{x | r⋆(x,E) < r
⋆(x,E)} is compressible.
For any E ∈ B, let us now write m(E, x) =
lim 1n
∑n−1
k=0 1E (T
kx). This m is countably addi-
tive (mod H) and T -invariant. Moreover, we can
show that m(E, x) = 0 (mod H) iff E ∈ H.
Now, let the Polish topology T on X possess
a countable clopen base U that is closed under
complements, finite unions and applications of T .
There then exists a T -invariant set N ∈ H such
that ∀ x ∈ X \ N , m(A
⋃
B, x) = m(A, x) +
m(B, x) whenever A,B ∈ U and A
⋂
B = ∅.
Fix x ∈ X \N and let us write m(A, x) = m(A),
A ∈ U . For any B ⊆ X , let us define m⋆(B) =
inf {
∑∞
i=1m(Ui) | B ⊆
⋃∞
i=1 Ui , Ui ∈ U ∀ i}. This
m⋆, an outer measure on P(X), is T -invariant,
bounded by one and m⋆(X) = 1.
Recall [34] that an outer measure µ⋆ on the
power set of a metric space (X, d) is called a met-
ric outer measure if µ⋆(E
⋃
F ) = µ⋆(E) + µ⋆(F )
whenever d(E,F ) > 0. If µ⋆ is a metric outer mea-
sure on (X, d) then all open sets, hence, all Borel
sets, are µ⋆-measurable. Then, m⋆ defined above
is a metric outer measure on X . The restriction of
m⋆ to B is a countably additive T -invariant prob-
ability measure on B.
Further, if T is not free, then it has a peri-
odic point on whose orbit we can always put a
T -invariant probability measure.
Hopf’s Theorem: if T is a Borel automorphism
(free or not) of a Standard Borel Space (S,B) such
that X is T -incompressible, then there exists a T -
invariant probability measure on B.
Now, a set A ∈ B is weakly T -wandering if T nA
are pairwise disjoint for n in some infinite subset of
integers. Then, a non-singular automorphism T on
a probability space (X,B,m) admits [46] an equiv-
alent T -invariant probability measure if and only
if there does not exist any weakly T -wandering set
of positive measure.
But, T -compressibility of X does not imply the
existence of a weakly T -wandering set W ∈ B such
that s
T
(W ) = X [47]. If a measurable A ∈ B is
T -compressible then s
T
(A) ≺≺ A and s
T
∼ A.
Let T1 and T2 be Borel automorphisms on a
Standard Borel Space. Then, if T1 and T2 are or-
bit equivalent and if T1 has an orbit of length n
then so has T2. The cardinality of the set of orbits
of length n for T1 and T2 is the same. Further,
if ck(T1) is the cardinality of the set of orbits of
length k, then for each k ≤ ℵo, ck(T1) = ck(T2)
whenever T1 and T2 are orbit equivalent.
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Dye’s theorem [48] proves that: any two free
ergodic measure preserving Borel automorphisms
on a Standard Probability Space (X,B,m) are
orbit-equivalent (mod m). Furthermore, we also
note that if T1 and T2 are Borel automorphisms
both compressible and not admitting Borel cross-
sections, then T1 and T2 can be shown to be orbit-
equivalent [49].
Let M(X) = M(X,B,m) be the group of all
measure preserving automorphisms on the space
(X,B,m). Two automorphisms inM are identified
if they agree a.e.
For a T ∈ M , let [T ] denote the full group of
T , ie, the collection of all τ ∈ M such that f.a.e.
x ∈ X , τ(x) = T n(x) for some integer n = n(x).
Note that τ ∈ [T ] iff orb(x, τ) ⊆ orb(x, T ) f.a.e
x ∈ X , or equivalently, there exists a decom-
position of X =
⋃
n∈ZAn (mod m) such that
X =
⋃
n∈Z T
nAn (mod m), T
nAn being pairwise
disjoint, and τ(x) = T n(x) for x ∈ An, n ∈ Z.
Let A ∈ B and τ ∈ [T ]. We shall write τ ∈ [T ]+
on A in case τ(x) = T n(x), where n = n(x) > 0
a.e. on A.
An automorphism T is called set periodic with
period k, for some positive integer k, if there exists
a partition P = {D1, D2, ..., Dk} of X associated
with T such that Di = T
i−1D1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k with
each Di ∈ B.
If every x is T -periodic with period k, then it is
clear that T is set periodic with period k. However,
it should also be noted that T can be set periodic
without having any periodic points.
An automorphism T ∈M(X) is called as a weak
von Neumann automorphism if
(1) T is set periodic with period 2n for all n ∈ N,
(2) A sequence {Dn(T ) = (Dn1 , ..., D
n
2n)}, n ∈ N,
exists of partitions of X associated with T
satisfying
(a) Dni = D
n+1
i
⋃
Dn+1i+2n , for i = 1, 2, ..., 2
n,
n ∈ N
(b) Dni = T
i−1Dni , for i = 1, 2, ..., 2
n, with
n ∈ N.
For x ∈ Dn1 , we shall call the finite sequence
(x, Tx, ..., T 2
n−1x) a fiber of length 2n. Two points
u, v ∈ X are said to be in the same fiber of length
2n if for some x ∈ Dn1 , u = T
kx, v = T ℓx, where
0 ≤ k, ℓ < 2n − 1.
If, in addition to the above (1) and (2), we have
(3) the σ-field generated by
⋃∞
n=1Dn(T ) is equal
to B (mod m),
T is called as a von Neumann automorphism.
This above condition (3) means that there ex-
ists a T -invariant set N ∈ B which is m-null
and such that the collection {D
⋂
(X − n) | D ∈⋃∞
n=1Dn(T )} generates the σ-algebra B restricted
to X −N , equivalently, the sets Dnk taken over all
n and all k separate the points of X −N .
For a weak von Neumann automorphism T , let
Pn(T ) denote the algebra generated by Dn(T ).
Then, Pn(T ) ⊆ Pn+1(T ) and the union P(T ) =⋃∞
n=1 Pn(T ) is again an algebra. For A ∈ B, write
d(A) = inf{m(A△B) | B ∈ P(T )}. If d(A) = 0 for
every A in a countable collection which generates
B then T is a von Neumann automorphism.
A DAM or Odometer V on {0, 1}N is a von Neu-
mann automorphism. Furthermore, any two von
Neumann automorphisms are isomorphic modulo
m-null sets.
Now, for ergodic T ∈ M(X) and ∀ A,B ∈ B
with 0 < m(A) = m(B), there exists a J ∈ [T ]
such that JB = A and J ∈ [T ]+ on B. Therefore,
if m(A) = m(B), then T
A
and T
B
are orbit equiv-
alent. Indeed, J when viewed as an isomorphism
from A to B establishes orbit equivalence (mod m)
between T
A
and T
B
.
Moreover, let T ∈M(X) be ergodic and let ǫ >
0 be such that ǫ < m(X). Then, there exists A ∈ B
such that A
⋂
TA = ∅ and m(X − A
⋃
TA) = ǫ.
Also, there exists a weak von Neumann automor-
phism ω ∈ [T ] such that [ω] = [T ].
Further, if τ1 ∈ [T ] is a set periodic auto-
morphism with period 2
K
such that D(τ1) =
(D1, ..., D2K ) is a partition of X associated with
τ1, then, for any ǫ > 0 and any set A ∈ B, there
exists a weak von Neumann automorphism τ1 ∈ [T ]
and an integer L > 0 that satisfy
(a) [τ1] = [τ2]
(b) D(τ1) ⊆ Dn(τ2) for all n ≥ L, where
{Dn(τ2) | n ∈ N} are the partitions of X
associated with τ2
(c) {x | τ2(x) 6= τ1(x)} ⊆ D2K ∈ D(τ1)
(d) for n ≥ L, we have m(A − A′n) < ǫ, m(A
′′ −
A) < ǫ, where A′n =
⋃
D where union is over
D′n = {D ∈ Dn(τ2) | D ⊆ A} and A
′′
n =⋃
D where the union is over D′′n = {D ∈
Dn(τ2) | m(A
⋂
D) > 0}.
Under the same hypotheses as above, if we have
in addition that τ1 ∈ [T ]+ on X \D2K for D2K ∈
D(τ1), then the weak von Neumann automorphism
τ2 ∈ [T ] and the positive integer L > 0 chosen
above also satisfy
(e) τ2 ∈ [T ]+ on X \DL2L for D
L
2L ∈ DL(τ2).
Furthermore, there exists an integer P > L, and
C ∈ B with m(C) < ǫ so that the following holds:
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(f) C(x, Tx) does not intersect DP2P ∈ DP for all
x ∈ X \ C, where for y ∈ orb(x, τ2) with
τ
n(x)
2 x = y and C(x, y) = (x, τ2x, ..., τ
n
2 x =
y), if n = n(x) ≥ 0 and also if C(x, y) =
(x, τ− 12 x, ..., τ
n
2 x = y), if n = n(x) < 0.
In other words, x and Tx belong to the same τ2-
fiber of length 2P for any x ∈ X \ C.
Then, given a free ergodic measure preserving
automorphism T on a SPS (X,B,m), there exist
two von Neumann automorphisms τ1 and τ2 in [T ]
such that (i) τ1 ∈ [T ]+ on X and (ii) [τ1] = [τ2].
Note that when two Borel automorphisms on
(X,B) are free and uniquely ergodic, then the or-
bit equivalence holds without discarding any set of
measure zero. Moreover, any two free Borel auto-
morphisms on (X,B), each admitting n invariant
ergodic probability measures, are orbit equivalent
whether we have n as finite or countable or un-
countable [42].
Now, we note that Krieger [50] introduces an in-
variant called the ratio set, r(T ), of automorphism
T as a closed subset of [0,∞) and r(T )
⋂
(0,∞) is
a closed multiplicative subgroup of (0,∞). Then,
if r(T ) = r(τ) = [0,∞) or if r(T ) = r(τ) =
{0}
⋃
{αk | k ∈ Z} for some α, 0 < α < 1, then T
and τ are orbit equivalent (mod m).
Extending these concepts to more general group
actions is possible. Then, let G be Polish group
of Borel automorphisms acting in a jointly mea-
surable manner on a SBS (X,B). Then, if X is
incompressible with respect to the G-action then
there exists a probability measure on B invariant
under the G-action [32].
However, note that further generalizations than
above are limited by counter examples.
For example, let G now denote the group of
all Borel automorphisms of an uncountable Polish
space with the property that the set {x | gx 6= x}
is of the first Baire category. Then, X is not com-
pressible.
The σ-ideal H
G
generated by G-compressible
sets in B is the σ-ideal of meagre Borel subsets
of X . Hence, X /∈ H
G
. However, every probability
measure on B is supported on a meagre set. There-
fore, a G-invariant probability measure on B does
not exist.
A flow on a SBS (X,B) is said to be non-singular
with respect to a σ-finite measure µ on B if µ(A) =
0 implies that µ(Tt(A)) = 0 for all A ∈ B and
t ∈ R. In case, µ(Tt(A)) = µ(A) for all t ∈ R and
A ∈ B, then we say that the flow preserves µ.
Let σ be a Borel automorphism on a SBS
(Y, C) and let f be a positive Borel function on
Y such that ∀ y ∈ Y , the sums
∑∞
k=0 f(σ
ky),∑∞
k=0 f(σ
− ky) are infinite. Let X = {(y, t) | 0 ≤
t < f(y)}. Then, X is the subset of Y ×R strictly
under the graph of f . Give Y ×R the product Borel
structure and restrict it to X . We then obtain a
new Borel space (X,B).
A jointly measurable flow Tt, t ∈ R, onX can be
defined as follows: a point (y, u) ∈ X moves verti-
cally up with “unit speed” until it reaches the point
(y, f(y)) when it goes over to (σ(y), 0) and starts
moving up again with unit speed. The term unit
speed means that the linear distance travelled in
unphysical time t equals t. The point thus reached
at unphysical time t > 0 is defined to be Tt(y, u).
For t < 0, T(y, u) is defined to be the point (y
′, u′)
such that T−,t(y
′, u′) − (y, u). The point (y, 0) is
called the base point of (y, u).
Analytically, the above is expressible as follows:
Let x = (y, u) ∈ X , and let t ≥ 0. Then, Tt(x) =
Tt(y, u) =
(
σny, t+ u−
∑n−1
k=0 f(σ
ky)
)
where n
is the unique integer such that
∑n−1
k=0 f(σ
ky) ≤
t + u <
∑n
k=0 f(σ
ky). If t < 0, the expression
is Tt(x) =
(
σ−ny, t+ u+
∑n
k=1 f(σ
− ky)
)
where
n is the unique integer such that 0 ≤ t + u +∑n
k=1 f(σ
− ky) < f(σ−ny). It is understood that∑− 1
k=0 and
∑0
k=0 are equal to zero. It is easy to
verify that Tt, t ∈ R is indeed a flow on X .
The flow Tt, t ∈ R as defined above is called
the flow (or special flow) built under the function
f with base automorphism T and base space (Y, C).
Note that a flow built under a function is a continu-
ous version of automorphism built under a positive
integer-valued function. We thus use the notation
of T f for the continuous case also.
Let the base space Y be Polish, the base auto-
morphism σ a homeomorphism of Y and f con-
tinuous on Y . Let us give Y × R the product
topology, where R has the usual topology. Let
X¯ = {(y, t) | 0 ≤ t ≤ f(y)} be the closure
of X ⊆ Y × R. Now, define g : X¯ → X by
g(y, t) = (y, t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ f(y) and g(y, t) = (σy, o)
if t = f(t). The map g identifies the point (f, f(y))
with (σy, 0). Let T be the largest topology on X
that makes g continuous. Under this topology, the
flow σf is a jointly continuous flow of homeomor-
phisms on X . The topology T can be shown to be
a Polish Topology.
Then, a jointly measurable flow is also jointly
continuous with respect to a suitable complete sep-
arable metric topology, the Polish topology, on X
which also generates the σ-algebra B.
Let Tt, t ∈ R be a jointly measurable flow (with-
out fixed points) on a SBS (X,B). Suppose we are
able to choose on each orbit of Tt a non-empty dis-
crete set of points with all these points taken over
all orbits forming a Borel set in B. Then, we sup-
pose that there exists a Borel set Y ⊆ X such that
∀ x ∈ X , the set {t : Tt(x) ∈ Y } is a non-empty
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and discrete subset of R. Such a subset is called a
countable cross-section of the flow.
Given a countable cross-section Y , we can write
X as the union of three Borel sets I, J , K as:
I = {x ∈ X | {t | Tt(x) ∈ Y } is bounded below},
J = {x ∈ X | {t | Tt(x) ∈ Y } is bounded above},
K = X − I
⋃
J . Let i(x) = inf{t | Tt(x) ∈ Y }
and j(x) = sup{t | Tt(x) ∈ Y }. Then i and j are
measurable functions, so that I and J , hence, also
K, are measurable sets.
Let us write S(x) = Ti(x)(x), x ∈ I. Then,
S(Tt(x)) = S(x) ∀ t ∈ R since i(Tt(x)) = i(x) − t.
The function S : I → I is again measurable, and
constant on orbits. Thus, if we restrict the flow
to I then the orbit space admits a Borel cross-
section, the image of I under S being the required
Borel cross-section. Similarly for J . Therefore, in
the set I
⋃
J , the flow is isomorphic to a flow built
under a function.
Then, there exists a Borel set Y ⊆ X such that
∀ x ∈ X the set {t | Ttx ∈ Y } is non-empty,
countable, and discrete in R, the flow is isomorphic
to a flow built under a function.
Thus, we note that every jointly measurable flow
(without fixed points) on a SBS admits a countable
cross-section.
Further, for a jointly measurable Tt, it can be
shown [39] that there exists a set B ∈ B such that
∀ x ∈ X the sets {t ∈ R | Ttx ∈ B} and {t ∈
R | Ttx /∈ B} have positive Lebesgue measure.
Then, it can further be shown [39] that every
jointly measurable flow Tt, t ∈ R (without fixed
points) on a SBS (X,B) admits a measurable sub-
set Y ⊆ X such that ∀ x ∈ X the set {t | Ttx ∈ Y }
is non-empty and discrete in R. Therefore, we see
that every jointly measurable flow (without fixed
points) on a SBS is isomorphic to a flow built under
a function.
For general finite measure preserving flows, this
result was proved in [51] while the refinement and
adaptation of that method to a descriptive setting
can be found in [39].
As a corollary, every jointly measurable flow
without fixed points on a SBS (X,B) is a flow of
homeomorphisms under a suitable Polish topology
on X which generates B.
Furthermore, for a jointly measurable flow Tt t ∈
R (without fixed points) on a SBS (X,B) and given
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there exists B ∈ B such that ∀ x ∈ X
the orbit of x spends the proportion α of time in B,
that is, ∀ x ∈ X , 1N Lebesgue measure {t | Ttx ∈
B, 0 ≤ t < N} → α as N →∞.
Note also that, under suitable modifications of
the definition of flow built under a function, these
results hold for jointly measurable flows with fixed
points as well.
Now, consider the notion of a flow built un-
der a function in a measure theoretic setting. Let
(Y,B
Y
) be a SBS equipped with a Borel automor-
phism τ : Y → Y and a σ-finite measure n quasi-
invariant for τ .
[A measure n on B is called quasi-invariant for τ
if n(B) = 0 iff n(τB) = 0 and is called conservative
for τ if n(W ) = 0 for every τ -wandering set W .]
Let f be a positive Borel function on Y such that
∀ y, the sums
∑∞
k=0 f(τ
ky) and
∑∞
k=1 f(τ
− 1y) are
infinite. Let Tt, t ∈ R be the flow τf built under
f with base space (Y,Y) and base automorphism
τ . It acts on Y f = {(y, t) | 0 ≤ t < f(y), y ∈ Y }.
Let ℓ denote the Lebesgue measure on R and
let the measure n on Y × R be restricted to Borel
subsets of Y f . Let us denote this measure on Y f
by m = mf .
The flow Tt, t ∈ R, when considered together
with the measure m is called the flow built under f
in a measure theoretic sense. We call the measure
n the base measure.
Now, [52], for any t ∈ R,
dmt
dm
(y, u) =
dn
(t+u)y
dn
(y) a.e.m.
where mt and nk are the measures m(Tt(.)) and
n(σk(.)) respectively and dmtdm denotes the LRN
derivative of a quasi-invariant measure [34].
Recall that the flow Tt, t ∈ R, is the flow σf .
Then, as a corollary, we also see that m is quasi-
invariant under the flow σf iff n, the base measure,
is quasi-invariant under σ. m is invariant under σf
iff n is invariant under σ.
Consider now a jointly measurable flow τt, t ∈
R, on a SBS (X,B) equipped with a probability
measure m quasi-invariant under the flow. Let us
also assume, for simplicity, that the flow Tt, t ∈ R,
is free. Then, the map t → τtx is one-one from R
onto the orbit {τtx | t ∈ R}. Thus, a Lebesgue
measure is definable on the orbit simply by trans-
ferring the Lebesgue measure of R to it. Let us
denote by ℓx this Lebesgue measure on the orbit
of x under the flow.
Then, m(A) = 0 iff ℓ({t | τtx ∈ A}) = ℓx(A) = 0
for m-almost every x. [A property which holds for
all x ∈ X except for those x in some m-null set is
said to hold m-almost everywhere.]
Let τt, t ∈ R, on (X,B,m) and Tt, t ∈ R, on
(X ′,B′,m′) be two non-singular flows. We shall
say that the two flows are metrically isomorphic if
there exist
(i) τt-invariantm-null setM ∈ B and Tt-invariant
m′-null set M ′ ∈ B′,
(ii) a Borel automorphism φ of X −M onto X ′−
M ′
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such that ∀ t ∈ R, and x′ ∈ X ′ −M ′ we have
(a) φ ◦ τt ◦ φ− 1(x′) = Ttx′,
(b) m(φ− 1(A′)) = 0 ⇐⇒ m′(A′) = 0, ∀ A′ ∈ B′,
(c) in case the flows are measure preserving we
require m ◦ φ− 1 = m′ in place of above (b).
Then, as shown in [53], every non-singular free
flow τt, t ∈ R, on a SPS (X,B,m) is isomorphic
to a flow built under a function in the measure
theoretic sense. The function which implements
the isomorphism preserves null sets.
On the other hand, the basic theorem of Am-
brose [51] states that: every free measure preserv-
ing flow on a SPS (X,B,m) is isomorphic to a flow
built under a function in the measure theoretic
sense. The function which implements the isomor-
phism preserves the measure. This holds also if m
is a σ-finite measure [54].
We shall end our rapid survey of the basics and
some results of dynamical systems at this point. In
surveying these mathematical developments, our
purpose was mainly to develop the required mathe-
matical vocabulary for the development of the Uni-
versal Theory of Relativity. We therefore stated
various definitions and quoted results without any
proofs. Details of proofs can be found in the refer-
ences provided.
However, we also note that the current mathe-
matical apparatus of the theory of dynamical sys-
tems will be found to be inadequate to “visualize”
physical situations. (See later.) Certainly, some
“new” conceptions will help here.
B. Physical aspects of the mathematical
formalism
In the absence of any relevant motivation, we
shall not consider higher than four dimensions
here, ie, we shall consider only three spatial di-
mensions and one time dimension. Moreover, we
shall adopt the approach of dynamical systems
and, hence, will treat time as a parameter of the
dynamical system.
Therefore, we assume that the physical world is
describable using a suitable 3-dimensional (topo-
logical) space, denoted by S. We shall call S the
physical space of Universal Relativity.
Next, we will assume that the cardinality of the
physical space S is c, ie, some suitable continuum
underlies the physical world. Further, we may ex-
pect the physical space S to be Standard Borel and
also to be a Lebesgue measure space. Physical ob-
jects are then Borel subsets of S with Borel mea-
sures as their physical properties.
But, the 3-space R3 cannot be the physical space
S of Universal Theory of Relativity because New-
ton’s theory, which assumes R3 to be the underly-
ing physical space, does not describe the physical
reality in its totality.
However, R3 is a Standard Borel Space and, un-
der our assumptions, the space S is related to R3
by a morphism, a continuous map, in the category
of all standard Borel spaces.
Next, let us recall that closed and bounded sub-
sets of R3 are compact. Consider the set K(R3)
of all non-empty compact subsets of R3. This set
can be equipped with the Vietoris topology that
is compatible with the Hausdorff metric δH . Since
R3 is standard Borel with the usual metric, so is(
K(R3), δH
)
standard Borel with the topology in-
duced by the Hausdorff metric.
The set F (R3) of all nonempty closed subsets
of R3 can be equipped with the σ-algebra E(R3)
generated by sets of the form
{
F ∈ E(R3) : F
⋂
U
6= ∅}, where U varies over open sets of R3. We
then obtain the Effros Borel Space
(
F (R3), E(R3)
)
of R3. The Effros Borel Space of R3, being Polish,
is standard Borel.
Moreover, consider the base B(R3) for the usual
topology of R3. Then, the Borel space of B(R3)
equipped with the Fell topology, ie, the pair of
B(R3) and the smallest σ-algebra containing the
Fell topology of R3, is exactly the same as the
Effros Borel Space of R3 because every compact
subset of R3 is closed and bounded.
The physical space, S, is then also related by
suitable morphism in the category of all standard
Borel spaces to the Polish space K(R3) equipped
with the Hausdorff metric δH .
Essentially, the physical space S of Universal
Relativity is some standard Borel space in the cat-
egory of all standard Borel spaces and we can uti-
lize this fact to our advantage.
As noted earlier, there exist hierarchies of Borel-
point classes as well as hierarchies of projective
sets for a standard Borel space. We are interested
in these classes and in measures defined on their
member sets.
Now, the space S is a Lebesgue Measure Space.
Measure preserving transformations of the physical
measure space (S,BS, µ) are therefore natural for
us to consider.
Let us call every member of a measurable par-
tition (mod 0) Υ of the physical measure space
(S,BS, µ) as a basic (physical) object. Then, any
Υ-set, also a standard Borel set in S, can be called
as a compound (physical) object. Classes of mea-
sures defined on these physical objects, mathemat-
ically well defined subsets of the space S, are their
physical properties then.
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We could then define the distance between phys-
ical objects as the Hausdorff distance between sets,
using for this association the standard Borel char-
acter of the space S. This is clearly doable in a
continuous manner using the morphism in the cat-
egory of all standard Borel spaces.
As any physical object moves, its physical move-
ment is then describable as the action of the trans-
formation of the space S on it.
But, what distinguishes the physical space S of
Universal Relativity from the other standard Borel
spaces in the category of all standard Borel spaces?
Up to isometries, a metric uniquely characterizes a
metric space. We therefore look for some property
which helps us uniquely determine the metric for
the physical space S.
Now, according to Einstein’s and Descartes’s
conceptions [9], physical objects are the regions of
space and vice versa. Then, the physical space it-
self (and its unique characteristic) must change as
the physical objects change.
Then, the unique identifying characteristic of
the physical space S is provided by the following
key physical situation:
• physical matter can be assembled (as well as
reassembled) in any arbitrary manner at any
location in the Universe.
But, this is equivalent to changing continuously
measurable partitions and Borel measures of the
physical measure space S. Perhaps [70], for this,
the spaceS needs to admit three, linearly indepen-
dent, homothetic Killing vectors which uniquely
determine its line element.
Now, a differentiable manifold X admits a Rie-
mannian metric, a type (0, 2) tensor such that for
all p1, p2 ∈ X , g(p1, p2) is symmetric and positive-
definite with g(p1, p2) = 0 if and only if p1 = p2.
A Riemannian pseudo-metric gˆ is also a type (0, 2)
tensor that is symmetric and non-degenerate with
gˆ(p, p) = 0 for all p ∈ X .
In general, a homothetic Killing vector captures
the notion of the scale-invariance of a differentiable
manifold. A manifold that conforms to some scale-
invariance is then required to admit an appropriate
homothetic Killing vector X satisfying
LXgab = 2Φ gab (1)
where gab is the metric, LX is the Lie derivative
and Φ is an arbitrary constant.
This is also the broadest, Sophus Lie’s, sense of
the scale-invariance leading not only to the reduc-
tion of the partial differential equations to ordinary
differential equations but leading, simultaneously,
also to their separation.
The Killing equation holds also for a Riemannian
pseudo-metric (Abraham & Marsden, [30], p. 144-
157). In general, we then demand that the space
admitting no special symmetries, that is no proper
Killing vectors, admits three linearly independent
homothetic Killing vectors. Such a metric, from
the broadest (Lie) sense, admits three functions
P (x), Q(y), R(z) of three space variables, conve-
niently called here, x, y, z, each being a function
of only one variable.
Based on the above considerations, we then de-
mand that the space S admits three independent
homothetic Killing vectors
X = (f(x), 0, 0) (2)
Y = (0, g(y), 0) (3)
Z = (0, 0, h(z)) (4)
for its line element
dℓ2 = gabdx
adxb (5)
Here the vectors X , Y and Z satisfy (1) with Φx,
Φy, Φz as corresponding constants.
As can be easily checked, the aforementioned de-
mand, that the continuum S admits three linearly
independent homothetic Killing vectors, leads us,
uniquely, to a three-dimensional space, S, admit-
ting the following line element [18] (after suitable
redefinitions of constants):
dℓ2 = P ′
2
Q2R2 dx2 + P 2Q¯2R2 dy2
+ P 2Q2R˜2 dz2 (1)
where we have P ≡ P (x), Q ≡ Q(y), R ≡ R(z)
and P ′ = dP/dx, Q¯ = dQ/dy, R˜ = dR/dz. The
vanishing of any of these spatial functions is a cur-
vature singularity, and constancy (over a range) is
a degeneracy of (1).
We will restrict to triplets of nowhere-vanishing
functions P , Q, R and will also not consider any
degenerate situations for (1).
Now, with coordinates x, y, z:
gˆab = diag
(
P ′
2
Q2R2, P 2Q¯2R2, P 2Q2R˜2
)
Then, for some two distinct points (x1, y1, z1) and
(x2, y2, z2) ∈ S and for each of which P ′ = Q¯ =
R˜ = 0, the line element dℓ2 = gˆabdx
adxb vanishes.
The gˆab is then a Riemannian pseudo-metric on
the space S.
Given P , Q, R, consider the equivalence class of
p ∈ S: gˆ[p] = {x : x ∈ S, gˆ(p, x) = 0} and also
the quotient space Supslopegˆ. Let A,B ∈ Supslopegˆ. Define
g(A,B) = gˆ(p, q) with p ∈ A and q ∈ B. Then, g
is a Riemannian metric on Supslopegˆ. On using P,Q,R
as coordinates on Supslopegˆ, we have
gab = diag
(
Q2R2, P 2R2, P 2Q2
)
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Since gˆ “lives on” S while g “lives on” Supslopegˆ,
we distinguish them. But, S and Supslopegˆ are home-
omorphic being of cardinality c, both. Hence, we
will, for brevity, write S for Supslopegˆ.
If T denotes the metric topology induced by the
metric g onS, more precisely onSupslopegˆ, then (S, T )
is an uncountable Polish space and, hence, of car-
dinality c. We then obtain a Standard Borel Space
(S,BS) where BS is the smallest σ-algebra of the
subsets of S containing T .
We have therefore a unique characterization of
the space S as a Standard Borel Space underlying
Universal Relativity.
Now, consider a subset of the space S such that
the derivatives P ′, Q¯, R˜ occurring in the pseudo-
metric gˆab are of “one fixed” sign for all of its
points. We could then choose P,Q,R as coordi-
nates within such a subset and could, then, write
gˆab = diag
(
Q2R2, P 2R2, P 2Q2
)
.
Hence, there are certain subsets of S, to be
called as the P-sets, on which the “restriction” of
the function gˆab is a function gab, ie, gab = gˆab|P .
A P-set of (S, gˆ) is never a singleton subset of S
when the functions P,Q,R are as chosen. The P-
sets are open sets of the Polish topology T of S.
Note also that every open set of (S, T ) is not a
P-set of (S, gˆ). For example, a proper subset of a
P-set of (S, gˆ) will not be a P-set of (S, gˆ) but it
can be an open set of (S, T ).
By construction, any two distinct P-sets, Pi and
Pj , i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are pairwise disjoint subsets
of S. Consequently, for a specific pseudo-metric
gˆab, the collection of all the P-sets provides us a
partition of the space S. Furthermore, each P-
set is, in own right, an uncountable Polish space
with gab = gˆab|P as a metric compatible with its
(induced) Polish topology.
Being members of the Borel σ-algebra BS of the
space S, the P-sets are (Borel) measurable and,
for specific gˆab, the collection of all the P-sets is
a measurable (mod 0) partition of the space S.
Hence, (Lebesgue) measures and signed measures
on S are natural for us to consider.
Therefore, to every class of (Lebesgue) measures
on such P-sets we can associate an appropriate
physical property of a material body. A material
body is always an extended body, since a P-set can-
not be a singleton subset of S.
The integration of measures on P-sets is always
a well-defined one, now for obvious mathematical
reasons. A chosen measure can be integrated over
a P-set and an average value of the measure always
obtainable. This average value of measure provides
then an “averaged quantity” characteristic of a P-
set. Evidently, this “average” is a property of the
entire P-set under consideration and, therefore, of
every point of that P-set.
A point of the P-set is then thinkable as hav-
ing these averaged properties of the P-set and, in
this precise non-singular sense, is thinkable as a
(newtonian) point-particle possessing those aver-
aged properties. In this non-singular sense, points
of the space S become point particles.
In essence, we have, in a non-singular manner,
then “recovered” the (newtonian) notion of a point
particle from that of our notion of a field - the
underlying continuum S.
Further, the “location” of this point-particle will
be indeterminate over the size of that P-set be-
cause the averaged property is also the property
of every point of the set under consideration. The
individuality of a point particle is then that of the
corresponding P-set.
Now, for a specific pseudo-metric gˆab, corre-
sponding collection Υ of all P-sets forms a mea-
surable (mod 0) partition of the space S. Recall-
ing our earlier terminology, a P-set is then a basic
(physical) object. Standard Borel Sets in BS which
are the unions of the members of the measurable
(mod 0) partition Υ, now the P-sets, are then the
compound (physical) objects.
Measures can also be integrated over compound
(physical) objects and a point of S in the object is
then also thinkable as a (newtonian) point particle
with these physical properties. Location of such a
point particle is then indeterminate over the size
of that object.
Then, the points of the underlying space S can
also be attributed (physical) properties averaged
over the size of an object. Hence, we can also rep-
resent an object under consideration as a (newto-
nian) point particle.
Therefore, we have the required characteristics
of Descartes’s and Einstein’s conceptions incorpo-
rated in the present formalism. Clearly, we have
then the non-singular notion of a point particle
as well as that of replacing any extended phys-
ical body by such a non-singular point particle.
Furthermore, physical bodies are also represented
as non-singular regions of the space S. Thence,
the union of the space and the physical objects is
clearly perceptible here.
Since (S,BS) is a standard Borel space, any
measurable, one-one map of S onto itself is a
Borel automorphism. Therefore, the Borel auto-
morphisms of (S,BS), forming a group, are nat-
ural for us to consider here. The Borel automor-
phisms of an uncountable Polish space have been
the subject of a recent study [36].
As any Borel automorphism of the underlying
space S maps a chosen P-set or a Υ-set to another,
the integrated properties may change and, conse-
quently, the (initial) characteristics of particle of
that P-set/Υ-set may change.
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[In this case, it is possible to adopt two views.
In the first one, the active point of view, we imag-
ine that a chosen P-set or an Υ-set itself changes
under the action of the Borel transformation of S
and “track” these changes. In the second, the pas-
sive point of view, we imagine that the action of
the Borel transformation of S only maps a given
(measurable) set onto (measurable) another and
track the changes in measures.
We note that the standard methods of the the-
ories of measures as well as dynamical systems
adopt the passive point of view and, it seems that
the active point of view is more closer to the physi-
cist’s ways of thinking [71].]
Now, the Hausdorff metric provides the distance
separating P-sets and also the distance separating
Υ-sets. This distance between sets will, hence-
forth, be called the physical distance between P-
sets or Υ-sets (extended physical bodies) because
“measurement in the physical sense” can be ex-
pected to yield only this quantity as distance sep-
arating physical objects.
Measure-preserving Borel automorphisms of the
space S then “transform” a given set maintaining
its characteristic classes of (Lebesgue) measures,
that is, its physical properties.
Non-measure-preserving Borel automorphisms
change the characteristic classes of Lebesgue mea-
sures (physical properties) of a set while “trans-
forming” it. Evidently, such considerations also
apply to even Υ-sets.
At this point, we note that a general automor-
phism of the space S has two parts: one measure-
preserving and one non measure-preserving. This
decomposition is maintained (mod 0). Hence, only
the measure-preserving transformations are stud-
ied in the theory of dynamical systems.
Then, a periodic Borel automorphism or peri-
odic component of Borel automorphism [32] of S
will lead to an oscillatory motion of a set while
preserving or not preserving its measures.
Therefore, a basic or compound (physical) ob-
ject undergoing periodic motion is a physical clock
in the present framework. Such an object under-
going oscillatory motion then “displays” the time-
parameter of the corresponding (periodic) Borel
automorphism since the period of the motion of
such an object is precisely the period of the corre-
sponding Borel automorphism.
Then, within the present formalism, ameasuring
clock is therefore any Υ-set or an object undergo-
ing periodic motion. An Υ-set or an object can
also be used as a measuring rod.
Therefore, in the present theoretical framework,
measuring apparatuses, measuring rods and mea-
suring clocks, are on par with every other thing
that the formalism intends to treat.
A Borel automorphism of (S,BS) may change
the physical distance resulting into “relative mo-
tion” of objects. We also note here that the sets
invariant under the specific Borel automorphism
are characteristic of that automorphism. Hence,
such sets will then have their “relative” distance
“fixed” under that Borel automorphism and will
be stationary relative to each other.
Now, in a precise sense, it follows that the posi-
tion of the point-particle (of averaged characteris-
tics of its associated Υ-set) is “determinable” more
and more accurately as the size of that Υ-set gets
smaller and smaller. But, complete localization of
a point particle is not permissible here since an Υ-
set is never a singleton subset ofS. The location of
the point particle is then always “indeterminate”
to the extent of the size of its Υ-set. Clearly, this
is an intrinsic indeterminacy that cannot be over-
come in any manner.
Furthermore, a Borel automorphism of the space
S results in a “relative motion” of Υ-sets and,
hence, of associated particles.
Clearly, therefore, a joint manifestation of Borel
automorphisms of the space (S,BS) and the in-
trinsic indeterminacy in the location of a point par-
ticle, of averaged measures on an Υ-set, is a can-
didate reason behind Heisenberg’s indeterminacy
relations in Universal Relativity.
This is in complete contrast to their probabilistic
origin as advocated by the standard formalism of
the quantum theory.
Notice now that, in the present considerations,
we began with none of the fundamental considera-
tions of the concept of a quantum. But, one of the
basic characteristics of the conception of a quan-
tum, Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, emerged
out of the present formalism.
Furthermore, in the present framework, we have
also done away with the “singular nature” of the
particles and, hence, also with the unsatisfactory
dualism of the field (space) and the source particle.
We also have, simultaneously, well-defined laws of
motion (Borel automorphisms) for the field (space)
and also for the well-defined conception of a point
particle (of averaged measure characteristics of an
basic or compound object). Then, the present for-
malism is a complete field theory.
[At this point, we then also note that the Borel
automorphisms of S need not be differentiable
or, for that matter, even continuous. Therefore,
the present considerations also use, for the most
fundamental formalism of physics, a mathemati-
cal structure different than that of the partial dif-
ferential equations. However, the question of the
physical significance of non-differentiable and non-
continuous Borel automorphisms of S is a subject
of independent detailed study.]
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Now, any act of measurement is conceivable here
only as a Borel automorphism of the space S.
Then, the measurability of any characteristic of
a point particle as defined in the present frame-
work is dependent on the “Borel automorphism”
to be used. But, from active point of view, that
Borel automorphism may change the very basic or
compound object of measurement.
[This above situation could as well be an ad-
ditional “reason” behind some indeterminacy rela-
tions. The demonstration of the proposed origin(s)
of indeterminacy relations will be the subject of an
independent study.]
The “determined or observed” characteristic of
a particle is a different conception here than its
intrinsic characteristics. The former notion clearly
depends on the Borel automorphism to be used
for the measurement. For example, the “observed
velocity or momentum” of a particle is a concep-
tion dependent on the notion of the physical dis-
tance changing under the action of a Borel auto-
morphism of S. Clearly, the coordination of the
underlying continuum S has nothing whatsoever
to do with the measurability here.
Importantly, dynamical systems on space S fol-
low the “strict determinism” in that the space co-
ordinates map uniquely under the action of a Borel
automorphism of the space S.
However, this is not the same “causality” as that
of the newtonian physical formulation.
The strict causality of newtonian conceptions
implies that given precise position and velocity of
a particle at a given moment and the total force
acting on it, we can predict the precise position
and velocity of that particle at any later moment
using appropriate laws.
In the present context, strict newtonian causal-
ity would have demanded that the position and the
velocity of a point-particle (definable in the present
formalism as a point of the Υ-set with associated
averaged measures) be exactly determinable. This
is of course not the situation for dynamical systems
on the space S.
But, reality independent of any act of observa-
tion, is then ascribable to the phenomena as well
as to the agencies of observation in this formalism.
Since physical objects are the regions of the space
and vice versa, the “existence” of the Υ-sets of
the space S is the “existence” of physical objects.
This “existence” of physical bodies is, obviously,
independent of any act of observation.
Moreover, as we have seen earlier, the role of
an observer in the proposed Universal Theory of
Relativity is very similar to that of an observer in
Newton’s theory. This should not be construed in
any manner as an “accidental” situation. This is
for the following reasons.
The proposed Universal Theory of Relativity
generalizes only the notion of force in Newton’s
theory to that of transformations of an appropri-
ate standard Borel space S and “derives” an ap-
propriate concept of (newtonian) particle from the
structure of this space.
The Borel automorphism of the space S is, ob-
viously, the cause behind an “observable effect” on
the Υ-set or, equivalently, a physical object. Con-
sequently, to associate a definite cause to a definite
effect has an appropriate sense in the present for-
malism and this “sense” is independent of an ob-
server. Any intervention by any, conscious or not,
observer is therefore not needed to “interpret” the
results of observations. Newton’s theory also had
the same role for an observer. It is a passive role
for an observer.
Objective reality of physical phenomena, that
the physical phenomena are independent of the act
of observation by an observer, is then the under-
lying philosophical or conceptual basis of the Uni-
versal Theory of Relativity. That the objective re-
ality of physical phenomena can be established in a
mathematically and physically consistent manner
should now be evident.
In summary, the proposed generalization of the
newtonian concept of force by that of a transforma-
tion of the Standard Borel Space S has the “gen-
uine potential” to provide us a physical theory of
everything. This generalization provides us, essen-
tially, a field theory that also contains a natural
non-singular notion of the (newtonian) particle to
represent physical bodies.
Moreover, measuring instruments and physical
objects are then treatable at par with each other
as a result of this generalization. This generaliza-
tion is also in complete conformity with the general
principle of relativity.
A fundamental implication of the quantum con-
ception is that of indeterminacy, Heisenberg’s in-
determinacy. The proposed generalization of the
concept of force leads us to a mathematical frame-
work that explains indeterminacy as arising out of
an intrinsic fuzziness of the concept of a particle
vis-a´-vis the field.
The present formalism, of the dynamical systems
of the underlying continuum S, is then, already, a
unification of the ideas of the quantum theory and
the general principle of relativity.
Surely, many details need to be worked out be-
fore we can test the proposed Universal Relativ-
ity. However, some general observations regard-
ing experimental tests can also be reached at the
present stage of our theoretical developments. It
is to such general experimentally important obser-
vations that we now turn to.
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III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
The proposed Universal Relativity rests on the
replacement of the newtonian concept of force at a
fundamental level with its “natural” generalization
- a transformation (Borel automorphism) of the
underlying continuum (the space S). It should,
of course, be clear now that this replacement is
that of the “total force” and not of its different,
individual, components.
Another issue of special relevance to physical
considerations is that of the physical construction
of reference frames.
Then, in “fixing” a physical reference frame, we
are restricting our attention to some specific Υ-set
of the space S and could be considering that it is
unchanging. Then, a subgroup of the full group of
Borel automorphisms of S keeping that reference
frame always invariant is natural for us to consider.
We could then be dealing with the quotient of the
space S by the reference frame.
However, there certainly exist Borel automor-
phisms of S which affect the chosen Υ-set. These
Borel automorphisms of this last type are precisely
those which affect the physical construction of the
chosen reference frame.
Now, any member automorphism of the afore-
mentioned subgroup could have other invariant
sets in addition to the Υ-set of the reference frame.
All these invariant sets of an automorphism have
their Hausdorff distance “fixed” and, hence, are
stationary relative to each other. By our physical
association, these invariant sets of the space S are
the, basic or compound, physical objects which are
at “rest” relative to each other.
Considerations of such type lead us, evidently,
to a description of the physical construction of a
reference frame in its totality and to a description
of motion of other objects relative to it.
For example, consider a point-object and its as-
sociated Υ-set. Let a Borel automorphism of the
underlying standard Borel space S be such that it
is measure preserving and (its action) leading to a
change in the Hausdorff distance of the point ob-
ject from that of a reference set (set A) which we
take to be an invariant set of that automorphism.
Also, let there be another set (set B), invariant un-
der the same automorphism, with respect to which
the Hausdorff distance to the chosen point-object
is unchanging. (See Figure 1.)
Physically, this above situation could, as an ex-
ample, represent “revolution” of the chosen point-
object around the set B that is at rest relative to
the reference set A.
The Borel automorphism in question describes
the “complete” trajectory of the point object in
FIG. 1: Circular Motion
this situation and, hence, “encodes” the entire in-
formation about all the forces that are needed to
determine the trajectory of the same point object
in theories using the notion of force.
[Because we limit ourselves here to only a gen-
eral discussion of physical issues arising in univer-
sal relativity, we shall not explicitly display the
Borel automorphism corresponding to the motion
described above. However, from the group prop-
erties of the automorphisms of the standard Borel
space, it is easy to see that such an automorphism
indeed exists.]
Clearly, this above is a consequence of the fact
that the universal relativity has only the law of
motion, the Borel automorphism of the space S,
that is also the “cause” of motion in it.
Hence, as a result of the above, if some observa-
tion is explainable in any theory using the concept
of force then, the same is explained in Universal
Relativity by treating the involved total force(s)
as corresponding transformation(s). In this way,
Universal Theory of Relativity incorporates theo-
ries that use the concept of force.
Essentially, a point object is a well-defined, non-
singular, notion in the mathematical framework of
Universal Relativity. If certain observation related
to a physical body is “explainable” by represent-
ing the involved material body as a point particle
whose motion is describable by assuming a total
force (equivalently, potential field) then, in univer-
sal relativity, the same “total force” is a Borel au-
tomorphism of the space S acting on the the Υ-set
of the imagined point particle.
Of course, we can adopt this above procedure of
“realizing” a Borel automorphism of space S for
only the cases which are “explainable” by theories
using the concept of force. This then also means
that there will be situations in Universal Relativity
which will not be explainable by theories using the
concept of force.
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FIG. 2: Torsion Balance
As a consequence of the above, experimental sit-
uations can arise for which Universal Relativity
can be tested in the laboratory.
Experimental tests of the Universal Theory of
Relativity will then have to be developed keeping
in mind this above. Specifically, we should then
look for or devise experimental situations for which
no “natural” explanations are offered by theories
using the concept of force [72].
One such possibility is provided by the torsion
balance experiment that has been the basis of
many important experimental results related to
gravity [55]. Therefore, as an example of the sit-
uations that can arise in Universal Relativity, we
discuss below the “explanations” for the outcomes
of the torsion balance experiment.
The Torsion Balance Test
Consider a torsion balance consisting of a thin
wire, hanging from one end at the roof, to which
a dumbbell is hanging from its exact middle at
the other end of the wire. Let the masses of the
dumbbell be m1 and m2, m1 = m2 = m.
Next, consider “external” masses m3 and m4,
m3 = m4 =M , attached to the ground, m3 placed
on one side and m4 on another side of the dumb-
bell, with common center at the wire.
As per Newton’s theory, there are two possible
situations in which no torque acts on the dumb-
bell of this assembly. The two such arrangements
of the masses are: 1] the external masses and the
dumbbell masses in one line and 2] line of the ex-
ternal masses being perpendicular to the dumbbell.
Then let the dumbbell be in its natural equilibrium
position in one of these states.
In Newton’s theory, “gravitational forces” are
supposed to act between the “external” masses
and the masses of the dumbbell, and these forces
“cause” the balance to “torque” when the “exter-
nal masses” are shifted, say, from the situation 1]
to the situation 2]. This holds irrespective of other
“couplings” of the masses, but these couplings can
nullify the “gravitational” torque. Therefore, we
then require and arrange that these other possible
couplings have been suitably eliminated or mini-
mized to adequate levels from the torsion balance
assembly of the above type.
Consequently, in Newton’s theory, the balance
will always be set into “oscillations” when the po-
sitions of the external masses are alternated be-
tween situations 1] and 2] above, say, by rotating
the external massesm3 and m4 about the common
center with the dumbbell.
In Universal Relativity, the balance setting into
oscillations is “explainable” by treating the in-
volved newtonian forces as corresponding transfor-
mations acting on the space S.
But, as per Universal Relativity, we also have a
transformation of the “external masses” from the
situation 1] to the situation 2] without the balance
ever getting torqued or set into oscillations. Uni-
versal Theory of Relativity therefore also predicts
that a “null outcome” is permissible for the exper-
iment of the above type.
Let us imagine a spherical shell whose outer sur-
face is as “frictionless” as permissible. The tor-
sion balance is situated “inside” the spherical shell
while the “external masses” are situated outside
the spherical shell. [The reason why spherical shell
is mentioned here is, evidently, due to its being an
“invariant” of the rotation map.]
Then, the motion of external masses can be such
as to not affect the interior of the spherical shell
and, hence, not affecting the state of the torsion
balance located inside it.
To see this above, let us first note that the tor-
sion balance is a compound object, to be referred
to as object 1, in the sense described earlier. The
external masses, together, are to be considered also
a compound object, object 2.
In our aforementioned experiment, we consider
that the “assembly” of the torsion balance and the
external masses is in one of the two “no torque
states” above at the beginning of the experiment.
Let Ti be the (initial) transformation acting on the
assembly of object 1 and object 2, above, ie, let the
assembly be acted upon by an initial Borel auto-
morphism Ti of the space S. The nature of the
initial Borel automorphism, although quite com-
plicated, may be left unspecified in our present
considerations.
Let Tr be the transformation of the rotational
motion of only the external masses and leaving the
torsion balance unaffected or the corresponding Υ-
sets invariant. That is, the map Tr acts on only
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the “external masses or world” to produce their
rotational motion.
The transformation acting on the assembly is
then the mathematical composition Tr ◦ Ti and
its action is such that only the external masses or
world external to balance revolve around the tor-
sion balance with the Υ-set of balance being an
invariant set of the composition Tr ◦ Ti.
Clearly, such a transformation is possible when
the external masses are sufficiently away from the
dumbbell masses so that the effects of rotational
motion of the external masses take time to “prop-
agate” to the dumbbell masses or when the dumb-
bell is well-shielded from all possible effects of the
rotational motion of external masses. Universal
Theory of Relativity then “guarantees” that the
torsion balance will not be torqued by the motion
of the external masses in the experimental situa-
tion imagined above.
Evidently, no “explicit calculations” using trans-
formations Ti and Tr are needed to reach this
conclusion. Universal Relativity always predicts
a “complete null effect” in this situation.
If, for the same experiment, we make the ex-
ternal masses move not along a circle but along
an elliptical orbit, there is to be no change in the
conclusion of Universal Relativity which predicts
a complete null effect even in this latter situa-
tion. Highly eccentric elliptic orbit for external
masses would imply “enhancement” of the new-
tonian non-null effect. An elliptical orbit for the
external masses could then be preferred over the
circular orbit for obvious reasons.
Then, in certain situations, the effect on torsion
balance is expected in Universal Relativity to be
“total null” if shielding of the balance is proper.
Then, if the external masses “rotate” around the
dumbbell masses sufficiently slowly, say, one revo-
lution in few minutes, and if we run the experiment
for a couple of weeks or months, so as to obtain
good statistic, we can test the Universal Theory of
Relativity. Of course, this test can only be con-
sidered successful if the “null result” is observed.
Else, in universal relativity, we shall be forced to
conclude that the “isolation” of the torsion balance
is not achieved.
Thus, if a torsion-balance experiment is suffi-
ciently carefully performed in the aforementioned
manner, we should be able to verify the possible
“null effect” prediction of the Universal Theory of
Relativity against that of the “certainly non-null
effect” of Newton’s theory.
We then note that certain, extremely high pre-
cision, torsion balance experiments are in use [73].
Any of these torsion balance assemblies can then
be employed to verify the “null effect” predicted
by the Universal Theory of Relativity.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Arthur Schopenhauer:
♣ All truth passes through three stages: First,
it is ridiculed. Second, it is vehemently opposed.
Third, it is accepted as being self-evident. ♣
Over the centuries, some fundamental concepts
that led Newton to his theory acquired the status
of being self-evident. Specifically, Newton’s con-
cept of force is embedded so deep into our think-
ing that we treat it as a self-evident concept. No
doubt, force is a very useful concept. But, while
adopting this concept, we are certainly required to
attribute to physical matter source properties that
generate the forces in question.
However, we then choose to ignore one funda-
mental limitation of this conception that the source
properties so attributed to physical matter cannot
find any explanations with the theory that uses the
(newtonian) concept of force.
Developments in Physics that took place over
the times since Newton formulated his mechanics
were, explicitly or implicitly, based on the concept
of force, developments in Quantum Theory not be-
ing any exceptional.
[The concept of potential energy is a “byprod-
uct” of the newtonian concept of force. From the
very beginning, quantum theory “assumed” this
conception of potential energy to formulate its var-
ious (Heisenberg) operators.]
Except, perhaps, for Hertz’s attempt [16] [p. 31]
when he felt the need to replace the concept of
potential energy by some suitable other, no one
attempted to generalize the concept of force; such
strong and gripping had been the influence of New-
ton’s thinking on the physicists.
In his attempts to incorporate the phenomenon
of gravitation within the overall framework of the
theory of relativity, Einstein reached the equiva-
lence principle and, for the first time, replaced the
concept of force by that of the “curvature” of the
spacetime geometry.
Although Einstein replaced the concept of gravi-
tational force by that of the curvature of spacetime
geometry, his formulation of general theory of rel-
ativity did not live up to his intentions. The same
conception did not work for other forces of Nature,
eg, for Coulomb’s force. Consequently, Einstein’s
mathematical formulation of a theory (of gravita-
tion) based on the principle of general relativity is
logically completely inappropriate.
Einstein had “realized” such problems with his
formulation of general relativity. That is perhaps
why he dubbed his equations of general relativity
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as “preliminary” equations. This obvious “failure”
led him to his numerous attempts at the Unified
Field Theory. Even these attempts failed.
Many others following the methods of Quantum
Theory systematically developed theoretical foun-
dations for the successful description of the micro-
physical world. For this purpose, definite but ad-
hoc rules of obtaining the Ψ-function were first
adopted and the predictions checked by ingenious
experimentations.
However, Einstein had, in his ways, also real-
ized that these developments in quantum theory
too were not entirely satisfactory from the perspec-
tive of some fundamental physical issues. He had,
time and again, warned [15, 16] us against the pit-
falls of the conceptions behind these theories - his
own formulation of general relativity as well as the
(probabilistic) quantum theory.
Here, we systematically built on Einstein’s afore-
mentioned intuition and replaced the newtonian
concept of force with its natural generalization as
a transformation of the underlying continuum. In
doing so, we were led to a natural unification of
the ideas of the quantum theory and those of the
general principle of relativity.
The formalism we developed satisfies one of the
foremost of the requirements of a genuinely univer-
sal theory of physics: that the constants of physics
“arise” in it through mutual relationships of phys-
ical objects and their values cannot be changed
without essentially destroying the underlying the-
oretical framework. It is also the Universal Theory
of Relativity that is in complete agreement with
the general principle of relativity.
In the last section, § III, we discussed an ex-
perimental test, the torsion balance test, of the
proposed Universal Relativity. In accordance with
the scientific methodology, it would then be worth-
while to let this and such tests decide whether the
proposed generalization of the newtonian concept
of force is really what is appropriate one to describe
the workings of the physical world.
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to S G Dani, M G Nadkarni, R V
Saraykar and V M Wagh for drawing my attention
to literature on theories of measures & dynami-
cal systems and, to N Krishnan as well, for many
helpful and encouraging discussions.
This work is dedicated to the memory of (Late)
Professor L K Patel who was a gifted relativist,
mathematician and, above all, a cheerful as well as
a kindhearted person.
[1] Ashtekar A (2004) Gravity and the Quantum,
Database: gr-qc/0410054 and references therein
[2] Wess J & Bagger J (1983) Supersymmetry and
Supergravity, (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton) and references therein
Ryder L H (1985) Quantum Field Theory, (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge)
Greene M B, Schwarz J H & Witten E (1987) Su-
perstring Theory, Vol I and II (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge) and references therein
Coleman S (1988) Aspccts of symmetry, (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge) and refer-
ences therein
Polchinski J (1998) String Theory, Vol 1 and 2
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) and ref-
erences therein
[3] See, for preliminary approach, Wagh S M (2004)
Heuristic approach to a natural unification of the
Quantum Theory and the General Theory of Rel-
ativity, Database: physics/0409057
Wagh S M (2005) Towards a Universal Theory
of Relativity, Gravity Research Foundation Essay,
submitted. Database: physics/0504036
[4] Heisenberg W (1949) The physical principles of
the quantum theory (Dover, New York)
[5] A classic reference is: Cartan E (1923) Ann. Ec.
Norm., 40, 325; (1924) 41, 1
[6] See, for example, Goldstein H (1950) Classical Me-
chanics (John Wiley & Sons, New York)
Kibble T W B (1970) Classical Mechanics (ELBS-
McGraw-Hill, London)
Sudarshan E C G & Mukunda N (1974) Classical
Dynamics - A modern perspective, (Wiley Inter-
science, New York)
[7] Bohr N (1928) Nature (Suppliment Series), April
14, 1928, p. 580
[8] Wagh S M (2004) Special Relativity as a Physical
Theory, Database: physics/0410124
[9] Einstein A (1968) Relativity: The Special and the
General Theory (Methuen & Co. Ltd, London)
(See, in particular, Appendix V: Relativity and
the Problem of Space.)
[10] Varadrajan V S (1988) Geometry of quantum the-
ory, Vol. I and II (Van Nostrand Reinhold Com-
pany, New York)
D’Espagnat B (1971) Conceptual Foundations of
Quantum Mechanics, (Benjamin, Mento Parla)
Jauch J M (1968) Foundations of Quantum Me-
chanics, (Addison-Wesley, Reading)
Also, Messiah A M L (1960) Quantum Mechanics,
(North-Holland, Amsterdam)
Richtmyer F K & Kennard E H (1942) Intro-
duction to Modern Physics, (MacGraw Hill, New
York)
71
[11] Bohr N (1970) in Albert Einstein: Philosopher Sci-
entist (Ed. P A Schlipp, Open Court Publishing
Company - The Library of Living Philosophers,
Vol. VII, La Salle)
[12] Jackson J D (1968) Classical Electrodynamics
(Academic Press, New York)
[13] Einstein A (1916) Annalen der Physik, 49. See,
also, (1952) The principle of relativity: A col-
lection of original papers on the special and gen-
eral theory of relativity. Notes by A Sommerfeld,
(Dover, New York)
[14] Dirac P A M (1970) Principles of Quantum The-
ory (Dover, New York)
Schweber S S (1966) An Introduction to Relativis-
tic Quantum Theory (Harper & Row, New York)
Corinaldesi E and Strocchi F (1963) Relativistic
Wave Mechanics, (North Holland, Amsterdam)
Tomonaga S (1962) Quantum Mechanics, (North
Holland, Amsterdam)
[15] Pais A (1982) Subtle is the Lord ... The science
and the life of Albert Einstein (Clarendon Press,
Oxford)
[16] Einstein A (1970) in Albert Einstein: Philosopher
Scientist (Ed. P A Schlipp, Open Court Publish-
ing Company - The Library of Living Philoso-
phers, Vol VII, La Salle)
[17] See, for example, Weinberg S (1972) Gravitation
and Cosmology (John Wiley, New York)
Misner C, Thorne K S &Wheeler J A (1973) Grav-
itation (Freeman, San Francisco)
Birrell N D & Davies P C W (1986) Quantum
Fields in Curved Space (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge) and references therein
Arnowitt R, Deser S & Misner C W (1962) in
Gravitation: An introduction to current research,
(Ed. L Witten, John Wiley, New York)
[18] Wagh S M (2004) Some fundamental issues in
General Relativity and their resolutionDatabase:
gr-qc/0402003
[19] See arguments in Wagh S M (2004) Einsteinian
field theory as a program in fundamental physics
Database: physics/0404028
[20] Feynman R P (1069) The character of a physical
law, (MIT Press, Cambridge)
See also, Feynman R P (1985) QED - The Strange
Theory of Light and Matter, (Princeton University
Press, Princeton)
Adler S L (2004) Remarks on the History of
Quantum Chromodynamics, Database: hep-
th/0412297 and references therein
[21] Bartotti B (1985) Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 16, No.
2, 83
de Broglie L (1964) The current interpretation of
wave mechanics (Amsterdam: Elsevier)
de Broglie L (1988) in Preface to Bohm D (1988)
Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania)
[22] See relevant articles in (1964) Relativity, Groups
and Topology, (Eds. C M De Witt & B S De Witt,
Gordon & Breach, New York)
DeWitt B S (1967) Phys. Rev., 160, 1113
DeWitt B S (1967) Phys. Rev., 162, 1195
DeWitt B S (1967) Phys. Rev., 162, 1239
[23] Dirac P A M (1948) Phys. Rev., 73, 1092
Dirac P A M (1950) Can. J. Math., 2, 129
Dirac P A M (1958) Proc. Roy. Soc., (London)
A246, 333
[24] See various relevant articles in Israel W & Hawk-
ing S W (1980) Eds. General Relativity: An Ein-
stein Centenary Survey, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge)
[25] See various relevant articles by Penrose R and oth-
ers (1975) in Quantum Gravity: An Oxford Sym-
posium, (Eds. C J Isham, R Penrose & Sciama D
W, Clarendon Press, Oxford) and references pro-
vided therein
[26] Connes A (1994) in Non-commutative Geometry,
(Academic Press, New York)
[27] Ko M, Ludvigsen M, Newman E T & Tod K P
(1981) Phys. Rep., 71, 51
[28] See, as a recent example, Fray S, Diez C A, Ha¨nsch
T W & Weitz M (2004) Phys. Rev. Lett, 93,
Database: astro-ph/240404
[29] Mach E (1872) Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des
Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit (Prag: J.G.
Calvelsche K. u. K. Universita¨ts Buchhandlung) -
English translation by Philip B. Jourdain (1911):
History and Root of the Principle of the Conserva-
tion of Energy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing
Company)
Mach E (1933) Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung
(Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 9te Auflage) - English
translation by Thomas J. McCormack (1960) The
Science of Mechanics (6th Edition with revisions
through the 9th German Edition. LaSalle, Illinois:
Open Court Publishing Company)
See, also, an interesting discussion about determi-
nation of mass in Narlikar V V (1939) Phil. Mag.,
(7) xxvii, 33
[30] See, for example, Hirsch M W & Smale S (1974)
Differential equations, Dynamical systems, and
Linear Algebra (Academic Press, New York)
Abraham R & Marsden J E (1967) Foundations of
Mechanics, (Benjamin, New York) and references
provided therein
Bedford T, Keane M and Series C (1991) Eds. Er-
godic Theory, Symbolic Dynamics and Hyperbolic
Spaces (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
[31] Joshi K D (1983) Introduction to General Topology
(Wiley Eastern, New Delhi)
Lipschutz S (1981) Theory & Problems of General
Topology (Schaum’s Outline Series, McGraw-Hill
International, Singapore)
[32] Nadkarni M G (1995) Basic Ergodic Theory (Texts
and Readings in Mathematics - 6: Hindustan
Book Agency, New Delhi)
Parthasarathy K R (1967) Probability measures of
Metric spaces (Academic Press, New York)
[33] Wagh S M (2004) On the continuum origin of
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations Database:
physics/0404066
[34] Halmos P R (1974) Measure Theory (Springer-
Verlag, New York)
Hewitt E and Stromberg K (1978) Real and Ab-
72
stract Analysis (Springer International Student
Edition, Narosa Publishing House, New Delhi)
Rohlin V A (1962) American Mathematical Soci-
ety Transactions (1) 10, 1 and references therein
Rohlin V A (1966) American Mathematical Soci-
ety Transactions, (2) 49, 171
[35] Srivastava S M (1998) A course on Borel Sets
(Graduate Texts in Mathematics, Springer, New
York) and references therein
[36] Clemens J D (2001) Ph D Thesis, University of
California at Berkeley
[37] Rylov Y A (2004), Database: physics/0411103
[38] Weiss B (1984) Contemporary Mathematics 26,
397-421
[39] Wagh V M (1988) Proc. Indian Acad. (Math. Sci)
98, 101-108
[40] Weiss B (1989) Contemporary Mathematics 94,
321-326
[41] Ornstein D S, Rudolph B and Weiss B (1982)
Memoirs of the Amer. Math. Soc. 37, No. 262 (end
of volume)
[42] Dougherty R, Jackson S, Kechris A (1994) Trans.
Amer. Math. Soc. 341(4), 193-225
[43] Rokhlin V A (1963) Generators in Ergodic Theory
I (Vestnik Leningrad Univ. Math, 26-32)
[44] Kechris A (1993) Lectures on Definable Group Ac-
tions and Equivalence Relations (Lecture Notes,
Caltech, Pasadena)
[45] Varadrajan V S (1963) Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.
109, 191-220
[46] Hajian A B and Kakutani S (1964) Trans. Amer.
Math. Soc. 110, 136-151
[47] Eigen S, Hajian A B, Nadkarni M G (1993) Proc.
Indian Acad. (Math. Sci) 103, 321-327
[48] Dye H (1959) Amer. J. Math. 81, 119-159
[49] Chaube P and Nadkarni M G (1989) Proc. Indian
Acad. (Math. Sci) 99, 255-261
[50] Krieger W (1970) On the Araki-Woods Asymptotic
Ratio Set and Non-singular Transformations on a
Measure Space (Springer Lecture Notes in Mathe-
matics, No. 160, Springer-Verlag, New York), 158-
177 and references therein
[51] Ambrose W (1941) Annals of Mathematics 42,
723-739
[52] Mathew J and Nadkarni M G (1982) in Statis-
tics and Probability: Essays in honor of C R Rao
(edited by G Kallianpur, P Krishnaih, J K Ghosh,
North-Holland, 493-504)
[53] Dani S G (1976) Amer. J. Math. 98, 119-163 and
references therein
[54] Krengel U (1968) Math. Ann. 176, 191-190; 182,
1-39.
[55] Cowsik R, Krishnan N & Unnikrishnan C S (2001)
Progress Report on the TIFR Equivalence Experi-
ment, (World Scientific)
[56] Nothing special about 4-dimensionality. It also ex-
isted with Newton’s theory. Differences between
these two theories, Newton’s theory and the The-
ory of Special Relativity, arise from only the kind
of transformations that are being used by them. In
fact, the 4-dimensional methods were discovered
by Minkowski much after Einstein formulated the
special theopy of relativity.
[57] Einstein expressed [16] (p. 75) his judgement of
his preliminary equations in the following words:
♠ The right side (the matter part) is a formal
condensation of all things whose comprehension
in the sense of a field theory is still problematic.
Not for a moment, of course, did I doubt that this
formulation was merely a makeshift in order to
give the general principle of relativity a prelimi-
nary closed expression. For it was essentially not
anything more than a theory of the gravitational
field, which was somewhat artificially isolated from
a total field of as yet unknown structure. ♠
[58] The exact statement used by Einstein [13] for this
purpose is the following:
♠ “So there is nothing for it but to regard all
imaginable systems of coordinates, on principle,
as equally suitable for the description of nature.
This comes to requiring that: -
The general laws of nature are to be expressed by
equations which hold good for all systems of coor-
dinates, that is, are covariant with respect to any
substitutions whatever (generally covariant).
It is clear that a physical theory which satisfies
this postulate will also be suitable for the general
postulate of relativity.” ♠
Notice the word “suitable” above. The strength of
the requirement of covariance depends upon the a
priori selection of geometrical quantities and can
be relaxed by adding more geometrical quantities
to the theory. It is therefore based on the Principle
of Simplicity, rather than being any fundamental
demand of the general principle of relativity. De
Witt in [22] (1967, Vol. 160) remarks “General rel-
ativity is concerned with those attributes of phys-
ical reality which are coordinate-independent and
is the rock on which present day emphasis on in-
variance principles will ultimately stand or fall.”
[59] To quote Pais [15] (p. 287) on this issue:
♠ “Einstein never said so explicitly, but it seems
reasonable to assume that he had in mind that the
correct equations should have no solutions at all
in the absence of matter.” ♠
[60] Clearly, any unbiased coin has the same probabil-
ity of toss as that for another unbiased coin. Then,
the spatial extension and the material of the coin
do not determine the probability for the toss of an
unbiased coin. In turn, the laws leading us to only
this probability of toss cannot determine these in-
trinsic properties of the coin.
[61] In this section, we will generally refer to books or
reviews wherein references to associated original
works can be found.
[62] For the same reasons, “explanations” of the classic
tests of Einstein’s theory of gravity can also be ex-
pected to be “different” when these fundamental
changes are taken into account.
[63] See [1] for an excellent historical account of related
conceptual developments.
[64] We could always question any chosen value of the
string tension. Why not any other value?
[65] The formalism of geometrodynamics is a concep-
73
tually consistent, rigorous, mathematical descrip-
tion of the “evolution” of a 3-geometry to a 4-
geometry of the spacetime. An appropriate “quan-
tization” of geometrodynamics therefore leads us
to a rigorous mathematical formalism for the cor-
responding quantum theory, that is, to the quan-
tum theory of geometry.
However, as we shall see later, the curvature of ge-
ometry is not a sufficiently general mathematical
concept that can substitute the physical, the new-
tonian, notion of force in its entirety. This fact
then severely limits the “physical usefulness” of
these approaches.
[66] Quantum Theory of Geometry, String Theory etc.
could, however, provide useful tools, just exactly
as the Euclidean geometry is for our ordinary, day-
to-day, purposes. But, Einstein’s vacuum as well
as (preliminary) field equations with matter, these
being based on physically inconsistent pictures,
cannot be “trusted” in any such sense.
[67] The constants of Nature then arise in Newton’s
theory from such relationships “postulated” to be
existing between physical objects.
[68] References to works mentioned by name in this
section can be found in [35].
[69] By descriptively ergodic it is implied that the anal-
ysis will not involve measure theoretic considera-
tions but will only be based on the concepts in-
volving Borel structure of the space X.
[70] At the present stage, we proceed here without the
proof for this statement.
[71] It is, perhaps, for such reasons that the current
methods of dynamical systems appear, to use too
strong a word here, “inadequate” for the visualiza-
tion of physical processes in the Universal Theory
of Relativity. The author has not yet given any
deeper attention to these issues. However, he be-
lieves them to be interesting and certainly worthy
of investigation.
[72] In this context, we also note the so-called Pioneer
Anomaly. The Doppler tracking of Pioneer 10 and
11 spacecrafts, both, apparently indicate an un-
modelled deceleration of order 10− 9 m/s2 in the
direction of the inner solar system. Notably, the
anomaly exceeds by five orders of magnitude the
corrections to newtonian motion predicted by Ein-
stein’s theory of gravity. Any modification of grav-
itation large enough to explain the anomaly is in
contradiction with the planetary ephemerides by
nearly two orders of magnitude. However, at the
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